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Daily Report

East Asia

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Daily Report

East Asia

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Indochinese Ministers Discuss Trade in Bangkok
BK2504011589 Bangkok THE NATION in English
25 Apr 89 p 1

[Excerpt] Vietnam's Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Co Thach will lead a high-powered delegation to Bangkok—straight from his crucial meeting with the Soviet leaders in Moscow this week.

Laos Minister for Economic Relations and Commerce Phao Bounnaphon will head Vientiane's team of economic policy planners to the Bangkok's symposium.

And senior representatives from Kampuchea will converge on Bangkok this Friday (April 28) to attend the first conference of its kind to discuss trade and investment opportunities in Indochina once a political settlement is reached.

Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan will deliver the keynote speech to kick off the unprecedented one-day discussions which will also hear comments and questions addressed to the Indochinese leaders from the leading region's and Bangkok-based business leaders.

More than 500 business leaders and diplomats as well as interested persons have registered to participate in the conference to be held at the Dusit Thani Hotel beginning at 8.00 am.

The list of several hundred registered participants reads like a Who's Who of the region's top business and diplomatic circles.

Mr Kon Thappharangsi, Thailand's minister in charge of investments and tourism, will deliver the luncheon speech.

The symposium is organized by THE NATION; THE ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL and the Board of Trade of Thailand.

The Vietnamese, Laotian and Kampuchean representatives are expected to make major announcements on how they plan to turn their war-ravaged region into a marketplace—a policy strongly supported by Thai Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan.

The morning session will be devoted to speeches from the Indochinese leaders—the first to be addressed directly to a large audience from the international business community.

The afternoon session will be devoted to comments and questions from a panel of top local and foreign business leaders on how they view trade and investment opportunities in Indochina.

Two hours will be set aside for questions from the more than 500 participants (submitted through the moderators) so that they can directly seek clarifications and explanations from the Vietnamese, Laotian and Khmer leaders.

Again, this will be the first time that businessmen from this region have a chance to meet and pose questions to the policy makers from Indochina in a closed-door session. [passage omitted]

SRV's Nguyen Co Thach Arrives
BK2704085789 Bangkok THE NATION in English
27 Apr 89 Afternoon Edition p 1

[Text] Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach this morning arrived in Bangkok from the Soviet Union to participate in a symposium on the trade prospects in Indochina jointly organized by THE NATION, THE ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL, and Thailand's Board of Trade.

During his stay, he is also expected to meet Japanese Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita, who will be visiting Thailand April 29 - May 2, and Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila.

Thach is to give a speech at the symposium on "Indochina: From War Zone to Trade Zone," at Dusit Thani Hotel tomorrow.

Nguyen Co Thach on PRC Stance
BK2704090989 Bangkok THE NATION in English
27 Apr 89 Afternoon Edition p 2

[Text] Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach said this morning he believes China will stop supplying arms to the Khmer Rouge when the last Vietnamese troops pull out of Kampuchea by the end of September.

He said Beijing has declared its intention to stop arms supplies to the Khmer Rouge after the Vietnamese troop withdrawal.

He said he also believes that Beijing would not let the Khmer Rouge, which has been accused of killing hundreds of thousands of people during its rule from 1975 to 1978, return to power in Kampuchea as stated by the Chinese.

"I think a great country like China will honour its commitment," he told reporters as he arrived at the Don Muang Airport from the Soviet Union. "A great country would not fool a small country."

China is the main arms supplier of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), which comprises three Khmer factions of which the strongest is the Khmer Rouge. The coalition government has been fighting with the Vietnamese troops and Hanoi-backed People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK).

Vietnam invaded Kampuchea in December 1978 to topple the Khmer Rouge and there're still about 70,000 troops inside the country.

But Thach said the planned pullout is linked to the agreements reached at earlier talks in Jakarta, which include the cessation of foreign arms supplies to the CGDK.

In the April 5 announcement of troop withdrawal, Vietnam said the PRK reserves the right to call for "international assistance" if foreign countries still provide arms to the CGDK.

Commenting on next week's planned meeting between CGDK leader Prince Norodom Sihanouk and PRK Premier Hun Sen in Jakarta, Thach sounded uncertain as to whether the talks would provide breakthrough on the power sharing between the CGDK and PRK after the Vietnamese withdrawal.

But he said Sihanouk still sticks to his own peace proposals which call for, among others, the dismantling of the PRK.

"It's something conjured up in a dream," he told the reporters. "In reality it could not work."

"Everything can be negotiated, except the dismantling of the PRK," he said.

He said Canada, Poland and India have been "positive" toward the Vietnamese proposal on reviving the three countries' role in the International Control and Supervision Commission used during the implementation of a 1954 Geneva agreement on Kampuchea to monitor the Vietnamese withdrawal and subsequent agreements.

But he said details have yet to be discussed on how the commission is going to function.

Vietnam has proposed the inclusion of Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas and a personal representative of the UN secretary general in the commission.

Thach said the United Nations, which recognizes the CGDK as the sole legitimate government of Kampuchea, should not have a role in supervising the Vietnamese withdrawal. But he said the UN might be acceptable if the Kampuchean seat in the world body is left vacant.

The Vietnamese foreign minister arrived in Bangkok this morning after visiting the Soviet Union. He is to attend a symposium on the trade prospects in Indochina, jointly organized by THE NATION, THE ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL and the Board of Trade of Thailand.

He said the Soviets are happy with the Chatchai administration's initiatives to turn the war zone in Indochina into a trade zone, adding that the effort is in line with the Soviet Union's desire to see peace in the world, especially in Southeast Asia.

On being questioned by reporters on his discussions with Soviet leaders, Thach said his talks were only on bilateral relations and regional issues.

Nguyen Co Thach Views UN Role

BK2804030589 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English
28 Apr 89 pp 1, 3

[Excerpts] The United Nations can have a role in the International Supervision and Control Commission [ICC] in Kampuchea only if it declares the Khmer seat at the UN and the ASEAN resolution on Kampuchea "non-valid," Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach said yesterday.

Mr Thach arrived in Bangkok from New Delhi and Moscow to participate in today's symposium on trade in Indochina.

The one-day symposium is being organised by THE NATION and the ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL newspapers.

In its April 5 declaration announcing its withdrawal from Kampuchea by September this year, Vietnam said it agreed the ICC would comprise of Canada, Poland and India.

It also said that Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas and a personal representative of UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar could "participate" in the ICC. [passage omitted]

Clarifying the role of Mr Alatas and the UN Secretary-General's personal representative, Mr Thach said:

"Personally Mr Alatas could not bring heavy artillery to the commission."

"As for the personal representative of the UN Secretary General, he can have small arms and not heavy artillery."

Vietnam accepts Mr de Cuellar's personal representative because he has nothing to do with the [ASEAN] resolution, Mr Thach added.

"There's room for negotiation in the sense that the UN declares non-valid the seat of Kampuchea and declares non-valid the resolution on Kampuchea," he said. [passage omitted]

Commenting on UN participation favoured by the ASEAN nations, Mr Thach said:

"As long as the UN reserves the seat of Kampuchea to Pol Pot, and as long as it maintains its one-sided resolution on Kampuchea, there's no room for the UN in this question."

Mr Thach said the countries named in Vietnam's proposed ICC have responded positively and are exploring the procedures, determining finance, composition and arms.

However, one senior Foreign Ministry official who requested anonymity said Thailand had learnt that Poland and Canada expressed reservations over joining the ICC.

The condition that Mr Thach raised for a UN role in the international control mechanism is not valid, the official said.

"One needs to differentiate between the function of the UN secretariat and members. As far as the membership and the seat of Kampuchea are concerned, it's up to the members to decide," he said.

"For a resolution that has been passed, there's no such practice of declaring it void. But new resolutions can be passed every year to reflect new reality. There should be a new resolution if there's no foreign troops."

Mr Thach, commenting on the holding of an international conference on Kampuchea—which he and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze called for during their recent meeting in Moscow—said the participants, venue and timing of the conference are still subject to negotiation.

Mr Shevardnadze and Mr Thach called for the convening of the conference before the September withdrawal.

"We would like as many countries as possible to participate in the conference, including China," Mr Thach said.

Nguyen Co Thach To Meet Sitthi
BK2804052189 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English
28 Apr 89 p 3

[Text] Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila said yesterday that he will meet his Vietnamese counterpart, Nguyen Co Thach, on Monday [1 May].

Earlier, ACM [Air Chief Marshal] Sitthi had said that there was no reason for him to meet Mr Thach who arrived in Bangkok yesterday to attend a symposium on Indochina trade starting today.

A source in the Foreign Ministry said ACM Sitthi changed his mind because he would like to know if Mr Thach had "something new" to say about the Kampuchean problem.

Indian Deputy Foreign Minister Natwar Singh is scheduled to meet ACM Sitthi today to brief him on Mr Thach's talks with Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in New Delhi before his visit to Bangkok.

The source said Mr Thach had approached India about joining the International Supervision and Control Commission.

The source said that though India had already accepted the invitation to join the commission, she still wanted to sound out Thailand's opinion on the matter.

Chatchai, Others Comment on Trade
BK2804103189 Bangkok THE NATION in English
28 Apr 89 Afternoon Edition p 1

[Report on address by Thai Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan to a conference: "Indochina: Turning a War Zone Into a Trade Zone," held at the Dusit Thani Hotel in Bangkok, 28 April]

[Text] Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan today, while stressing that "there must not be two Southeast Asias," called for all countries in the region to take part in economic cooperation in a common effort to ensure peace and share prosperity in the bright future of the area.

Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach quickly responded by proposing that Thailand be "the coordinator of our common efforts" in future economic cooperation.

In his keynote address at the conference on "Indochina: from war zone to trade zone," at the Dusit Thani Hotel, Premier Chatchai said there can be no true winner in any war and common prosperity is "the best guarantee of peace."

"My earnest desire is to help bring prosperity to the whole region," he declared.

"I long for the day when Thailand and ASEAN together with Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam can become closely linked to one another through ties in trade investment, communications and telecommunications.

"And I hope I will see the day when all Southeast Asians can sit together to discuss what they can do for each other or what they can accomplish in joint endeavours with one another," he added.

Thach, in his address to the conference, agreed with Premier Chatchai that all countries in Southeast Asia should put their heads together in discussing future regional cooperation in both economic and political fields.

He said a "consultative body" could be established for Southeast Asian countries to hold discussions at regular intervals, preferably at the ministerial level; and a "secretariat" of this regional body could be set up to study

and conduct research on various areas of regional cooperation, such as banking, trade, customs clearing, in order to lay the groundwork for agreements on regional cooperation.

"Our dream is great, so the spirit that animates us all must be equally serious. For the eyes of the world are on us, with hopes and expectations that some working scheme for regional economic cooperation be found," Thach added.

He also proposed that Thailand be the "coordinator" of the efforts in organizing future regional economic cooperation.

Commenting on Premier Chatchai's address, Thach said what the Thai premier stated gave him "confidence" in Thailand's policy toward Indochina.

"I am now confident of his (Premier Chatchai) determination to implement his policy," he said.

Yuk Na Thalang, chairman of the Board of Trade of Thailand, told the conference the transformation of Indochina from a war zone to a trade zone "has been done."

He also reported that Premier Chatchai's friendly and far-sighted policy toward Indochina has been "warmly and widely welcomed" from the Thai private sector, Indochina and the rest of the world.

Yuk will lead a high-level Thai private sector team for a tour of Vietnam from May 21-28.

Suthichai Yun, editor of THE NATION, noted in his address that Southeast Asia is indeed "writing a new chapter of history" of peace and prosperity. The conference, organized jointly by the Board of Trade, THE ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL and THE NATION, he said, symbolizes a new line of thinking, a new optimistic outlook for the future of Southeast Asia.

Laotian Commerce and Economic Relations Minister Phao Bouonnaphon said his country is ready to welcome foreign investment and looks forward to cooperating with all countries in Southeast Asia in economic development of Laos and of the region.

He said Laos has received investment applications from more than 70 foreign firms and more can be accepted.

Lao Minister Addresses Seminar
BK2804102089 Bangkok THE NATION in English
28 Apr 89 Afternoon Edition p 2

[“Excerpts” of Speech Delivered by Lao Minister of Trade and Foreign Economic Relations Phao Bouonnaphon at 28 April Bangkok Conference on “Indochina: Turning a War Zone Into a Trade Zone”]

[Text] Since its establishment in 1975 the Lao PDR [People's Democratic Republic] has been implementing its foreign policy of peace and friendship with all countries in order to have time to develop the country after a

long and vigorous struggle for the cause of national liberation. In its road of national reconstruction, Lao PDR continues to expand relations with Vietnam, Kampuchea, USSR and other socialist countries on the basis of equality and mutual assistance. At the same time we are in favour of maintaining and developing the existing relations with the Western countries, developing countries and particularly with its neighbouring countries. Due to the just mentioned policy, the economic relations between Lao PDR and foreign countries have been increasingly expanded and we are able to obtain foreign cooperation, foreign investment from friendly countries and international organizations and develop trade with many countries. The international cooperation and foreign trade help us a lot to heal wounds of war, to rehabilitate the economy, to expand the culture, to improve the living standards of our people, to build some initial technical, transport and communications and so on. It also makes the Lao economy to join step by step the world economy. In respect of Lao-Thai cooperation during the past 13 years, even though political environment and other events damaged from time to time the long and good tradition between the two peoples and created increasingly the tense atmosphere. [sentence as published] But the transport of electricity from Lao PDR towards Thailand or vice versa still remains without any difficulty. This shows that one cannot separate the brotherly friendship between Lao and Thai people.

The meeting between H.E. Kaysone Phomvihan and H.E. General Chatchai Chunhawan has resulted in a joint communique on 24th November 1988 as an additional important factor for safeguarding peace and cooperation between Lao PDR and Thailand. It will contribute also to promote peace, stability, peaceful co-existence and cooperation in this region.

The setting up of Lao-Thai friendship association and the committee for economic, scientific, cultural and technical cooperation, the joint committee for solving border dispute, the agreement for building Mekong river bridge, the exchange of visits of government and provincial officials, businessmen and tourists will strengthen good understanding. The trade and economic cooperation between the two countries have been expanded, business joint-venture has been increased. Such policy responds correctly to the needs and benefits of our two peoples.

In the past two years, based on new economic policy, we have been carrying out economic reforms according to New Economic Mechanism and Economic Restructuring in which we have new plan to adjust our foreign economic relation mechanism. We have implemented the policy for stimulating production, promoting export, increasing imports, expanding services, liberalizing trade, practising market price system, having better correlation between goods and money and developing the market outlets. All economic sectors such as state,

state-private, private, collective and individualist are encouraged to actively participate in production and trade activities according to the policy and regulations of the government.

We have also the policy of understanding different forms of cooperation with foreign countries in order to potentially combine our resources which are naturally endowed with large unexploited land and forest and raw materials with the capital, lessons and technology from foreign countries. This is to develop the least developed country with a stable growth.

Now, the Lao government is mobilizing all capital assets to realize the second five-year plan (1986-1990) whose priority programmes are as follows:

- attainment of food self-sufficiency, including food security.
- forestry development, environment protection, gradual reduction of slash-and-burn practice in agriculture aimed at finally liquidating this destructive practice to the environment.
- production of more consumer goods for internal demand and export.
- improvement of the transport and communications infrastructure.
- reform the education system.

In the main policy of implementing the said programme, we emphasize on the promotion of small and medium programmes in order to gradually step up to the big ones. At present, the economic structure in Laos is composed of agriculture, industry and services.

To expand the foreign economic cooperation in legal aspects, the Lao government has promulgated law of investment in Lao DPK last July.

The importance of this law of investment is that the Lao government welcomes foreign capital investment on the basis of respect of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lao PDR. There are three forms of investment:

- business by contract,
- join-venture and
- 100 percent ownership.

The government of the Lao PDR issued on 21th March 1989 a decree concerning the implementation of the said law which has laid down the detailed measures so as to really make the investment effective on the basis of equality, mutual benefits, respect of independence.

The two important documents of our government have been ratified by the People's Supreme Assembly indicating that the government of Lao PDR guarantee all protection of foreign capital assets in Lao PDR and such capital assets will not be confiscated by the state, profits from business could be transferred out of the country or reinvested. The Lao government authorizes foreigners to invest in various economic sectors starting from agriculture, forestry, irrigation, communication, transport, industry processing, construction to industrial and services sectors.

At present, there are more than 70 foreign companies which have applied for investment in Lao PDR in various forms as I have mentioned above. Sectors which have attracted foreign investment are: agricultural product processing, forestry exploitation and processing, mining, finished products, trade, banking, air transport, tourism, hotel and services industry.

PRK Minister Gives Address

BK2804110089 Bangkok *THE NATION* in English
28 Apr 89 Afternoon Edition p 2

[“Excerpts” of Speech Delivered by Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Kong Sam-ol at 28 April Bangkok Conference on “Indochina: Turning a War Zone Into a Trade Zone”]

[Text] Kampuchea has great potential in agricultural production, forestry and animal husbandry and there is no shortage of agricultural land. Yet, at the present moment, we only exploit two-thirds of the land reclaimed before the war and there are more than 1 million hectares still unexploited. The present aim is to restore production and per capita income to the prewar level. 1989's GNP represents about 70 percent of the 1968's and per capita income is still lower due to the population's increase of 20 percent over 1968. With this rate of population increase, it is necessary to raise production capacities by two-fold compared to the prewar years and three-fold as compared to the present. More than 80 percent of the population are farmers who engage in traditional agriculture which depends entirely on natural climatic conditions due to the fact that the level of scientific and technical application is still low. Irrigated land occupies only 5-7 percent of the total area cultivable. The average yield is around 1.3 tonnes per hectare.

For the past ten years, we have increased the area of intensive cropping and the yield has been from 3 to 4 tonnes per hectare. But the area of intensive cropping represents a small proportion.

Rubber plantations cover an area of 52,000 hectares out of which 43,000 are restored for latex production with low yields in dry latex of 35,000 tonnes and needs foreign funds for full exploitation.

Animal husbandry is a family activity lacking modern techniques.

Fish and forestry exploitation still offers many possibilities.

Manufacturing industries have just started to develop around the 1960's concentrating on small-and medium-scale production. After Liberation Day we restored a number of factories but these are operating below capacity due to the machinery's old condition, lack of raw materials, spare parts, and energy. A substantial portion of the agricultural products have been domestically utilized and if exported are not processed or transformed.

Concerning the potential in mining, present prospects suggest some possibilities. But still there are constraints to overcome such as the availability of technology and funds. We have been concentrating and restoring factories which use raw materials in the country as well as cottage industries and handicrafts. Problem that should be solved first is electricity, especially hydroelectric plants which can be the key to the industrialization plan.

Kampuchea has a network of roads around Tonle Sap Lake which links many different regions of the country. There are two main railway lines connecting the capital city to the rice rich provinces in the west and to the seaport. Transportation by road and water remains to be restored and improved due to damage done during the war and the lack of maintenance. In the future, it is inevitable that a large portion of funds have to be apportioned to this sector.

After the liberation, the rate of population increase has been faster than the food supplies available, particularly for those who live in the cities. Population distribution, nevertheless, remains uneven nationwide.

National resources and infrastructure in Kampuchea can offer possibilities for restoration and development. Available arable land can feed a population of 12 to 13 million in 2005. Land suitable for rubber plantations and rice cultivation still offer possibilities for expansion. The overall climate of the country is conducive to animal husbandry. Resources in fish and forestry can meet domestic and external demand. There are many possibilities in constructing hydro-electricity plants. Only a small proportion of the road network has been utilized. Factories have not been fully in operation yet due to lack of machinery, equipment, energy and raw materials. Labour is abundant and can be trained to be receptive to modern technology. Possibilities in developing tourism are large because of the Angkor temples and other places of curiosity.

These above potentials can offer many possibilities in the social and economic development in the future.

Throughout our own development, we have gathered many experiences as well those from the countries which have progressive economic development as a basis on

which to continue to build our own economy at the present and in the future. We are contemplating on improving successively and gradually infrastructure and management policy in order to increase efficiency and stability. As a matter of fact, in 1988 and early 1989 we have made amendments to the constitution which previously included only 3 forms of economy (state, collectivity and family) to include two more: private and joint venture. Together we now have five forms of economy. We believe it is necessary to have a private sector and joint venture in order to mobilize capital, whether individuals or groups are involved.

In April 1989 we promulgated five new laws: namely land use and ownership, farmer mutual help, cottage industry and handicraft and private transportation to suit our country's real conditions. In March 1989 the government passed a decree law on foreign investment in which we encourage international agencies, foreigners, overseas Kampucheans who wish to invest capital or modern technology in Kampuchea based on the respect of independence, sovereignty, legislation and mutual interest. Ownership of capital and other rights of the investor will be guaranteed and favourable conditions facilitated. Investment can be made in all aspects of the national economy especially agriculture, animal husbandry, extensive economic projects, production of goods for export or production of import substitute goods, modern technology and high skilled labour, services generating foreign currencies; domestic labour, raw material and natural resources; infrastructure. The form of investment can be joint venture, foreign owned venture and contractual. All capital and assets of the investor are fully guaranteed against requisition, confiscation and nationalization. Although the draft of this foreign investment decree law came rather late in the past, there have been many overseas Kampucheans, foreigners, foreign companies who have successively come to explore and propose their intentions in investment. In order to assure further implementation, our government is working on insurance and labour law presently.

South Pacific Showed 1988 Economic Recovery
*BK2404005089 Hong Kong AFP in English 2036 GMT
23 Apr 89*

[Text] Manila, April 24 (AFP)—The economies of most South Pacific countries showed signs of recovery last year after discouraging figures in 1987, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) said Monday [24 April]. The average gross domestic product (GDP) of Fiji, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Western Samoa hit 3.4 percent in 1988 compared to 1.2 percent growth in 1987, the ADB said in its annual report, released here Monday.

The report, which was released ahead of the bank's annual meeting in Beijing from May 4 to 7, said Fiji showed the biggest improvement. It recorded a two percent GDP growth last year compared to a minus

figure of 7.8 percent in 1987. The increase was attributed to increased sugar production, tourist arrivals and private investment, the ADB said.

The GDP of the Solomon Islands, which declined by 5.1 percent in 1987 also grew to two percent in 1988 due to higher output and prices of fish, palm oil and timber.

Papua New Guinea however saw its GDP growth drop from 4.8 percent in 1987 to 4.1 percent due in part to the poor performance of major agricultural exports such as sawn timber, rubber, cocoa and copra.

Tonga and Western Samoa both suffered 1.9 percent GDP declines in 1988 from 1.4 percent growth in 1987 as a result of declining agricultural production caused [by] severe drought and lower prices of their export commodities.

Increased demand caused by economic recovery has spawned inflation in the island nations, with an average 8.9 percent rate posted in 1988 compared to 4.1 percent the year before. Some countries posted double-digit inflation.

Inflation hit 10 percent in both Kiribati and Tonga while the Solomon Islands registered a 19.3 percent inflation rate, the ADB report said.

The bank predicted that the South Pacific nations would "improve their economic growth in 1989," due to more tourists arrivals and higher prices for their primary commodities. The ADB said their economies would adjust to the damage caused by cyclones and political turmoil in 1987, when the governments of some of the countries changed.

Japan

Position on FSX Project Clarified

OW2704153689 Tokyo KYODO in English 1455 GMT
27 Apr 89

[Text] Tokyo, April 27 KYODO—Japan has thoroughly informed the U.S. of its views on the joint development project for the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force's next-generation fighter aircraft, code-named FSX, key Defense Agency officials indicated Thursday.

Vice Defense Minister Seiki Nishihiro, briefing reporters, said Japan has now presented the U.S. with all the materials it needs to arrive at a decision to proceed. "There's nothing left for them to ask us about," he said.

But he indicated that there are still areas left which could stall the project further if the two countries do not maintain close coordination to prevent misunderstandings.

The FSX "Memorandum of Understanding" (MOU) signed last November under the Reagan administration ran into trouble after U.S. President George Bush decided to endorse it only with certain "clarifications."

The clarifications included safeguarding U.S. technology, ensuring U.S. access to technological spinoffs from the project, and securing a larger U.S. workshare for the development and production phases.

A Japanese Government source said Nishihiro's remarks on remaining areas of debate were a reference to U.S. insistence on guaranteed assurances that technology spinoffs from the collaborative project would be supplied to the U.S.

The source said a settlement to this problem, which is likely in the near future, would greatly facilitate the two sides arriving at an overall agreement.

Masaji Yamamoto, head of the agency's Equipment Bureau, briefing recently-concluded talks in Washington the two countries closed distances between their respective positions.

"It would still take a great deal of time if we were to try and iron out all our points of difference, but then it is also possible to accelerate the process," Yamamoto said.

Yamamoto returned to Japan Thursday after talks with U.S. State, Defense, and Commerce Department officials.

New Proposal To Be Put Forth

OW2804052789 Tokyo KYODO in English 0428 GMT
28 Apr 89

[Text] Tokyo, April 28 KYODO—Japan will soon put forward a fresh proposal to the United States on joint development of its next-generation support fighter, the FSX, Defense Agency sources said Friday.

Defense Agency Director General Kichiro Tazawa told reporters Friday that he hopes to reach a final agreement before Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita steps down from power, expected in late May.

Japan and the U.S. exchanged memorandums of understanding last November to codevelop the FSX, based on General Dynamics F-16.

Growing congressional concern about an outflow of aircraft technology, however, has led the new administration of President George Bush to call for "certain clarifications" of the agreement before signaling a formal go-ahead for the joint project.

The clarifications include safeguarding U.S. technology, ensuring U.S. access to technological spinoffs from the project and securing a larger U.S. workshare for the development and production phases, Japanese Government sources said.

Masaji Yamamoto, head of the agency's Equipment Bureau, returned from Washington on Thursday after failing to narrow differences in talks with U.S. government officials.

Japan's Air Self-defense Force plans to make a maiden flight of the FSX in the summer of 1993 and to deploy 130 aircraft beginning in 1994.

Development costs are estimated at 165 billion yen, while production costs are put at 5.15 billion yen each for each plane.

MITI Head To Pledge Expanded Imports

OW2804085789 Tokyo KYODO in English 0545 GMT
28 Apr 89

[Text] Tokyo, April 28 KYODO—Hiroshi Mitsuzuka, Japanese minister of international trade and industry, indicated Friday he will make a Japanese pledge to expand imports from other countries when he meets with U.S. and Canadian officials over the next week.

Mitsuzuka told reporters after a cabinet meeting that his week-long visit to the U.S. and Canada, due to start Saturday, will be voted to establishing relationships of cooperation and trust, and to finding solutions to pending trade conflicts.

He met Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita after the meeting to discuss the coming trip, the minister said.

Referring to the release of an anxiously awaited report by the U.S. Trade representative listing foreign trade barriers, due out early Saturday morning (Japan time), Mitsuzuka said he will "watch" to see what is contained in the report.

The report is widely expected to list Japan as one of the U.S. trading partners engaged in unfair trade practices, which could lead to several Japanese industrial sectors being subject to punitive action under "Super Section 301" of the 1988 U.S. Omnibus Trade Act.

In the U.S. Mitsuzuka is scheduled to meet U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills, Commerce Secretary Robert A. Mosbacher and other U.S. Government and congressional leaders to press the U.S. to refrain from invoking the section, Japanese officials said.

Meanwhile, Agriculture Minister Tsutomu Hata also told reporters after the day's cabinet meeting that he will ask U.S. officials during his upcoming Washington visit to not make any further "unreasonable" requests of Japan to open its farm market to foreign products.

He said Japan has no idea of discussing more bilateral agricultural trade issues with the United States at the moment.

He also said he believed Japanese agriculture should not be listed as one of the Japanese industrial sectors targeted for possible punitive action by the U.S. under the section 301 provisions.

Hata is expected to leave for the U.S. on Sunday and meet with U.S. Agriculture Secretary Clayton Yeutter and other U.S. officials.

Automobile Exports Decrease in FY88

*OW2704182989 Tokyo KYODO in English 0836 GMT
27 Apr 89*

[Text] Tokyo, April 27 KYODO—Japanese automobile exports in fiscal 1988 ended in March totaled 6,190,529 units, down 1.2 percent from the previous year, for the third consecutive year-on-year decline due partly to a stronger yen, an industry survey showed Thursday.

The Japan Automobile Manufacturers' Association put passenger car exports to the United States during the year at 2,177,866 units, which was below Japan's annual voluntary car export ceiling of 2.3 million.

Analysts attributed the fall to the declining price competitiveness of Japanese autos sold abroad stemming from markups because of the rising yen, as well as to shipment restraints for inventory adjustment in overseas markets.

Auto exports to North America, Japan's largest auto customer, fell 8.2 percent to 3,047,198 units, followed by 1,676,870 units to Europe, up 2.6 percent.

Southeast Asian countries, a major market for Japanese trucks, accounted for 496,921 units, up 4.0 percent. Shipments to the Middle and Near East totaled 223,134 units, up 0.6 percent.

By category, cars including minicars totaled 4,572,992 units, up 1.1 percent, trucks 1,572,681 units, down 7.9 percent, and buses 44,856 units, up 22.0 percent.

Meanwhile, the association said auto exports in March rose 18.5 percent to 547,798 units.

Spokesman Reacts To French Criticism

*OW2704114689 Tokyo KYODO in English 1120 GMT
27 Apr 89*

[Text] Tokyo, April 27 KYODO—The Foreign Ministry cautioned Thursday that disparaging remarks about Japan by French Government officials could cause a drop in Japanese investment.

"On both sides...Any person in a responsible position should be careful not to be blinded by stereotyped perceptions of the other (side) or indulge oneself in emotional outbursts," said Foreign Ministry Spokesman Taizo Watanabe in a meeting with foreign correspondents.

Watanabe's harsh remarks were spurred by a recent newspaper report in which France's European Affairs Minister Edith Cresson accused Japan of attempting to "take over" the West European economy. She said Japan had already taken over the United States.

"Any negative report on this kind could drive Japanese investment out of France into other members of the European Community," Watanabe said.

The spokesman said Japan has checked through diplomatic channels as to "whether the views expressed were truly hers and, if it is so, whether they represent those of the French Government."

He said France responded that its official view on Japanese investment is that outlined by French President Francois Mitterrand when he visited Japan in February to attend the funeral of Emperor Hirohito.

Mitterrand told Japanese Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita then that he was "satisfied with the behavior and activities of Japanese businessmen in the country," Watanabe said.

He quoted Mitterrand as saying, "Japanese investment in France contributed greatly to French manufacturing industries and Japan's quality control should be a model for France."

Cresson told the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE that the U.S. has passively given in to a Japanese "takeover" of its economy and is now unwittingly helping Japanese interests in Europe.

Takeshita, Uno Itineraries Announced

*OW2804081389 Tokyo KYODO in English 0050 GMT
28 Apr 89*

[Text] Tokyo, April 28 KYODO—Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita will visit five Southeast Asian countries April 29-May 7, while Foreign Minister Sosuke Uno will go to the Soviet Union, Mongolia and China April 30-May 7, the Foreign Ministry announced on Friday.

According to the itineraries released after the day's regular cabinet meeting, Takeshita will leave for Bangkok on Saturday and hold talks with Thai Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan on May 1.

He will be received in audience by King Bhumibol Adulyadej the same day.

Takeshita will proceed to Kuala Lumpur on May 2 and meet Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad.

The Japanese prime minister will arrive in Singapore on May 3 and hold a meeting with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew on May 4.

On May 5, Takeshita will meet Indonesian President Suharto and make a major policy speech on Japanese foreign policy toward the Southeast Asian countries in Jakarta.

He will return to Japan on May 7 after meeting with Philippine President Corazon Aquino in Manila on May 6.

Uno will leave for Moscow on April 30 for regular ministerial talks with his Soviet counterpart Eduard Shevardnadze scheduled on May 3 and 4 and will pay a courtesy call on Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

He will return to Tokyo on May 7 after visiting Mongolia and China.

Prime Minister Takeshita said last Tuesday that he is stepping down after obtaining diet approval of the 60.4 trillion yen budget for fiscal 1989, expected in late May.

Official on Aim of Takeshita's Trip

*OW2704152089 Tokyo KYODO in English 1445 GMT
27 Apr 89*

[Text] Tokyo, April 27 KYODO—Japanese Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita's upcoming trip to five Asian nations will not be an occasion for bestowing gifts but for expanding dialogue with maturing partners, a Foreign Ministry official said Thursday.

The official, speaking on condition of anonymity, did not, however, rule out any major new aid commitments during the trip from April 29 to May 7.

Takeshita, who Tuesday announced his intention to resign the premiership, has decided to push ahead with his planned visit to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand in order to "preserve consistency and continuity" in Japan's foreign policy.

"The trip itself is not intended as a trip for bringing souvenirs," the official said in response to the widely-held view that visiting Japanese dignitaries come bearing gifts.

"Our recognition is that we are already reaching the stage where the leaders can visit from time to time for the purpose of deepening our dialogue...without specific 'omiyage' (gifts)," he said.

"This does not necessarily mean that there will not be certain cooperation projects which will be agreed upon with the countries," he hastened to add.

Questioned on whether Takeshita will offer new yen credits to the Philippines during his stop in Manila, the official said, "I don't think that the so-called yen loans or that aspect of Japanese economic cooperation has been specifically prepared for this particular trip."

He said Takeshita will explain to President Corazon Aquino what Japan is prepared to do within the overall framework of the Multilateral Aid Initiative (MAI). "What specific points, such as the amount of projected aid, still remains undetermined," he said.

JSP Urges Trip Cancellation

*OW2804061389 Tokyo KYODO in English 0435 GMT
28 Apr 89*

[Text] Tokyo, April 28 KYODO—The Japan Socialist Party on Friday said it will urge Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita to call off his 9-day visit to Southeast Asia scheduled to begin Saturday.

Tsuruo Yamaguchi, secretary general of Japan's largest opposition party, said it would be "irresponsible" for an outgoing prime minister to go abroad and promise Japan's economic assistance.

Yamaguchi told a press conference Takeshita should cancel the visit and respond to popular calls for the abolition of the 3 percent consumption tax imposed on April 1. A thorough probe into the Recruit stock trading and bribery scandal involving many politicians is also needed, he said.

Yamaguchi also said his party will continue to demand that former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone be summoned to the Diet as a sworn witness to testify about his links with the Recruit scandal.

Takeshita declared on Tuesday that he will resign to take responsibility for causing popular distrust in politics because of the scandal.

But the prime minister also said he will go to Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines as scheduled to maintain the consistency and continuity of Japan's foreign policy.

Nguyen Co Thach Intends To Meet Takeshita

To Meet 'As Scheduled'

*OW2804095189 Tokyo KYODO in English 0938 GMT
28 Apr 89*

[Text] Bangkok, April 28 KYODO—Japanese Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita and Vietnamese Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach will meet here Sunday [30 April] "as scheduled," Co Thach said Friday.

The Vietnamese minister told a group of reporters that Japan wanted such a meeting while Takeshita is in Bangkok and added, "I think there is no problem."

Japan's Foreign Ministry said Thursday Takeshita, who will visit Bangkok as part of nine-day visit to five ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries, has no plan to meet Co Thach while he is in Bangkok.

A Takeshita-Co Thach meeting will be the first high-level contact between the two countries since Vietnam invaded Kampuchea at the end of 1978.

Japanese Embassy sources said the meeting has not "officially" been decided.

Ministry Denies Meeting Plans

*OW2704144889 Tokyo KYODO in English 1039 GMT
27 Apr 89*

[Text] Tokyo, April 27 KYODO—Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita has no plan to meet Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach in Bangkok on Sunday, the Foreign Ministry said Thursday.

A high-level Foreign Ministry official said there is no such schedule for the prime minister and that Takeshita will not meet Thach.

Thach, who arrived in Bangkok on Thursday to attend a symposium on Indochina there, said he has agreed to meet the Japanese prime minister on Sunday.

The official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said he cannot understand why the Vietnamese foreign minister said so.

The official said Japan and Vietnam once considered a Takeshita-Thach meeting because both men will be in the Thai capital at the same time.

However, the idea was abandoned before substantial consultations on the matter, the official said.

Takeshita, who is leaving Tokyo on Saturday for a nine-day swing through Southeast Asia, will be in Bangkok through May 2 before proceeding to Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines.

Meeting With Sihanouk Denied

*OW2804115789 Tokyo KYODO in English 1145 GMT
28 Apr 89*

[Text] Tokyo, April 28 KYODO—Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita will not meet either Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Kampuchea nor Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach during a nine-day visit to Southeast Asia, a Foreign Ministry official said Friday.

The official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said such meetings could not be scheduled.

Vietnam's Co Thach said in Bangkok Friday that he will meet Takeshita in the Thai capital on Sunday.

Takeshita also was earlier said to have a meeting scheduled with Kampuchean resistance leader Prince Sihanouk, who is president of Democratic Kampuchea, in Bangkok or Jakarta.

Takeshita is scheduled to fly to Bangkok Sunday [30 April] and stay there through May 2. He is to later go to Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines before returning to Tokyo on May 7.

Uno Accepts Postponement of No's Visit

*OW2804045489 Tokyo KYODO in English 0048 GMT
28 Apr 89*

[Text] Tokyo, April 28 KYODO—South Korean President No Tae-u will postpone a state visit to Japan that was scheduled for late May, the Japanese Government announced Friday.

The announcement came 3 days after Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita said that he will resign.

Foreign Minister Sosuke Uno said the governments of Japan and South Korea agreed to delay No's trip and will reschedule it "at an appropriate time."

Japan and South Korea announced on March 10 that No would visit Japan in late May.

The South Korean President had first planned to visit Japan last November but the trip was canceled because of the illness of Emperor Hirohito, who died of cancer on January 7.

After the cabinet meeting, Uno told reporters that it is very regrettable that No's visit to Japan was put off but that friendly relations between Japan and South Korea remain solid and stable.

Uno did not make it clear whether the South Korean President's visit to Japan will be realized within this year.

Uno added that the two countries may hold a regular ministerial-level meeting before No's visit to Japan.

Tokyo and Seoul planned to hold the ministerial meeting this fall as a follow-up to No's visit to Japan that had been scheduled for late May.

Asked whether Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita's resignation announcement affected the postponement of No's visit to Japan, Uno said the South Korean Government may have considered various political circumstances in Japan when making its decision.

Deputy Foreign Minister Leaves for Moscow Talks
*OW2804121589 Tokyo KYODO in English 0853 GMT
28 Apr 89*

[Text] Tokyo, April 28 KYODO—Deputy Foreign Minister Takakazu Kuriyama left for Moscow Friday for talks with his Soviet counterpart, Igor Rogachev.

Kuriyama and Rogachev will meet Saturday and Sunday before a regular consultation on Wednesday [3 May] between Foreign Ministers Sosuke Uno of Japan and Eduard Shevardnadze of the Soviet Union.

The deputy foreign ministers will discuss matters concerning the conclusion of a bilateral peace treaty, which Japanese officials said include Japan's call for the return of four Soviet-held islands off Hokkaido.

Rogachev Says Territorial Claim 'Baseless'
*OW2804093089 Tokyo KYODO in English 0804 GMT
28 Apr 89*

[By Antonio Kamiya]

[Text] Moscow, April 28 KYODO—Japan and the Soviet Union begin a fresh round of high-level diplomatic talks here Saturday [29 April] with Japanese officials determined to keep up the momentum of Tokyo's push for a settlement of the decades-old territorial dispute dividing the two nations.

A working group headed by Japan's Deputy Foreign Minister Takakazu Kuriyama and his Soviet counterpart, Igor Rogachev, will lead off a scheduled two-session meeting Saturday, with their principals joining in for two more sessions Wednesday.

Japanese officials say they do not expect easy progress but emphasize the importance of the dialogue aimed at removing the biggest strain in bilateral ties.

Japan's Foreign Minister Sosuke Uno, expected to arrive here on Sunday for the talks, forewarned of the difficulties earlier this week, saying "the situation remains severe."

However, "we must cultivate the bud of dialogue," he told the Japanese press in Tokyo on Tuesday.

The territorial dispute involves Japan's claim to a cluster of islands off the northeastern tip of Hokkaido which the Soviets have occupied since the end of World War II.

The dispute on the sovereignty of these islands—the Habomai group, Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu—has held off the signing of a peace treaty between the two countries and impeded full normalization of political and economic ties.

The Soviets, during the previous round of the Kuriyama-Rogachev meeting held in Tokyo in March, came up with a plethora of historical and legal arguments to back their sovereignty claim to the islands, including the invocation of a little-used clause in the U.N. Charter on allied actions against an "enemy" state.

The Soviets claim the disputed islands are theirs not only historically but also legally under the terms of the wartime Yalta agreement, a deal they say were protected by the U.N. "enemy state clause."

The Soviet invocation of the U.N. Charter took the Japanese side by surprise, and Japan plans to "refute" the Soviet contention in the upcoming session, according to Japanese Foreign Ministry officials.

The "enemy state clause" states that nothing in the U.N. Charter can invalidate any World War II action taken against an enemy state by the allies.

Japan contends that the U.N. clause concerns only those measures taken by the wartime allies to end hostilities and has nothing to do with territorial problem.

In addition, the Japanese position is that the disputed islands are an integral part of Japan, and not part of the Kurile chain which the United States and Britain agreed to give to the Soviet Union in their secret February 1945 Yalta pact.

Both Washington and London have since supported the Japanese position, which was established in two 19th century treaties signed between Japan and tsarist Russia.

Japanese Foreign Ministry officials preparing for the upcoming talks say they are not expecting an immediate breakthrough but will try to keep the issue on the talking table.

Japan regards the talks on the territorial dispute itself as a sign of progress, with officials noting that Moscow always insisted that the issue had been closed before Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985.

Rogachev even suggested last March that the two countries should shelve their territorial dispute for the sake of better political and economic ties. Tokyo said no.

During the Tokyo round of talks, the Japanese side also rejected a Soviet offer to conclude a package of economic and technological accords to pave the way for better ties, insisting that economic cooperation must be linked to an improved political climate.

The Soviet stiffened their public posture this week with the publication of a signed article by Rogachev in the government newspaper IZVESTIYA calling the Japanese claim to the disputed islands "baseless" and asserting once again that there is no territorial issue between the two countries.

Despite the preopening salvos, Japanese and Soviet officials have agreed to release what a Japanese Foreign Ministry official described as "some kind of press release" after Uno's meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on Wednesday [3 May], instead of walking away empty-handed.

Wednesday's meeting is the third since the two met in Tokyo last December. It was during the December meeting that the two countries agreed to set up a permanent working group at the vice foreign minister level to sort out the problems for the elusive peace treaty.

While in Moscow, Uno is scheduled to pay a courtesy call on Gorbachev, with the tentative date of the meeting set for Thursday, the final day of Uno's stay in the Soviet capital.

Uno will also visit Mongolia and make a brief stopover in Beijing before returning to Tokyo on May 7.

Soviet Fishery Talks Deadlocked
*OW2804081589 Tokyo KYODO in English 0536 GMT
28 Apr 89*

[Text] Moscow, April 28 (KYODO)—Negotiations between Japan and the Soviet Union over a new agreement controlling Japanese salmon fishing in Soviet waters are at an impasse over Soviet demands to reduce both quotas and fishing fleet size, a Japanese official said Friday.

The Soviet Union demanded in talks which resumed last week that the amount of salmon Japanese vessels are allowed to catch annually in Soviet waters be reduced from last year's quota of 17,668 tons to 15,000 tons this year, the official said.

The Soviets also are seeking to reduce the number of Japanese vessels allowed to engage in any sort of fishing within Soviet territorial waters, the official said.

Japan may agree to a reduction in its salmon quota in response to a Soviet plan to ban salmon fishing altogether in the northern Pacific by 1992.

But it will not accept a cut in authorized fleet size, and intends seeking a reduction in its payments under a fishery cooperation scheme corresponding to the cut in its salmon quota, the official said.

The fifth session of the Japan-Soviet fisheries committee talks is scheduled to continue, he said.

Japanese Restaurant Opened in Sakhalin
*OW2804064089 Tokyo KYODO in English 0338 GMT
28 Apr 89*

[Text] Kushiro, Hokkaido Pref., April 28 KYODO—A Soviet-Japanese joint venture will open a Japanese restaurant in the Soviet port city of Kholmsk, Sakhalin, the Japanese partner said Friday.

The joint venture, Yuko Kyoei Co., which was formed March 22, has already started construction work on the Japanese food outlet "Restaurant Kushiro," said Kyoei Koeki Co., a trading firm. The grand opening is set for June 15.

Kyoei Koeki invested about 3.36 million rubles, while the Executive Committee of the City of Kholmsk, the Kholmsk Fishing Port, and the city's Social Supplies Industrial Complex each invested 1.5 million rubles, said the company's president, Mamoru Okada.

The first meeting between four board members each from the Japanese and Soviet sides will take place at Kholmsk on May 5. They will appoint an executive director and discuss management policies for the new project, the official said.

A former restaurant in the center of the city will be remodeled to make a new 2-story eating establishment with a capacity of about 200. It will also boast a Japanese garden.

Traditional Japanese food will be served on the first floor, while original dishes mixing local and Japanese food will be served on the second floor, Okada said.

Much of the seafood will be acquired locally. Cooks, utensils, and liquor will be brought in from Japan, he said.

Although prices at the restaurant are expected to be slightly higher than other local shops, Okada said he was confident that a profit could be made since locals are very interested in Japanese food and have few options for such cuisine in the city.

LDP Leader Leaves for Taiwan

*OW2804074889 Tokyo KYODO in English 0131 GMT
28 Apr 89*

[Text] Tokyo, April 28 (KYODO)—Shin Kanemaru, former deputy prime minister and leader within the Liberal Democratic Party faction headed by Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita, left here for Taiwan Friday morning.

He will return home May 5 after visiting the island at the invitation of a Taiwanese leader, party sources said.

Toyota To Assist Chinese Automaker

*OW2804085589 Tokyo TOKYO in English 0732 GMT
28 Apr 89*

[Text] Tokyo, April 28 KYODO—Toyota Motor Corp. And Toyota Tsusho Corp. signed a technical assistance agreement with a Chinese automaker to provide technology and training on automobile manufacturing, a Toyota Motor spokesman said Friday.

Under the agreement, Toyota will supply commercial vehicle body manufacturing and training in Japan for production of its Hiace model to China National Automobile Industry I-E Corp. Shenyang Co. Ltd., a vehicle body manufacturer in Shenyang City, Liaoning Province.

Toyota will also buy Shenyang Press dyes, inspection equipment and special welding machines for the manufacture of the Hiace.

The Shenyang plant is scheduled to begin production in 1991, with annual capacity projected to reach about 20,000 units in 1995.

Ito Calls For Reforming Political System

*OW2704123889 Tokyo KYODO in English 1209 GMT
27 Apr 89*

[Text] Tokyo, April 27 KYODO—Senior Liberal Democratic Party [LDP] executive member Masayoshi Ito called Thursday for reforming Japan's money-guzzling political system.

Ito is tipped as the most probable successor to outgoing Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita but has declined to take over from his because of poor health [sentence as received].

Ito said the ruling conservative party is in an "unprecedentedly strong foul wind" amid mounting public distrust in politics, which stemmed from the Recruit stock trading and bribery scandal.

The 76-year-old chairman of the LDP's decision-making executive council, was speaking at a party given by the major business group Keizai Doyukai, Japan association of corporate executives.

As Japan's parliamentary democracy faces a major crisis, the LDP must reform itself to convince the Japanese people that it is being reborn, he said.

Ito urged voters to abandon their traditional practice of sponging money off politicians, saying the level of politics reflects that of voters.

Meanwhile, Ito told reporters Thursday that he has declined a request that he succeed Takeshita as LDP president and prime minister.

Ito, talking with reporters at his home, said he has received the request from Takeshita's Chief of Staff Keizo Obuchi, the chief cabinet secretary, with whom he met Wednesday night.

Ito told Obuchi that his health is poor and may cause trouble to society if he fell ill while in office.

Ito said he has instead recommended former Chief Cabinet Secretary Masaharu Gotoda, 74, a one-time head of the National Police Agency, who currently chairs the LDP's political reform panel.

Gotoda served as former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone's chief of staff for over three years.

Many LDP members, however, do not believe Ito will insist on declining the request, LDP sources said.

The sources said Ito has suffered chronic diabetes for a long time but that they have not heard that his illness worsened recently.

Ito is strongly dissatisfied with moves among major LDP factions to bargain over party and cabinet posts when he has not even agreed to take over from Takeshita, they said.

Leaders of the LDP's five major factions—Takeshita, Nakasone, LDP Secretary General Shintaro Abe, former Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and former State Minister Toshio Komoto—all favor Ito, the sources said.

Prime Minister Takeshita on Thursday denied a press report that he and his cabinet will resign in early May before the Diet approves the 60.4 trillion yen budget for fiscal 1989.

Beleaguered by the widening Recruit stock trading and bribery scandal, Takeshita declared on Tuesday he is stepping down from the office he has occupied since November 1987.

Takeshita, talking with reporters at his official residence briefly, reconfirmed his earlier remark that his cabinet will resign after the passage of the bill, expected in late May.

Takeshita called Gotoda to his office in the afternoon to discuss political reform plans asking him to work out substantial proposals on May 17, LDP officials said.

Former Finance Minister Miyazawa, to whose faction Ito belongs, said in a speech at his faction meeting that all know who is the best choice as Takeshita's successor. Miyazawa did not mention Ito by name.

Miyazawa said he talked with LDP Secretary General Abe over telephone earlier in the day, quoting Abe as saying that he would start efforts in the second week of May to pick a new leader.

Rescinds Gotoda Recommendation

OW2804063489 Tokyo KYODO in English 0613 GMT
28 Apr 89

[Text] Tokyo, April 28 KYODO—Senior Liberal Democratic Party executive member Masayoshi Ito said Friday he does not feel qualified to become LDP president and prime minister in succession to Noboru Takeshita.

Ito, 76, chairman of the LDP's decisionmaking Executive Council, told a news conference that he is determined to decline an offer to succeed Takeshita, who is stepping down in late May.

Ito, tipped as the most probable successor to the outgoing prime minister, said if he took over power it would cause problems for the party and the government because of his poor health.

LDP sources said Ito has suffered from chronic diabetes for a long time.

Ito described as "impolite" moves among major LDP factions to bargain over party and cabinet posts at a time when a new leader is yet to be picked.

Ito said he has abandoned an idea to recommend former Chief Cabinet Secretary Masaharu Gotoda to the premiership.

On Thursday, Ito told reporters he had received a request to succeed Takeshita from Takeshita's Chief of Staff Keizo Obuchi, but declined it.

Ito said at that time he has instead recommended Gotoda, 74, a one-time head of the National Police Agency, who currently chairs the LDP's Political Reform Panel.

Gotoda served as former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone's chief of staff for over 3 years.

Lower House Passes Budget, LDP Members Resign

LDP Prepares To 'Ram' Budget Through
OW2704122589 Tokyo KYODO in English 0901 GMT
27 Apr 89

[Text] Tokyo, April 27 KYODO—The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is set to ram the fiscal 1989 budget through the House of Representatives unilaterally and send it immediately to the second chamber for further deliberations on Friday [28 April].

Three major opposition parties said they will boycott Friday's plenary session.

This will be the first unilateral budget passage by the ruling party in Japan's 44-year postwar parliamentary history.

On Thursday, the LDP unilaterally opened the house budget committee and passed the 60.4 trillion yen state budget for fiscal 1989 in the absence of opposition party members.

The budget includes 3,919.8 billion yen for defense, up 5.9 percent from fiscal 1988, and 727.8 billion yen for economic assistance to developing countries, up 6.7 percent.

Following the LDP's unilateral action, representatives of the Japan Socialist Party [JSP], Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party huddled in the Diet and agreed to boycott Friday's plenary session.

The opposition representatives—JSP's Shun Oide, Komeito's Yuichi Ichikawa and DSP's Yukihisa Yoshida—met House Speaker Kenzaburo Hara and urged him to invalidate the voting at the Budget Committee, opposition sources said.

The three men also asked Hara to do his best to realize a joint opposition demand that former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone be summoned to the Diet to testify about his involvement in the Recruit stock trading and bribery scandal.

Hara was noncommittal, only telling them that he will consider it.

Opposition parties boycotted the vote-taking Budget Committee session, calling for further deliberations and for a thorough investigation into the Recruit stock trading and bribery scandal at the committee.

Oide denounced the government and the LDP for what he called an "unprecedented outrageous act" to pass the national budget in the absence of opposition members.

Budget Approved, Upper House Next

OW2804081289 Tokyo KYODO in English 0723 GMT
28 Apr 89

[Text] Tokyo, April 28 KYODO—The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) on Friday rammed the fiscal 1989 budget through the House of Representatives unilaterally and sent it immediately to the second chamber for further deliberations.

Opposition parties boycotted the vote-taking plenary session of the lower chamber.

The lower house voted 281-1 at a plenary session to approve the budget.

This was the first unilateral budget passage by the ruling party ever in Japan's 44-year postwar parliamentary history.

On Thursday, the LDP unilaterally opened the Budget Committee of the lower house and passed the 60.4 trillion yen state budget for fiscal 1989 in the absence of opposition party members.

The budget incorporates 3,919.8 billion yen for defense, up 5.9 percent from fiscal 1988, and 727.8 billion yen for economic assistance, up 6.7 percent.

DSP Head Calls For Opposition Unity

OW2804105989 Tokyo KYODO in English 0906 GMT
28 Apr 89

[Text] Tokyo, April 28 KYODO—The leader of the country's No 2 opposition party, Eiichi Nagasue, called Friday for an agreement among four opposition parties to iron out basic policy differences, particularly on security and economy.

Nagasue, chairman of the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), said an opposition coalition government must maintain free economy and Japan-U.S. security relationship.

Leaders of the Japan Socialist Party, Komeito, DSP and the United Socialist Democratic Party agreed, at a meeting in Kyoto on April 7, to topple the Liberal Democratic Party from power and forge an opposition coalition government.

The JSP calls for abolition of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and for an unarmed neutral Japan, differing from the DSP which supports the security treaty.

Nagasue said Japan could maintain its postwar peace and stability under the security arrangements with the United States and that the JSP's concept of unarmed neutrality cannot win public support.

Nagasue, who spoke at a lecture session at a hotel here, also said Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita's announcement of his intention to step down on Tuesday [25 April] does not mean a settlement of the Recruit stock trading and bribery scandal.

He said the House of Representatives should be dissolved at an early date for a general election to reflect voters' opinions in the Diet.

Dietman Resigns Over Budget Tactics

OW2804054789 Tokyo KYODO in English 0521 GMT
28 Apr 89

[Text] Tokyo, April 28 KYODO—Yukio Aoshima, a member of the House of Councillors, tendered his resignation to upper house President Yoshihiko Tsuchiya on Friday to protest the ruling party's moves to unilaterally clear the fiscal 1989 state budget through the House of Representatives.

Aoshima, 56, a popular television personality and leader of the three-member Niin Club upper house group, told reporters of his decision at a press conference.

The ruling Liberal Democratic Party is poised to ram the 60.4 trillion budget through the lower house later Friday.

Aoshima called on the government of Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita to dissolve the lower house for a general election and allow the public to give its verdict on the Recruit scandal and the 3 percent consumption tax introduced on April 1.

He also called on opposition parties to close their ranks to change the current political situation.

If his resignation is accepted at a session of the upper house, he will be succeeded by his club colleague Taku Izumi, 59, composer.

Aoshima was first elected to the upper house in 1968 and has served continuously since then.

He ruled out the possibility of retiring from national politics, indicating he may run in a House of Councillors election scheduled for this summer.

Lower House Vice Speaker Resigns

OW2804071989 Tokyo KYODO in English 0647 GMT
28 Apr 89

[Text] Tokyo, April 28 KYODO—The vice speaker of the house of representatives, Shinnen Tagaya, said on Friday he has tendered his resignation from the post in protest against the Liberal Democratic Party's unilateral action to take a vote on the fiscal 1989 budget.

Tagaya, 69, an opposition independent, left the Japan Socialist Party after assuming the post of deputy speaker in July 1986.

North Korea

Youth Festival Invites South Figures To Attend

List of Invitees Released

SK2804051289 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0435
GMT
28 Apr 89

[Text] Pyongyang April 28 (KCNA)—The Korean Preparatory Committee for the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students [WFYS] invited delegates of political parties and organizations and public figures of South Korea as honorary guests to the festival and made public letters of invitation sent respectively to them.

The invited guests are:

1. Kim Chae-sun,	president of the National Assembly	18. Yi Chong-kak,	chairman of the Seoul Council of Labour Movement Organizations
2. Kim Tae-chung,	president of the Party for Peace and Democracy	19. Yun Chong-sok,	acting chairman of the National Alliance of the Peasants Movement
3. Kim Yong-sam,	president of the Reunification Democratic Party	20. Han Ho-son,	chairman of the Central Council of Agricultural Cooperative Unions
4. Kim Chong-pil,	president of the New Democratic Republican Party	21. Yi Pong-ku,	chairman of the South Korean General Federation of Christian Peasants Associations
5. Pak Chun-kyu,	chairman of the Democratic Justice Party	22. Kim Sang-tok,	chairman of the South Korean Roman Catholic Peasants Association
6. Kim Su-hwan,	Roman Catholic cardinal	23. Yim Chong-sok,	acting chairman of the National Council of Student Representatives and chairman of the General Student Council of Hanyang University
7. Paek Ki-wan,	director of the Reunification Affairs Institute	24. Yi Pom-yong,	chairman of the National Council of Representatives of Youth Organizations
8. Yi Pu-yong,	permanent co-chairman of the National Alliance of the Movement for the Nation and Democracy	25. Choe Chang-u,	chairman of the Social Democratic Youth League
9. Mun Ik-hwan,	advisor to the National Alliance of the Movement for the Nation and Democracy	26. Chon Mun-hwan,	chairman of the Preparatory Committee for Participation in the 13th Festival of Youth and Students in Pyongyang and chairman of the General Student Council of Sogang University
10. Kye Hun-che,	co-chairman of the National Council for Independence, Democracy and Reunification	27. Ko Sang-ho,	chairman of the South Korean Christian Youth Council
11. Pak Hyong-kyu,	co-chairman of the National Council for Independence, Democracy and Reunification	28. Yi Kwang-yong,	chairman of the South Korean General Federation of Christian Student Associations
12. Che Chong-ku,	permanent representative of the Progressive Political Alliance	29. Chong Yong-sok,	leader of the Central Headquarters of Chondoism
13. O Chong-il,	chief delegate of the South Side to Preliminary Talks for the Convocation of a Nationwide Meeting	30. O Ik-che,	co-chairman of the South Korean Alliance of the Christian Social Movement
14. Ko Un,	chief delegate of the South Side to Preliminary Contact for a Meeting Between Writers in the North, South and Overseas	31. Kim Yong-won,	chairman of the South Korean Council of Christian Churches.
15. Pak chong-kun,	chairman of the South Korean General Federation of Trade Unions	32. Kim Song-su,	chairman of the South Korean Christian Presbyterian Church Council
16. Yi Yong-sun,	co-chairman of the National Council of Labour Movement Organizations	33. Ki Won-hyong,	chairman of the Alliance of the Buddhist Movement for the Nation, Independence and Reunification.
17. Pang Yong-sok,	chairman of the South Korean Alliance of Democratic Workers	34. Chi Son,	chairman of the National Council of Priests for Practising Justice and Peace
		35. Pak Yong-mo,	chairman of the South Korean Alliance of Women's Organizations
		36. Yi U-chong,	chairman of the Council of Bereaved Families of the Movement for Democracy
		37. Yi So-son,	

38. Pak Yong-kil, chairman of the Council of Families of Young Democratic Figures

39. Yi Chong-suk, co-chairman of the Council of the Families' Movement for the Practice of Democracy

40. Kim Yun-su, co-chairman of the South Korean General Federation of National Artists

41. Chon Pong-cho, chairman of the South Korean General Federation of Art and Cultural Organizations

42. Kim Chong-hwan, chairman of the Alliance of the Movement for Popular Culture

43. Kim Song-kyun, permanent co-representative of the Council for North-South Cultural Exchange

44. Song Kon-ho, advisor to the Council of the Families' Movement for the Practice of Democracy

45. Yi Kwang-pyo, chairman of the South Korean Society of Newspapers

46. Yi Chun-pal, chairman of the South Korean Journalists Association

47. Pak Song-so, chairman of the South Korean Lawyers Association

48. Kim Sang-ki, co-representative of the National Council of Professors for Democracy

49. Yun Yong-ku, chairman of the National Council of Teachers

50. the president of Seoul University

51. the president of Korea University

52. the president of Choson University

53. the president of Sogang University

54. the president of Yonsei University

55. the president of Hanyang University.

Follows the letter of invitation sent respectively by Choe Yong-hae, chairman of the Korean Preparatory Committee for the 13th WFYS, to them on April 25:

The 13th World Festival of Youth and Students will be held in Pyongyang from July 1 to 8, 1989, amid the great interests of the youth, students and people around the world.

The Pyongyang festival will involve various symposiums, cultural and art festivals and sports meets, exhibitions and other colorful functions which will be conducive to friendship, solidarity and peace among the youth, students and people on the five continents of the world.

The Korean Preparatory Committee for the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students courteously invites you to the significant Pyongyang festival, the first of its kind on the Asian continent.

If you participate in the Pyongyang festival, we will cordially greet you with compatriotic feelings and provide you all conveniences.

News Conference Held
*SK2804062089 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0540
GMT
28 Apr 89*

[Text] Pyongyang April 28 (KCNA)—The Korean Preparatory Committee for the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students [WFYS] held a news conference with home and foreign reporters today at the People's Palace of Culture in connection with the invitation extended to delegates of political parties and organizations and public figures of South Korea to participate in the Pyongyang festival as honorable guests.

Speaking at the news conference, Kim Chang-yong, vice-chairman of the Central Committee of the League of Socialist Working Youth of Korea and vice-chairman of the Korean Preparatory Committee for the 13th WFYS, said:

The chairman of the Central Committee of the DPRK Red Cross Society sent a telephone message to the president of the South Korean Red Cross on April 22 telling the South side to take over a letter sent by the Korean Preparatory Committee for the 13th WFYS to South Korean public figures through Red Cross officials at Panmunjom at ten on the morning of April 25, and convey it to the personages concerned of South Korea.

But, the president of the South Korean Red Cross in his April 24 telephone message to the chairman of the Central Committee of the Red Cross Society of our side refused to take over the letter under the unjustifiable pretext that the Red Cross hot line between the North and the South is used for a purpose quite alien to talks.

Hoping to have the letter conveyed directly to the South Korean figures concerned at any cost through lawful procedures by means of the existing channel through which the North and the South had exchanged letters, we requested the Central Committee of our Red Cross Society to send again a telephone message on April 27 to the Red Cross of the South side, demanding it to take over our letter at 11 this morning. But the South Korean Red Cross side persistently refused to take it over.

Such being the situation, we are going to make public the letter here, so that it may be known to the relevant figures of South Korea.

Kim Chang-yong published the content of the letter that the Korean Preparatory Committee for the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students had intended to send to South Korean figures through the Red Cross liaison

officials at Panmunjom and the names of the delegates of the political parties and organisations and figures of various circles, 55 in all, who are invited to the festival as honorable guests.

He said the desire and demand of the South Korean people of all walks of life and public figures who are deeply interested in the forthcoming Pyongyang festival are well taken into consideration in sending the letter inviting the delegates of South Korean workers, peasants, youth and students and intellectuals and figures of political, academic, religious and opposition circles named above as honorable guests to the Pyongyang festival.

The wish to be an observer of the Pyongyang festival was expressed long ago within the ruling quarters of South Korea, too.

At the fifth round of meeting for the preparations of North-South joint parliamentary meeting held at "Tongil Pavilion" in our side's area at Panmunjom in mid-October last year, the present chairman of the Democratic Justice Party, who was then head of the South side's delegation, showed interest in the date and preparations of the Pyongyang festival and asked delegates of our side to make its preparations well, telling them that he would come to Pyongyang together with the delegates of the South side, when the festival opened.

It is common joy and pride of the nation which should be shared by the entire fellow countrymen to hold the grand World Festival of Youth and Students for strengthening friendship and solidarity among youth and students of the five continents who love justice and peace under the skies of Pyongyang, the first of its kind to take place in the east in the history of the festival. So, to participate in the auspicious festival is a natural demand in the national point of view that no one can refuse.

Out of the noble desire to greet the Pyongyang festival as a great common national event with the South Korean youth, students and people of all strata as desired and demanded by them and promote national unity and peaceful reunification in this course, the Korean Preparatory Committee for the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students decided to invite delegates of South Korean workers, peasants, youth and students, and intellectuals and personages of the political, academic, religious, opposition and other circles as honorable guests and send an invitation letter to this effect to the relevant personages of the South side.

Kim Chang-yong said:

The letter carrying our noble intention to greet the Pyongyang festival as a historical common festivity of the nation with the compatriots in the South cannot reach directly the personages concerned of the South side owing to the unreasonable act of the South Korean Red

Cross, but is opened to the public at this press conference. We, however, sincerely hope that public figures of all circles in South Korea will respond to our invitation with pleasure.

Kim Chang-yong answered questions put by reporters.

South Blocks North-South Student Talks
*SK2804105889 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1051 GMT
28 Apr 89*

[Text] Panmunjom April 28 (KCNA)—The North-South student talks to discuss the participation of South Korean students in the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students slated in Pyongyang failed again due to the obstruction of the South Korean fascist clique.

The "National Council of Student Representatives" of South Korea held a press conference at Seoul University last night and declared again it would attend the North-South student talks and made it clear that it would send to Panmunjom its delegation for the talks scheduled at three Friday afternoons. And it held at Seoul University a meeting of students for participation in the Pyongyang festival and marched toward Panmunjom.

The student delegates of the South, however, could not come to the venue of talks owing to the hideous outrage of the No Tae-u group which positioned more than 15,000 police and dropped the checkbar on the road to Panmunjom to "block their talks at the initial stage" as it did on June 10 and August 15 last year and on March 16 this year.

The North side's student delegation to North-South student talks made a trip of 500 ri from Pyongyang to Panmunjom, convinced that there would be a significant meeting with fellow students from the South.

The members of the North side's student delegation entered the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Panmunjom, the venue of talks, at 15:00, the appointed time. But the southern door of the conference room remained tightly shut and the student delegates of the South side did not show up.

The student delegates of the North side could hardly repress their indignation at the act of the South Korean puppet clique in barring student talks for the fourth time.

The North side's student delegation called a press conference in the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and released a statement in connection with the failure of North-South student talks owing to the obstruction of the U.S. imperialists and the fascist clique.

28 April 1989

Delegation Issues Statement

*SK2804103089 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1021 GMT
28 Apr 89*

[Text] Pyongyang April 28 (KCNA)—Our side's delegation to North-South student talks released a statement today in Kaesong in connection with the fact that the April 28 North-South student talks to discuss the participation of South Korean students in the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students failed to open owing to the obstructions of the South Korean authorities.

The statement says:

The fourth abortion of North-South student talks has evoked resentment of the entire Korean students and greatly disappointed the people at home and abroad.

The South Korean authorities are to blame for the failure of Panmunjom student talks to let the fellow students in the South come to the Pyongyang festival the road to which is wide open for the free access of young people of different colors and languages in all parts of the world, across continents and oceans.

Recalling that the South Korean person in power in his "July 7 declaration" said that he would promote North-South exchange and visits and, in the "National Assembly" in February, stated that the participation of delegates of the "National Council of Student Representatives," ("Chondaehyop") in the Pyongyang festival would be affirmatively examined, the statement stresses:

The South Korean authorities' persistent obstruction to North-South student talks for the participation of the South Korean youth and students in the Pyongyang festival, shows that they want neither contact and dialogue between the North and the South nor national reconciliation and unity, but seek only anti-communist confrontation and permanent division of the country.

The North side's delegation to North-South student talks thinks that the acts of the South Korean authorities in barring at the point of the bayonet the Panmunjom student talks for the fourth time will face condemnation by all the students and people in the North and the South.

Though North-South student talks failed to open today, the day will surely come when the youth and students in the North and the South will advance shoulder to shoulder along the road of national reunification, hugging each other.

Let us all open the door of North-South student talks with united force and display the honor and pride of being the Korean youth and students in the grand Pyongyang festival at any cost.

Availing itself of this opportunity, the North side's delegation to North-South student talks expresses the hope that the youth and students of all countries around the world will resolutely condemn the moves of the United States and the South Korean authorities in foiling North-South student talks for opening to the South Korean students the way to the Pyongyang festival and extend stronger support to the just patriotic struggle of the South Korean students to drive out foreign forces and reunify the country independently.

Ministry Spokesman Criticizes U.S. Plane Move

SK2804132089 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 1100 GMT 28 Apr 89

[Press statement by DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman in Pyongyang on 28 April—read by announcer]

[Text] Today easing tension and ensuring peace on the Korean peninsula are important factors in accelerating the course of overall international detente.

However, the United States is openly perpetrating acts running counter to easing tension on the Korean peninsula by continuously reinforcing the U.S. Armed Forces in South Korea.

On 24 April the U.S. Forces in Japan command decided to transfer 10 "RF-4C" reconnaissance planes and forces belonging to the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron of the U.S. Air Force based in Kadena, Okinawa, Japan, to Taegu, South Korea. The maneuvers of the U.S. military authorities to drag new armed forces into South Korea while raving about periodic integration, agreements, and so forth are a product of their premeditated intrigue to artificially aggravate confrontation and tension on the Korean peninsula and put the brakes on North-South dialogue by reinforcing the U.S. air force in South Korea.

Not satisfied with spy activities carried out by infiltrating high-speed and high-altitude SR-71 reconnaissance planes and U-2 planes over the Korean peninsula each day, the U.S. authorities are attempting to again drag modern-type reconnaissance planes into South Korea from Japan. Their aim is clear.

The fact that the U.S. authorities are continuously increasing armed forces while stating that they want to see a relaxation of tension on the Korean peninsula and that dialogue between the North and South of Korea should be inspired exposes the fact that there is no truth in their remarks. Through such an act by the United States, we again see through the dark intention hidden in its false remarks about peace.

We cannot but pay serious attention to the fact that the U.S. authorities announced open reinforcement of their forces in South Korea at a time when the No Tae-u government's anti-democratic and anti-dialogue moves have dropped their disguise and it has become mired in an extreme crisis.

Needless to say, such an attitude by the United States is designed to save its colonial fascist rule, which has become mired in a crisis, by supporting the South Korean dictatorial regime by means of strength.

A terrible atmosphere is prevailing in South Korea where the fascist dictatorial regime, in an effort to maintain itself, resorts to wholesale fascist outrages, taking issue with the patriotic Pyongyang trip of Rev Mun Ik-hwan and branding the democratic and reunification forces as leftist pro-communist forces.

By supporting through force of arms the South Korean authorities who have taken off even the mask of democracy, the U.S. authorities prove that they are the very one seeking fascism and division.

The government of the Republic, putting forward concrete proposals for phased arms reduction on the Korean peninsula, is making every effort to realize them.

Building up the armed forces by the U.S. authorities, far from responding to our sincere proposals for disarmament, is a challenge to peace on the Korean peninsula and in Asia and a mockery of the trend toward international detente.

The U.S. authorities should clearly understand that if they persist in the policy of strength, going against the trend of the times, they will drink a bitter cup, exploding the anti-U.S. sentiment among the South Korean people.

If the United States truly wants detente and peace, it should stop at once its arms buildup in South Korea and take a step without delay to withdraw the armed forces it has introduced.

The United States and the South Korean authorities should act with discretion, looking squarely at the situation prevailing in South Korea.

[Dated] 28 April 1989, Pyongyang

Transfer of Planes Questioned

SK2804100589 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0959 GMT
28 Apr 89

[“Why Are They Transferring Eagle Nest?]

[Text] Pyongyang April 28 (KCNA)—MINJU CHOSON today comments on the recent announcement of the Japan-based U.S. forces command that ten “RF-4C” reconnaissance planes and forces belonging to the 15th

Tactical Reconnaissance Flying Corps of the U.S. Airforce based in Kadena, Japan, would be moved to the Taegu base in South Korea within this year.

This means the transfer of the eagle nest to South Korea from Japan and it is virtually part of their arms buildup, says the news analyst, adding:

This transfer is aimed to further intensify aerial espionage against the northern half of Korea.

If the U.S. imperialists do not want to unleash another war on the Korean peninsula, there will be no need to move the up-to-date spy planes to South Korea for intensified air espionage.

This step of the U.S. imperialists to reinforce their aggression armed forces in South Korea, instead of withdrawing them, clearly shows once again that, though the administration has changed in the United States, there has not been a change in its policy of aggression on Korea, the news analyst points out, and goes on:

The reckless large-scale military manoeuvres, support to the South Korean puppet army and massive buildup of the aggression armed forces have further increased the danger of war on the Korean peninsula.

We are closely watching the U.S. imperialists' new war provocation moves and will never allow any military provocation.

CPRF Denounces Buildup

SK2804053489 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0456 GMT
28 Apr 89

[Text] Pyongyang April 28 (KCNA)—The Secretariat of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland [CPRF] in its Information No. 544 dated April 27 denounced the U.S. imperialists' stepped-up arms buildup in South Korea.

Recalling the announcement of the U.S. imperialists that they will transfer 10 “RF-4C” reconnaissance planes and forces of the U.S. Airforce 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Flying Corps based in the Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, Japan, to the base in Taegu by the end of December this year, the information says:

This is part of their policy of strength aimed at hastening preparations for a war against the North. It is a heinous challenge to the desire of the entire Korean people for peace and peaceful reunification.

The U.S. imperialists who have turned South Korea into the biggest nuclear depot in the far east announced only recently that they would deploy in South Korea latest-type fighter bombers “F-15E”, and are bringing in more warplanes after promoting the detachment of the U.S. 5th Airforce stationed in South Korea to the U.S. 7th Airforce.

They have already covered Seoul and all other areas of South Korea with military bases and installations and are these days building new air bases in Cheju Island and Sosan, South Chungchong Province, and pressing ahead with a plan for the stockpile of reserve war supplies worth two billion dollars.

They are reinforcing their aggression armed forces and continually rendering the situation strained on the Korean peninsula today when the international situation on the whole is tending toward detente and peace. This shows all the more clearly that their talk about "detente," "peace" and the like is a sham.

Zhao Ziyang, Kim Il-song Visit Nampo

Inspect Steel Complex

SK2804052789 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0519 GMT
28 Apr 89

[Text] Pyongyang April 28 (KCNA)—Comrade Zhao Ziyang, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, on an official goodwill visit to Korea inspected the Hwanghae Iron and Steel Complex today.

Comrade Kim Il-song, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea [WPK] went to the complex with him.

Tens of thousands of workers and their families and school children and students lined the long route, carrying flags of Korea and China, bunches of flowers and balloons in their hands.

When the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song and respected Comrade Zhao Ziyang arrived there, the crowd enthusiastically welcomed them, bursting into the cheers of "hurrah!"

Cadres accompanying Comrade Zhao Ziyang and his entourage went with him.

The guests were accompanied by Ho Tam, member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea; Choe Kwang, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee and chief of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army; and other officials concerned.

Comrade Kim Il-song and Comrade Zhao Ziyang were greeted by Kang Hyon-su, member of the WPK Central Committee, chief secretary of the North Hwanghae Provincial party committee and chairman of the North Hwanghae Provincial People's Committee; Choe Man-hyon, member of the WPK Central Committee and minister of metal industry; Kim Hyong-chong, chairman of the North Hwanghae Provincial Administration and Economic Guidance Committee; and leading officials of the Hwanghae iron and steel complex.

The guests first saw tapping operation.

Then they made a round of the production processes of the continuous roughing site of the steel shop and the youth wire rod shop.

Visit West Sea Barrage

SK2804111089 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1101 GMT
28 Apr 89

[Text] Pyongyang April 28 (KCNA)—Comrade Zhao Ziyang, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, on an official goodwill visit to Korea, inspected the West Sea Barrage on April 28.

Comrade Kim Il-song, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea [WPK], went there with him.

The cadres accompanying Comrade Zhao Ziyang and his suite members went with him.

Ho Tam, member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the WPK Central Committee; Choe Kwang, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee and chief of the general staff of the Korean People's Army; and other officials concerned went with the guests.

The West Sea Barrage was festively decorated.

When the boat carrying the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song and respected Comrade Zhao Ziyang arrived at the wharf of the West Sea Barrage from the Hwanghae Iron and Steel Complex, the crowds warmly welcomed them, sending up cheers of "hurrah!"

Comrade Kim Il-song and Comrade Zhao Ziyang were met there by Pak Song-il, chief secretary of the Nampo Municipal Party Committee and chairman of the Nampo Municipal People's Committee, and Chang In-sok, chairman of the Nampo Municipal Administration and Economic Guidance Committee, who are members of the WPK Central Committee.

Comrade Zhao Ziyang went round the West Sea Barrage which was built in a short period of five years by soldiers of the Korean People's Army and builders with our own designs, technique and efforts under the far-reaching nature-remaking plan of the Workers' Party of Korea.

The guests enjoyed a bird's-eye view of the barrage on the observatory.

Citizens of Nampo warmly saw off the friendly envoy of the fraternal Chinese people along the route.

Attend Banquet

SK2804104589 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1029 GMT
28 Apr 89

[Text] Pyongyang April 28 (KCNA)—The Nampo Municipal Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea [WPK] arranged a banquet today in honor of Comrade Zhao Ziyang, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, visiting Nampo.

Comrade Kim Il-song, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, was present.

Invited there were the entourage of comrade General Secretary Zhao Ziyang and his suite members.

On hand were Ho Tam, member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the WPK Central Committee; Choe Kwang, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee and chief of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army; and other officials.

Pak Sung-il, member of the WPK Central Committee and chief secretary of the Nampo Municipal Party Committee, made a speech at the banquet.

He warmly welcomed Comrade Zhao Ziyang, an outstanding activist of the Chinese party and state and a close friend of the Korean people, and his entourage on behalf of the Nampo municipal party committee and the entire party members and working people of Nampo.

Though it is your first visit to our municipality, Comrade General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, the Nampo citizens well know about the noble efforts made by you for the triumphant progress of the Chinese revolution and the strengthening and development of Korea-China friendship and about the great exploits you have performed in this course, and pay high regards to this, said the speaker.

The Nampo citizens feel particular intimacy for the Chinese people and always hope that the revolution and construction will go on smoothly in China, Pak Sung-il said, and continued:

Now the Chinese people under the correct guidance of Comrades Zhao Ziyang and Deng Xiaoping and other leaders of the Communist Party of China are vigorously endeavouring to build a modern and powerful socialist state with the characteristics of China by promoting the policy of reforms and open policy, while maintaining the four cardinal principles, in response to the decisions of the 13th National Congress of the CPC. As a result, the economy is developing rapidly and the might of the People's Republic of China is growing daily.

The stronger China grows and the higher its position rises in the international arena, the greater its contribution to socialism and the cause of peace in Asia and the rest of the world.

Our people sincerely and warmly congratulate the fraternal Chinese people on all their achievements and wish them greater success in their future struggle to turn their country into a prosperous, democratic and civilized socialist state in a short period by energetically promoting both material and mental civilization of socialism.

Korea-China friendship is noblest one based on deep comradely trust and revolutionary obligation between the leaders of the two countries, and indestructible great one which has been sealed in blood in the struggle against common enemies and has stoutly grown, overcoming all the rough storms for over half a century.

The peoples of the two countries know well what precious wealth the Korea-China friendship deeply rooted in their hearts is for the revolutionary struggle in the two countries, for peace in Asia and the world at present and for the victory of the cause of socialism and communism in which they have to walk together a long and rugged path.

We citizens of Nampo will make every effort for the friendship and solidarity between the parties and peoples of the two countries, in response to our party's consolidate and develop the traditional Korea-China friendship generation after generation and invariably and firmly adhere to the comradely obligation sealed with the fraternal Chinese people, said Pak Sung-il.

The banquet proceeded in an amicable atmosphere overflowing with the feelings of friendship.

Zhao Speaks at Banquet

SK2804105089 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1040 GMT
28 Apr 89

[Text] Pyongyang April 28 (KCNA)—Comrade Zhao Ziyang, general secretary of the central committee of the communist party of China, made a speech at a banquet given today by the Nampo Municipal Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea [WPK].

Stressing that the deep fraternal friendship between China and Korea touched him and his entourage very much during his goodwill visit to Korea, he said:

The main purpose of my visit to your country was to meet Comrade General Secretary Kim Il-song and see the great achievements made by the Korean people in socialist construction under the leadership of the Workers' Party of Korea.

The healthy sight of Comrade Kim Il-song delighted me greatly.

I had sincere and friendly talks with Comrade Kim Il-song and exchanged sufficient views on many questions.

This has contributed to further deepening understanding between us and developing sino-Korean friendship. I am deeply satisfied with this.

This time we visited Kwangbok Street, Chongchun Street and the Nungnado Stadium built at the "speed of the 80s" and went round the large-scale Sunchon Vinalon Complex and the Korea-China Friendship Taekam Cooperative Farm. And today we visited the Hwanghae Iron and Steel Complex and the renowned West Sea barrage. We witnessed enormous achievements made by the Korean people in socialist construction under the leadership of the Workers' Party of Korea and the high spirits and inexhaustible wisdom of the Korean people. These have left deep impressions to us.

I would like to take this opportunity to extend warm congratulations to the industrious and resourceful Korean people.

Great friendship exists between the two parties, two countries and two peoples of China and Korea. The Sino-Korean friendship forged with blood has overcome all tests of history over the past half a century. The Communist Party of China, the Chinese Government and people will make all their efforts in the future, too, as in the past, to consolidate and develop this great friendship.

Protocol on Talks With Romania Signed

SK2804110189 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1057 GMT
28 Apr 89

[Text] Pyongyang April 28 (KCNA)—A protocol of the 14th meeting of the Inter-Governmental Economic and Scientific-Technological Consultative Committee of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Romanian Socialist Republic was signed at the Mansudae Assembly Hall on April 28.

It was signed by DPRK Vice-Premier Hong Song-nam and First Deputy Prime Minister of the Romanian Government Ion Dinca.

South Korea

Editorial Criticizes Remarks by U.S. Officials

SK2704120589 Seoul HANGYORE SINMUN in Korean
25 Apr 89 p 6

[Editorial: "Does It Want Democratization in Korea To Fail?—We Criticize American Officials' Remarks"]

[Text] A survey of the attitudes that the U.S. Administration and some of its officials have recently adopted toward Korean affairs shows that U.S. policy toward Korea has not changed at all. What is more, "U.S. policy toward Korea, which is worked out to serve solely U.S. national security and interests," appears to be once again in its "prime" thanks to some U.S. news organizations that have joined forces with the U.S. officials. Whenever the political situation in Korea has shown some signs of unrest, they always pour cold water on the democratic process in Korea, which is cautiously walking on thin ice,

and encourage some hard-line forces opposing democratization by alluding to the possibility of a southward invasion by North Korea or a coup d'état by the Korean Army. It must be noted that they speak and act exactly as they always do.

Even though some in the United States are aware of the strong anti-U.S. consciousness in Korea and act cautiously, utterances and reports hurting the democratic process in Korea continue to come from the United States in rapid succession. Participants in a meeting of the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs held on 27 February, including U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Clark, are reported to have said: Successive U.S. ambassadors to South Korea have suggested that in terms of culture, South Korea is not fit for democracy as it is bound by its Confucian traditions. Following remarks of this kind that cast doubt on democratization in Korea, the U.S. daily THE WALL STREET JOURNAL went so far as to suggest that "the possibility of another coup d'état in South Korea cannot be ruled out entirely" in a hackneyed but hair raising and threatening article.

This report by THE WALL STREET JOURNAL makes one wonder whether it was not written with a deliberate purpose in that it was printed at a time when the process of democratization in Korea was experiencing difficulty due to Rev Mun Ik-hwan's visit to North Korea.

Before rebutting the notion that South Korea is unfit for democracy because of its Confucian traditions, we cannot but ask the United States: On what basis did it say that there could be another coup d'état in South Korea, a country that has gone through the 19 April uprising and the June resistance struggle with which the people have kept Chon Tu-hwan, the dictator, from prolonging his stay in power on the strength of U.S. support. Also, we have no choice but to pay great attention to and harbor doubt about the fact that such reports and utterances continue to grow in perfect order in the United States.

What has amplified this more than anything else is the remark by the commander of U.S. Forces in Korea Louis Menetrey who said in his testimony before the U.S. Senate's Armed Services Committee hearings: I am concerned about the fact that the North Korean leadership may be convinced the possibility of taking over South Korea is growing stronger. It might be more convinced that it is possible to successfully bring South Korea under its rule if it believes it is exercising considerable influence over the degree and nature of unrest in South Korea.

After saying that South Korea is unfit for democracy, the officials in the U.S. Administration have now hinted at the possibility of another coup d'état as the political situation became unstable and have finally begun to mention the shopworn threat of North Korea's southward invasion.

The seriousness of the matter is that such a public figure as the commander of the U.S. Forces in South Korea went so far as to allude to the labor movement, the student movement, and the intellectual movement being under the influence of North Korea.

In view of the substance and the manner of delivery, the remarks and reports hurting our country's democratization that continue to come from the United States require that we raise our vigilance against their conjuring up an atmosphere similar to that on the eve of Chon Tu-hwan's ascending to power.

Trade-Industry Chief Discusses U.S. Relations
SK2804012589 Seoul SEOUL SINMUN in Korean
25 Apr 89 p 5

[Interview with Trade and Industry Minister Han Sung-su by reporter An Pyong-chan—date and place not given]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Reporter's remarks] When he returned to his office on the morning of 24 April after 216 hours' absence after holding trade negotiations in the United States, Minister Trade and Industry Han Sung-su was starting to get extremely busy visiting Chongwadae and the office of the deputy prime minister to make reports and receive visiting Japanese business leaders in the afternoon.

Despite the hard march in Washington to avoid being designated a priority foreign country [PFC], he did not look exhausted. This may be because the PFC question is a very serious pending issue for our government. [passage omitted]

[An] It seems that the people's concern is now whether our country will be designated a PFC or not. As a Cabinet member in charge of the issue, can you give any concrete explanation?

[Han] I am sorry that I am unable to do that. However, please know that the government is doing its best under the circumstances to avoid our country being designated a PFC. Some American news media have reported that an atmosphere is growing in Korea that being designated a PFC is unavoidable. However, we still have time, until 30 May.

[Reporter's remarks] Minister Han sipped green tea, as if he had a dry throat. Then, he seemed to ponder something else. Maybe he was reminding himself of the saying that one awaits providence after one does what one can do.

[An] Was there any result from your U.S. visit? It was the first visit you paid as the responsible minister in connection with the Korean-U.S. trade friction.

[Han] Rather than any results, I think I created an atmosphere of negotiation in my own way. I can say this was the significance of my visit. I met many people from

the U.S. Administration, Congress, and journalistic circle and explained Korea's political and economic situation to them and urged their understanding. In particular, I stressed again and again that they should consider the impact on the political relations between the two countries, such as anti-American sentiment which would grow, if our country is designated a PFC.

[An] Did you mean that if our country is designated a PFC, that would influence democratization in our country?

[Han] Yes. I also asked them why they try to create impact against Korea, while offering indirect support for the democratization in the Phillipines. [passage omitted]

[An] How agreeable were they with your logic?

[Han] Instead of the Congressmen, the Cabinet members of the U.S. Government seemed to understand what I was saying. I think this was because both the Reagan and the Bush administrations underwent or is undergoing the situation in which the opposition camp is larger than the ruling camp. When I said that in our country, too, the opposition camps are stronger than the ruling camp, they seemed to feel as if they were meeting an ally. The problem is the U.S. Congress.

[An] If that is the case, considering the present air in the U.S. Congress, do you mean that it is inescapable for our country to be designated a PFC?

[Han] I gave full explanations to the U.S. Congress as well. As you know, only 3 percent of the U.S. population are farmers. However, their voices are very strong, and Congressmen, too, cannot be ignorant of their constituencies. Trade Representative Carla Hills, who is known as a tough hard-liner, seemed to understand our explanations to some degree. But, she, too, said that I should try to convince Congress, though she could understand what I was saying. So, I realized that the U.S. Congress was both the cause of the problem and the source of its solution. [passage omitted]

[An] Carla Hills also said that designating our country a PFC is a fait accompli, didn't she?

[Han] Madame Hills agreed with my point of view that the ROK-U.S. trade issue should be considered with a bird's-eye view on the global economy as a whole. However, she also seemed to be helpless before Congress. The larger opposition camp is a problem for the United States as well.

[An] Even though it seems somewhat late, our ruling and opposition parties are likely to make a joint effort to settle the ROK-U.S. trade issue.

[Han] I think even that is very fortunate. In terms of system and budget, it is true that our country's public relations and lobbying are very inactive in comparison with Japan and Taiwan. Furthermore, we are behind

even in developing export markets other than the American market and in expanding investments abroad. Even our lobbying activities have been conducted only toward a small number of high-ranking U.S. Government and Congressional people.

By using an enormous amount of money, Japan makes effort to create friendly public sentiment through news media organizations, and Taiwan operates a private lobbying organization toward the people of all circles. This is a well-known fact. As for the number of hired lobbyists, as of 1985 Japan had 119 lobbyists, Taiwan 31, and our country only 27 (statistics by Korea Traders Association).

[An] At any rate, it seems that the countdown has started for designating our country a PFC. Under these circumstances, does the government have any counterplan which would be implemented when our country is designated a PFC?

[Han] You can think that being designated as a PFC is not an instant retaliation but the beginning of negotiation. However, if our country is designated a PFC, we should withdraw the proposals which we put forth to avoid becoming a PFC and should start to renegotiate. Of course, our shock and damage would be great. We currently are exerting all-out efforts to avoid designation as a PFC. Therefore, it is not the time to immediately work out any serious counterplan.

[An] Don't you think that our relations with the United States should be completely reexamined if our country is designated a PFC?

[Han] There would be various side effects at home and abroad. It would be necessary to make an effort to mitigate the damage. However, our present stand is that it is very difficult to concede in opening the agricultural market, even if we would be designated a PFC.

[An] What is our future plan?

[Han] We should work out measures for negotiation to avoid retaliation after we are designated as a PFC, and it is important to conduct the work of persuasion through various channels to make them realize our situation.

[Reporter's remarks] Minister Han stressed that our lawmakers' diplomatic activities should be intensified, because the U.S. Trade Representative is under the strong influence of Congress. He said that such diplomatic activities should not be limited to a small number of people, but should be comprehensively conducted toward all senators and representatives.

Minister Han also added that systematic cooperation is necessary between government and industry because industry would be the first to suffer if we are designated a PFC.

Daily Advocates Diplomacy in Depth With U.S.
SK2804075789 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean
27 Apr 89 p 2

[Editorial: "Direction for Trade Diplomacy Toward the United States"]

[Text] There is a rush for trade diplomacy with the United States. A working-level negotiation group led by an assistant minister of commerce is carrying out its activities in Washington, and Minister of Commerce Han Sung-su returned home a few days ago after staying in Washington for a week.

Deputy Prime Minister Cho Sun will also go to the United States on 29 April. While belatedly stressing that it is necessary for lawmakers to carry out trade diplomacy, the National Assembly is also moving to organize a delegation, soon, to send it to the United States.

This is natural in view of trade disputes that are raging furiously between Korea and the United States. And it is all the more so because our country is very likely to be designated a priority foreign country for comprehensive negotiations by the U.S. Trade Representative's Office.

If a country is designated a priority foreign country, in less than 20 days the U.S. Trade Representative's Office starts an investigation into the relevant country's unfair trade practices and will request the relevant country to enter direct negotiations with the United States. The United States can levy a 100-percent retaliatory tariff on the relevant country's goods. Even when designated, the relevant country can have an approximately 1 and 1/2 year grace period until actual action is taken. However, if a country is designated, the impact is very great.

Therefore, we recognize that all diplomatic means must be used in alleviating a strong stand within and outside the U.S. Administration toward Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and other countries that enjoy surpluses in trade with the United States. As far as Korea is concerned, in particular, the level of Korea's income and foreign exchange reserves are lower than those of Japan and Taiwan, and Korea also faces a more difficult political and social situation than Japan and Taiwan do. Among the issues of further opening our markets for agricultural products, abolishing import restrictions stipulated by special laws, easing foreign investment restrictions, and other trade issues between Korea and the United States, we have virtually no room for compromise over the issue of increasing our imports of U.S. agricultural goods.

In a sense, this is an issue that must be dealt with at a political level. It is reasonable that the government says that it will make ministerial contacts, rather than working-level contacts, in order to persuade the United States.

However, the question is how efficient it is for high-level officials to successively and hastily visit Washington when or just before problems occur. The press interview

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of Minister of Commerce Han greatly disappointed us. Simply put, he said that the prospect is dim for our country to avoid designation as a priority foreign country; that even when we are designated, we will still have a year and that he would try hard during this period; and that we have so far been negligent in our diplomacy toward the U.S. Congress. His explanation was pessimistic and offers only frustration.

We know that probably there were invisible and incalculable achievements in his visit. It is necessary for us to explain, though belatedly, our economic situation, which has been aggravated since the outset of this year; our balance of payments; labor-management relations; and the democratization issue.

What is important is to make diplomatic efforts to persistently foster trust at a governmental, civilian, and parliamentary level. It is necessary for us to continuously maintain friendly ties with working-level U.S. officials and businessmen and to contact the U.S. Congress, which represents public opinion, in order to explain that trade disputes were caused by their weak competitiveness and that punitive measures violate the spirit of the GATT. We must penetrate each state and carry out diplomacy on the civilian level in such a way as to stress how beneficial trade with us is to U.S. consumers. Diplomacy with only high-ranking officials in Washington has its limits. The trade issue has been raised in relation with the anti-U.S. movement in the country, U.S.-Korean military relations, and northern diplomacy on the whole. It is necessary for us to enter negotiations persistently in an overall manner in order to restore trust, instead of being happy with immediate gains or lamenting immediate losses.

ROK, Japan Agree To Postpone No's Visit
SK2804013589 Seoul YONHAP in English 0132 GMT
28 Apr 89

[Text] Seoul, April 28 (YONHAP)—South Korea and Japan have agreed to postpone President No Tae-u's official visit to Tokyo from late May until a date to be decided through diplomatic channels, presidential spokesman Yi Su-chung announced Friday.

The Japanese Government broached the possibility of delaying No's trip after Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita announced his resignation, Yi said.

"Our government reached the judgement, after prudent consideration of the Japanese political situation, that it is difficult to push ahead with No's trip as scheduled," he said.

"Our government, therefore, offered to delay it, and the Japanese Government accepted our proposal, agreeing to discuss a new itinerary. Japan informally conveyed its willingness to postpone the presidential visit, saying it would be inappropriate to proceed with the official visit."

A government source said No could visit Japan in the fall or next year. The trip was earlier delayed by Emperor Hirohito's death early this year.

Government Offers To Help North Fight Measles
SK2704130189 Seoul Television Service in Korean
1200 GMT 27 Apr 89

[Text] The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs has offered to provide North Korea with preventive medicine, medication, and medical manpower, if the North Korean authorities want them, to help them in activities to prevent the spread of measles in North Korea.

North Urged To Heed Changes in Socialist Areas
SK2704110589 Seoul SEOUL SINMUN in Korean
25 Apr 89 p 2

[Editorial: "New Challenges to China"]

[Text] Although the Chinese student demonstrations calling for democratization following the death and funeral of former CPC General Secretary Hu Yaobang appear to be under control, it is very likely that they will have an enormous effect on the speed and ways of carrying out China's political and economic reforms.

Compared with the reforms under way in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in East European countries, the economic reforms China is experimenting with are one step ahead. However, the demands of the Chinese people who have awakened to what is happening in the outside world are far greater than the realities in China can meet and with political reform lagging behind economic reform, it is natural for the Chinese Government's stopgap measures to be short of satisfying to the Chinese people. As a result, the students' frustration over the snail's pace of the economic reforms will remain dormant, but are expected to explode whenever unrest that comes natural in the turmoil of changing period provides it with an outlet.

Just as the memorial service for Premier Zhou Enlai in 1976 led to the downfall of the then Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping after it turned into a mass demonstration called the "Tiananmen Incident," it remains to be seen what kind of wind will blow in the aftermath of Hu's death.

The root cause of the student demonstrations lies in the fact that the economic reform promoted first by Hu and then by General Secretary Zhao Ziyang had begun to slow down conspicuously since last fall after conservatives put on brake on it and in the fact that the Chinese Government lacks the capabilities of satisfying the demands for political democratization and economic reform all at the same time.

It is true that some socialist countries have introduced some of the capitalist market principles in order to overcome the contradictions inherent in the socialist system, which has obviously failed to satisfy the political

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and economic demands of people living in the later half of the 20th century, and these changes have been quite successful. However, China is now faced with twin ordeals, namely the contradictory socialist political system that is so closed and so self-righteous and the contradiction caused by the unfair distribution of wealth and corruption common to the capitalist system.

In a sense, the student criticism and discontent currently are largely been fueled by their ardent aspirations for more freedom, which is the fruit of the opening and development that have been made possible by Deng Xiaoping's pragmatist lines.

To a certain degree, this can be said to be the trouble common to all of the socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, which are probing ways of overcoming the stagnation and contradictions communist party-dominated one-party authoritarianism through experimenting with the capitalist market principles. In a bid to overcome such contradictions, Gorbachev's Soviet Union has recently revised election laws in conformity with social changes, while Hungary and Poland, as we witness, are boldly attempting gradual reforms in their political and economic systems.

It remains to be seen whether Deng Xiaoping, whose modernization program has failed to effect political reform and to prevent corruption in the midst of the whirlwind of reform that went out of control, will leave the political scene or not and how the Chinese Government, which is blamed by the students and people for inflation, the centralization of power, and the failure to prevent corruption, will respond to their voices. What agonizes the Chinese leaders is that in reality there is no clear-cut way to cope with such problems.

These are the problems that accompany development and advances and even North Korea will inevitably realize that it cannot keep the heat and voices of changes and development under way in the Soviet Union, East European countries, and China from reaching their ears indefinitely. It is hoped that North Korea will gain from its fraternal socialist countries the wisdom to rid itself of the curtain before it is too late.

* Anti-South Media Functions Analyzed

Seoul NAEWOE TONGSIN in Korean
No 629, 3 Mar 89 pp 1c-8c

[Unattributed article: "Characters and Functions of Media for North-South Dialogue—the True Colors of the 'Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland' and the 'Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland'"']

[Text] North Korea has of late further stepped up its strategic propaganda to the South through such disguised peace instruments as the "Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland" [CPRF].

After postponing unilaterally a scheduled preliminary contact for North-South parliamentary talks for reasons involving the Team Spirit'89 exercise, North Korea launched propaganda to shift the responsibility to the South Korean side in its media daily; at the same time, it kept sending various inflammatory messages to South Korea through CPRF, the "Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland" [DFRF], and the "South Korean National Democratic Front" [SKNDF], an apparatus for malicious propaganda concerning South Korea.

These disguised peace instruments are all vanguard groups of the KWP [Korean Workers Party]. In the past, whenever tension and confrontation heightened between South and North Korea, those media grew increasingly vociferous. Since the beginning of this year in particular, while sending a larger variety of seditious messages than ever, they have come to the fore to act as a liaison point for dialogue.

CPRF on 8 February issued a "spokesman's statement" denying domestic and foreign press reports on alleged behind-the-scenes contacts for a South-North summit. Earlier on 7 February, it published a seditious message through a regular "secretariat's report" relating to the inquiries into the Kwangju incident and Fifth Republic irregularity cases.

On 15 February, it sent a letter to the National Alliance for Democracy proposing a "working-level contact to prepare for an all-Korea national convention" to obscure the existing North-South dialogue channels. Earlier at the beginning of the year, CPRF, in the name of its chairman, Ho Tam, had invited Chong Chu-yong, honorary chairman of the Hyundai group, to visit North Korea. It thus took on the role of a contact point with the South.

Meanwhile, DFRF on 27 February issued what it called a "secretariat's white paper," a propaganda sheet distorting President No Tae-u's performance in the first year of his presidency and seeking to drive a wedge between our government and people. As for SKNDF, it has also daily sought to spread rumors and incite violence through the clandestine radio "Voice of National Salvation" in order to create political and social confusion in South Korea.

In addition to these vanguard groups for clandestine operations against South Korea, North Korea has the "Consultative Council of South Korean Personages in North Korea to Promote Peaceful Reunification" and the "Korea National Committee for the Defense of Peace." Of the two, the former virtually exists in name only because its leaders, all abductees from the South, have either died or are too old and weak, while the other group is not being used much either because its members are of little note and the group is mainly involved with activities relating to world peace issues.

Therefore, it can be said that the CPRF, DFRF and SKNDF are the instruments currently being used most effectively by North Korea in its clandestine South Korea activities. Those vanguard groups were organized to create a favorable environment for the KWP to carry out its strategy for a South Korean revolution.

These organizations use various forms of propaganda and agitation, including statements, white papers, memoranda, talks, secretariat's reports, and sheets of charges, which, in substance, are two-faced and constantly changing. Today they may be devoted to issuing messages of a peace offensive, but tomorrow shift to inflammatory rhetoric inciting violence.

Since the beginning of this year, taking advantage of the surging controversies in South Korea over its relationship with North Korea and other political, economic and social issues, North Korea has been using these front organizations even more positively for propaganda messages to the South. To sum up the facts about these organizations and their activities:

CPRF:

According to North Korean propaganda, CPRF was organized on 13 May 1961 at Kim Il-song's suggestion. Looking back, those were the days the Second Republic had come into being in the South as a result of the 19 April 1960, student uprising; on 15 August the same year, North Korea proposed national reunification based on a North-South confederation system in a stepped-up peace offensive toward the South.

In addition to the political confusion following the student uprising, an unprincipled, sentimental national unification debate spread among our people. Some students indulged in a visionary unification mood, chanting such slogans as "Go to the North. Come to the South. And let's meet at Panmunjom!"

Taking this change in the situation into account, North Korea organized CPRF, ostensibly as a body to carry out the nation's reunification. In their mission, there is no difference between DFRF, which had been organized earlier, and CPRF; however, there are some differences between the two in their nature and lineup.

North Korea claims that CPRF is made up of political parties and public organizations. But it is different from DFRF in nature. Being a special covert operations apparatus exclusively dedicated to matters relating to national reunification, CPRF's mission and role are limited ones. Since it acts as the contact point on reunification-related matters, CPRF is, needless to say, in the KWP's grip. At present, the CPRF chairman is Ho Tam, member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the KWP Central Committee.

As regards its nature, it can be said that CPRF is, in a nutshell, an organization that directly acts for the KWP on matters concerning the latter's national reunification line. As seen in its proposal for the tripartite talks in January 1984, CPRF's major activities include agitation for the U.S. troop withdrawal and antigovernment, anti-U.S. struggles, opening of joint fronts with various circles alleging to be the "patriotic forces" in South Korea, and canvassing for international support of North Korea's national reunification line.

Besides those proposals through CPRF as a front body, North Korea has lately been stepping up a variety of propaganda and agitation activities toward the South. As the means of agitation, it mainly uses the regular "secretariat's report," combining it with so-called statements, white papers, memoranda, sheets of charges and open questionnaires. Occasionally, a form of press conference is used to mass produce seditious messages intended for influencing developments in South Korea.

CPRF last year put greater emphasis on propaganda and agitation relating to a North-South joint conference, the Team Spirit military exercise and the Seoul Olympic games. Since the beginning of this year, it has issued a number of propaganda and agitation messages focusing on major pending political issues in South Korea such as North-South political talks, the Kwangju uprising for democracy and Fifth Republic irregularity cases.

Those messages issued by CPRF are all couched in such plausible peace terms as "national harmony and solidarity" or "dialogue efforts to resolve national problems"; basically, however, they are habitually filled with inflammatory phrases aimed at spawning a revolutionary atmosphere in South Korea and carrying through North Korea's reunification-through-communication line.

DFRF:

A North Korean political dictionary (1977 edition) defines DFRF as an "organization to unite anti-imperialist, patriotic forces in the southern half of the country and contribute to the struggle for the nationwide victory of the Korean revolution."

DFRF was formed on 29 June 1949 with the merger of the "Democratic Front of North Korea" (formed in July 1947) and the "Democratic Front of South Korea" (formed in February 1946). While insisting from the beginning that the cause of national reunification "should be carried out by the South Korean people themselves," DFRF pursued its reunification front strategy through activities calling for, among other things, the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the UN commission from South Korea. Such being the cause it is dedicated to, DFRF now embraces 20 organizations including three political parties—the KWP, the Social Democratic Party and the Young Friends Party [Chondoist Chongu Party]—and public organizations such as the League of

Socialist Working Youth, the General Federation of Trade Unions and the Agricultural Workers Union, plus the Korean Christians League and the Korean Buddhist Association.

Thus, ostensibly DFRF is made up by a multitude of parties and organizations, for the purpose of creating impressions that they all support and defend the dictatorship of the KWP.

Following the liberation of Korea, DFRF proposed a general election for North and South Korea to establish a legislature. It also proposed an election committee representing North and South Korean political parties and public organizations. Through these and other activities, it spearheaded operations to communize South Korea. On 23 January 1979, it came up with an unrealistic all-Korea national convention plan, proposing that besides the parties and organizations in South and North Korea, patriotic personalities in all walks of life and overseas Korean organizations and individuals be allowed to take part in it.

On 6 August 1981, a DFRF joint declaration was published calling for a "convention to expedite national reunification" to be held by representatives of South and North Korean political parties and public organizations and representatives of overseas Koreans. Characteristic of these proposals was DFRF's professed readiness to meet with South Korean or overseas Korean individuals except those from the South Korean Government, in a gesture of opening the door of dialogue to any one at any time.

In the background of these moves, however, there were these facts: DFRF had flatly rejected South Korea's 12 January proposal for mutual visits of the top South and North Korean leaders and its 5 June proposal for a South-North summit meeting. The moves also reflected an attempt to cause political and social confusion in South Korea through the creation of a joint reunification front.

The subsequent North Korean activities through DFRF, including the call for North-South dialogue, largely avoided whatever may have led to specific results but focused on efforts to make propaganda gains both domestically and internationally. This had the effect of exposing to the public eye DFRF's true colors as a puppet body and, as a result, North Korea has lately been observed refraining from making proposals through DFRF or using DFRF in a peace offensive.

In addition, North Korea apparently takes this point into consideration: although DFRF is the most representative organization, ostensibly it is a consultative body embracing all political groups in North Korea and, such being the nature of the organization, it would lessen its value as a reunification front if used directly as a front for denunciation propaganda on South Korea.

SKNDF:

SKNDF, formerly called the Revolutionary Party for Reunification [RPR], is a clandestine propaganda apparatus which actually does not exist in the ROK. This is a fact known to every one.

Nevertheless, North Korea continues to use SKNDF as a front to incite a violent revolution in South Korea in various ways. Using the Voice of National Salvation, its propaganda radio, SKNDF keeps broadcasting to South Korea, with no letup, seditious propaganda materials full of falsehood and fabrications.

History of the RPR, the predecessor of SKNDF, dates back to July 1968, when ROK authorities made a wholesale arrest of a spy ring headed by Yi Mun-kyu, who had been sent to South Korea after receiving secret training from the KWP Liaison Department, which crushed North Korea's attempt to form an underground party organization. RPR was the tentative title of that organization.

Later in August 1968, North Korea printed a false report in NODONG SINMUN that "according to a report from Seoul, RPR has been revived in South Korea." Also, in a disguised propaganda show, it published a declaration of the so-called RPR Central Committee and an RPR political program.

North Korea has staged various make-believe shows pretending that RPR actually existed. For example, on every occasion marking a major event in North Korea such as a party congress or Kim Il-song's birthday, a so-called RPR representative would show up staging a clumsy play of vilifying the ROK Government and extolling North Korean systems.

The falsehood was even extended overseas. On 18 April 1975, a ghost organization existing only in name, called the RPR Committee for Solidarity with Koreans in Japan, was created and it even published MINJOK TONGIL SINMUN [NATIONAL REUNIFICATION NEWSPAPER] as its organ. At the same time, the absurdity went so far as to send persons posing as RPR representatives to various international events.

North Korea at a plenary meeting of the RPR Central Committee on 27 July 1985 changed the name of the organization from RPR to SKNDF, and the radio Voice of RPR to "Voice of National Salvation." The meeting also adopted and published a "declaration" concerning the name changes, a new program and constitution and a list of as many as 250 inflammatory slogans.

The declaration set forth what it called an immediate program, including "realization of democratic government," "development of a self-supporting national economy," "realization of independent, peaceful reunification," etc. It indeed was a long list of items wrapped in such words as "democratic," "national" and "independent"—terms North Korea loves to use as euphemisms.

While the declaration seemingly avoided use of such radical terms as "revolution" as much as possible, it was replete with those sugar-coated words—"national" and "democratic," actually meaning "anti-U.S." and "antigovernment" respectively, and "independent" or "self-reliant" meaning things based on Kim Il-song's chuché idea.

*** Chondaehyop Participation in Festival Stalled**
Seoul HANGYORE SINMUN in Korean 21 Mar 89 p 5

[Article by reporter Kim Chi-sok]

[Text] The plan of Chondaehyop (National Council of Student Representatives) to participate in the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students, scheduled for July in Pyongyang, hit a snag as the Promotion Committee for South-North University Student Exchanges (chaired by Professor Chong Yong-sok of Tanguk University) has declared an end to its mediation efforts.

The Promotion Committee, charged with delivery of letters and mediation between South and North Korea, on 16 March declared that "the North Korean side and Chondaehyop persist in their demand for direct talks between them, which runs counter to the policy of our government. Therefore, we hereby abandon our mediation efforts."

According to the Promotion Committee and government sources, "although the Promotion Committee has made positive efforts toward participation by our students in the World Festival of Youth and Students since the committee was inaugurated on 31 January—proposing among other things South-North university student talks on exchanges—Chondaehyop has continued to reject the presence of the Promotion Committee, persistently demanding direct talks with the North Korean side. Therefore, we find it meaningless to continue our efforts."

The action leads to a virtual blockade of routes for Chondaehyop to receive government consideration on such matters as personal safety and accommodations. This inevitably makes the group's participation in the festival impossible.

It seems that this shift in the attitude of the government and the Promotion Committee has been prompted by a recent change in the political atmosphere as well as by their basic distrust of North Korea.

Since the Korean Student Committee of North Korea (chaired by Kim Chang-nyong) sent Chondaehyop an invitation to the festival on 26 December of last year, the government has been skeptical about the true intention of the North Korean side.

The government's thinking has been that the North Korean intention in picking Chondaehyop is to add fuel to domestic feuds and to split public opinion in South Korea by drawing Chondaehyop—a leader in such

movements as the struggle for South-North student talks—into a socialist political event and thus to use Chondaehyop to create an environment conducive to a "South Korean revolution."

The government, citing this reason, notes that the North Koreans themselves have been saying in their propaganda that "the upcoming festival will greatly encourage the South Korean youth, students, and people who are waging vigorous struggles against U.S. imperialism and for independence, against fascism and for democracy, and for the independent and peaceful reunification of the country."

Furthermore, the government charged that North Korea abruptly and unilaterally postponed the eighth preliminary contact for the proposed parliamentary talks on 8 February, 2 days before the scheduled contact, for reasons involving the Team Spirit exercise, and that it also rejected the Red Cross talks and is seeking dialogue and contacts only with specified groups such as Chonminnyon [National Coalition of the Movement for Democracy and the Nation].

Meanwhile, in the students' view, the government was not in favor of Chondaehyop's participation in the festival in the first place, but had to form the Promotion Committee to avoid anything that might contradict its pursuit of the revisionist Nordpolitik. And now, it decided that the time is appropriate to abandon efforts relating to the festival participation.

Also, the fact that the conservative camp has lately intensified an ideological offensive in connection with the issue of the midterm assessment of the president's performance seems to be a factor that influenced the decision of the government and the Promotion Committee.

Their feeling is that although the government had, in a way, been left so far with no alternative but to heed student demands, the time has come to draw the line, for the survival of the regime among other things. The government's position seems to be that should proposed direct talks between Chondaehyop and the North Korean side be tolerated, it would not only signal the yielding of the initiative in the national unification movement to a nongovernmental sector but also threaten the existence of the regime itself.

Chondaehyop attaches greater importance to the struggle for the festival participation than to the participation itself. It seeks to "launch, through the struggle for the festival participation, a massive campaign for the awareness of a correct path to national unification, and thus create great momentum for struggles to ease tension and secure peace."

At the same time, arguing that "the present regime pursues a German-type exchange policy premised on a perpetual national division," Chondaehyop insists that "through the struggle for the festival participation, we

must take the initiative in the exchange issue, launch a massive, independent, and unification-oriented movement for South-North exchanges and see that consciousness of democratic unity and anti-U.S. awareness take root more broadly and firmly."

Therefore, from Chondaehyop's standpoint, participation in the festival is important, but it would be meaningless unless carried out in a form that promotes the movement for independent exchanges. As a result, no talks but direct ones with North Korea are acceptable to it.

Meanwhile, the North Korean side shows a relatively realistic attitude with an eye on both the ROK Government and Chondaehyop.

The Korean Preparation Committee for the World Festival of Youth and Students (chaired by Choe Yong-hae) and the Korean Student Committee stated in a letter sent to the Promotion Committee on 15 March that "we will meet with the Promotion Committee on the condition that we will also hold talks with Chondaehyop representatives."

"At a time when Chondaehyop does not belong to the Promotion Committee and, therefore, neither of them can represent the other, it is quite appropriate and reasonable that we meet with both Chondaehyop and the Promotion Committee," the North Korean letter said, noting that "there is no reason why the Promotion Committee should be unable to accept our reasonable and realistic proposal."

While holding on to the basic line that led to its inviting Chondaehyop, North Korea's attitude seems to reflect its judgment that without the ROK Government's approval Chondaehyop's festival participation is impossible. At the same time, it apparently seeks to induce Chondaehyop's participation in the festival.

However, the government and the Promotion Committee have now turned down the North Korean proposal—to North Korea's disappointment, one may say.

Under the present circumstances, the possibility is almost nil of Chondaehyop joining the Promotion Committee to open the way for North Korea to recognize the Promotion Committee as the sole party to deal with. Also, a general meeting of the International Preparation Committee (IPC) is scheduled for late March to determine a final list of organizations taking part in the festival. This is another factor making Chondaehyop's participation impossible.

Consequently, the war of nerves involving the government, Chondaehyop, and North Korea over the festival participation issue since late last year is likely to take on a new aspect.

Chondaehyop, which had set forth the festival participation struggle, together with the struggle for democracy, as its top-priority activity for this year, will continue to press its festival participation demand on the government.

On the other hand, the government will try to convince the public of the unrealistic attitude of Chondaehyop, pointing to Chondaehyop's refusal to join the Promotion Committee.

Chondaehyop believes that the festival participation struggle will draw far greater support and response from the people than the 10 June and 15 August 1988 struggles for South-North student talks. On the other hand, as far as the government is concerned, it has done all it could and the people will perhaps think so, too.

Therefore, it is highly possible that the festival participation issue will spark massive physical clashes in the future between students and the government.

With regard to the Pyongyang festival participation issue, the ruling and opposition parties and other public leaders heretofore had their own speculations but basically agreed that "it is better that they go and participate."

Many people find it distressing that the festival participation plan hit a snag over the question of a preparatory liaison point and threatens to be a source of contention between the government and students.

Official To Represent UNIDO in Poland

SK2804090589 Seoul YONHAP in English 0858 GMT
28 Apr 89

[Text] Seoul, April 28 (YONHAP)—A South Korean official leaves for Warsaw Sunday to represent the Investment Promotion Service of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in the Polish capital, the Science and Technology Ministry said Friday.

The step is an exchange with Polish UNIDO official Piotr Kuzniewski, who arrived in Seoul April 20, a spokesman for the ministry said.

Seoul has no diplomatic ties with any communist country except Hungary, with which it exchanged ambassadors Feb. 1.

The Polish investment expert is scheduled to stay at UNIDO's Seoul office for a year, during which time he is expected to introduce to Korean businessmen his country's investment policy and environment along with information on joint ventures in the technology and investment fields.

Warsaw has reportedly prepared 150 projects in almost all industrial sectors from textiles to electronics for technical cooperation and joint ventures with small- and medium-sized Korean businesses, the spokesman said.

The Korean expert, a Finance Ministry official, who will be stationed in Warsaw for a year, is to promote cooperation in technology and investment between the countries and to pave the way for economic cooperation with other East European nations, he said.

Export Increase to Asian NICs Reported
*SK2804030789 Seoul YONHAP in English 0227 GMT
28 Apr 89*

[Text] Seoul, April 28 (YONHAP)—South Korean exports to newly industrializing countries (NICs) in Asia are increasing, in contrast with stagnant exports to the United States and other industrialized nations, the Korea Trade Promotion Corp. reported Friday.

Shipments to Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore have recorded their highest increase rates ever over the past three years, surpassing the United States, Japan and the European Economic Community.

Exports to Taiwan soared 69.9 percent in 1986, 66.7 percent in 1987 and 71.9 percent in 1988, but have slipped to 54.3 percent growth in the first quarter of this year amid an overall slowdown in export growth, the report said.

Exports to Hong Kong grew 30.3 percent in 1987, 61.6 percent in 1988 and 25 percent during the first three months, while shipments to Singapore rose 74.6 percent and 46.2 percent in 1987 and 1988, respectively, and in the first quarter climbed 36.8 percent.

Exports to the three NICs accounted for 7.4 percent of South Korea's exports in 1987, 9.7 percent last year and 10.9 percent during the first quarter of this year.

Exports to the three "Asian dragons" were worth 1,524 million U.S. dollars during January-March, far more than the 1,178 million dollars for West Germany, France and Britain, which imported more Korean merchandise than the Asian countries until 1986.

Though the volume is still small, exports to Australia and Africa grew 58.6 percent and 56.3 percent, respectively, over the past three months compared with the same period last year.

The changing trade structure is a result of the Korean won's continued appreciation and the stepped-up protectionist measures against Korean commodities by industrialized countries, the report said.

Industrialized nations' negative trade policy against Korea will accelerate the change in export patterns, it said.

Korea To Develop GSP Trade System
*SK2804022189 Seoul YONHAP in English 0212 GMT
28 Apr 89*

[Text] Seoul, April 28 (YONHAP)—South Korea, following the example of industrialized countries, plans to adopt a generalized system of preferences (GSP) that will give trade favors to developing nations. GSP features tariff cuts and quota increases intended to encourage exports from developing countries.

A spokesman for the Trade and Industry Ministry said Friday it will expand exports to developing nations on a deferred payment basis and enlarge the economic development cooperation fund for those countries.

In a meeting designed to streamline Korea's trade system and chaired by Vice Trade and Industry Minister Yim In-tae, the ministry also decided to lift or ease various import restrictions, including scrapping the import diversification system, the official said. Participants also decided to accelerate liberalization of the agricultural, foreign exchange, capital and service sectors in what the spokesman called an effort to take more responsibility for the world economy.

The trade system will be made more consistent with rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which promote free trade, and the Uruguay round of multilateral trade negotiations, he said. Laws, including the foreign trade law, will be rewritten next year and then revised after the Uruguay round ends in 1992.

Various procedures for trade will be streamlined. The revisions will improve the import-export license system, the control system on export-import items, the compensation system for trading partners and the adoption of countermeasures to unfair trade practices, he said.

Better Relations With Pacific Nations Desirable
*SK2804025289 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD in English
28 Apr 89 p 8*

[Editorial: "Ties With Pacific Nations"]

[Text] Though for good reasons, Korea's foreign relations have long been lopsidedly preoccupied with big nations and well-known cultures in the Americas, Europe, Asia and Africa. In the meantime, Oceania, particularly the mid-Pacific countries and peoples of Polynesia and Micronesia, have tended to be left in neglect.

With the greater degree of self-determination and the international advances of many of these nations, it has become necessary and desirable to turn our eyes and ears to them. They are no longer negligible but increasingly self-assertive, vibrant and viable—politically, economically and culturally important.

It is most meaningful at this juncture that missions from a few of the nations are visiting Korea for economic consultation and cultural exchange. A 13-member Hawaiian folk dance troupe from the Polynesian Cultural Center in Oahu is in Seoul to present a cross-section of the traditional arts, crafts and folklore of the peoples of the sprawling and diverse Polynesian islands.

A Fijian economic mission and entertainment group are also visiting Korea for similar purposes. The 15-member Showcase Fiji contingent accompanies a Fiji Trade and Investment Board delegation to Seoul and Taipei. The rare appearance of these groups is worthy of our hearty welcome and appreciation.

Their visits here should be reciprocated in the near future for the sake of exploring and developing closer amicable and beneficial relations between Korea and its potential partners in the Pacific for shared prosperity.

Some Foreigners To Undergo AIDS Testing
SK2804030389 Seoul YONHAP in English 0251 GMT
28 Apr 89

[Text] Seoul, April 28 (YONHAP)—Some categories of foreigners staying in South Korea for more than 91 days will be required to undergo an AIDS test from September, a spokesman for the Health and Social Affairs Ministry said Friday.

Aliens employed by Korean companies or government agencies and foreign researchers, students, trainees, entertainers and athletes who have stayed or are to stay for more than 91 days will be required to undergo the test, he said. But journalists, diplomats and their family members, soldiers stationed here and all foreigners accompanied by a spouse are not required to submit to the test.

U.S. military personnel with orders to travel overseas will be retested and if found positive for the AIDS virus will not be assigned outside the United States, he said.

Anybody entering the country with a medical certificate showing that they were tested for AIDS by an official quarantine or medical center and found free of the deadly virus will not be retested in Korea, the spokesman said.

AIDS tests for foreigners will be required under a revision to the law on the prevention of AIDS.

Eight Koreans have died out of 41 who have tested positive for the AIDS virus as of April 27. Another went abroad, and the rest—22 males and 10 females—are under "special care." The first Korean AIDS carrier was detected in 1985 and 11 of the 41 were detected since last November, when foreigners from more than 160 countries were here for less than 91 days to take part in the Seoul Olympic games, the spokesman said.

3,000 Policemen Resign To Protest Assault
SK2804084589 Seoul YONHAP in English 0827 GMT
28 Apr 89

[By Hong Sang-pyo]

[Text] Seoul, April 28 (YONHAP)—More than 3,000 South Korean police officers tendered their resignations en masse Friday to protest an assault on a police superintendent by an opposition lawmaker.

Police officials said more officers of the 130,000-strong national police force are expected to join the unprecedented protest.

Rep. Sim Wan-ku of the Reunification Democratic Party [RDP] allegedly slapped Supt. Chong U-yong, chief of the Traffic Department of Changwon police station, on Thursday.

Slapping somebody in the face is traditionally considered one of the gravest insults in Korea.

Sim was in the provincial capital, 285 kilometers south of Seoul, to investigate claims by two workers of a electronics company that they were tortured with an electric cattle prods during questioning at Changwon police station about labor activities. Sim was a member of his party's team sent to the southern industrial city to probe rampant labor disputes.

Sim and four other RDP lawmakers became angry when police arrested a labor union leader they were escorting into the police station and fighting between the lawmakers and a column of riot policemen started before Sim struck the police superintendent, according to news reports.

Police officers who have tendered their resignations include Choe Chae-sam, chief of the police bureau of South Kyongsang Province and commander of the city's police, and senior officers from Kyongsang Police Bureau and Pusan City Police Bureau.

Cho Chong-suk, director of the National Police Headquarters, has said he will reject their resignations but expressed deep displeasure over the behaviour of the lawmaker.

Sim claims that he was assaulted first during the melee at the entrance to the police station. Police had blocked workers from going inside the station because some 10,000 striking workers from 12 factories were clashing with riot police in the city at the time.

The incident may develop political overtones amid the growing labor strife across the country, analysts said. The ruling party, siding with the police, who often have been criticized for violating human rights during interrogations, denounced Sim's offense as an "obvious criminal act" and demanded that he be disciplined by the National Assembly.

Police also threatened the two-term lawmaker, saying he may be sued for slander and charged with obstructing justice.

Sim and his party dismiss the resignations as an attempt to cover up torture of the two workers.

The RDP, led by Kim Yong-sam, sent a delegation to Prime Minister Kang Yong-hun Friday afternoon to register an official complaint against the police's "distorting and magnifying an episode triggered by its rude actions."

The other two opposition parties, the Party for Peace and Democracy and the New Democratic Republican Party, are remaining carefully neutral but have expressed regrets over both Sim's "unrestrained act" and the emotional response of the police.

Prosecutor-General Kim Ki-chun has ordered prosecutors to investigate the incident and to take stern action against anyone found to be responsible.

Novelist Hwang Sok-yong Arrives in Tokyo
SK2804013689 Seoul *THE KOREA TIMES* in English
28 Apr 89 p 3

[By correspondent Chong Hun]

[Text] TOKYO—Dissident writer Hwang Sok-yong arrived in Tokyo from Beijing yesterday after a controversial month-long visit to North Korea.

Hwang, 45, told reporters at Narita International Airport he would travel to a third country if he cannot renew his visa to stay in Japan when it expires after 15 days.

Hwang said he would write what he saw and heard in North Korea while staying in Japan. "I won't go home until I finish writing. If they refuse to renew my visa, then I will move on to a third country," he added.

The Seoul government authorities announced Monday that Hwang would be arrested when he returns home on charges on violating the National Security Law, which prohibits unauthorized visit to North Korea.

Wife Questioned About Trip
SK2804013289 Seoul *THE KOREA TIMES* in English
28 Apr 89 p 3

[Text] Ms. Kim Myong-su, wife of novelist Hwang Sok-yong, has been questioned in connection with her husband's visit to North Korea, it was belatedly learned yesterday.

Ms. Kim, 35, was taken to the Agency for National Security Planning April 11 and quizzed whether she knew beforehand about Hwang's Pyongyang trip.

Chon's Brother-in-law Gets Suspended Sentence
SK2804081089 Seoul *YONHAP* in English 0749 GMT
28 Apr 89

[Text] Seoul, April 28 (YONHAP)—Stunned prosecutors watched in disbelief Friday as a brother-in-law of former President Chon Tu-hwan was released by a Seoul district court with a suspended sentence, an event experts described as "exceptional," after being convicted of embezzlement.

Seoul District Criminal Court sentenced Yi Chang-sok, 38-year-old brother of Yi Sun-cha, Chon's wife, to three years in prison and fined him 2 billion won (3 million U.S. dollars), but suspended the prison term for five years.

Prosecutor Kim Hui-son, who had requested a seven-year prison term and 3.5 billion won fine, said he will immediately appeal to a higher court because the ruling is totally unacceptable.

"In light of an earlier court ruling that sent Kim In-pae, a former secretary-general of the Ilhae Foundation who embezzled 90 million won but repaid it, to jail for eight months, the verdict in Yi's case lacked balance," he said.

The judge said in meting out the ruling that the sentence was suspended because Yi repented and repayed the entire amount of taxes he evaded.

Yi was arrested and indicted on Dec. 2 last year on charges of embezzling 2.9 billion won (4.36 million dollars) and of evading 1.7 billion won (2.6 million dollars) in taxes while head of a steel company from 1984 to 1986.

Korea's Law on Economic Crimes, which governs Yi's case, calls for a prison term of from five years up to life when the amount embezzled is between 1 billion won and 5 billion won.

The Ilhae Foundation, set up by Chon in 1983, came under public fire for its coercive fundraising from big businesses and for Chon's plans to use it as a base for influencing his successor after retirement.

Yi was the last of Chon's relatives arrested in an extensive crackdown on members of the former first family involved in corruption during Chon's rule.

Chon's younger brother, Chon Kyong-hwan, is serving a seven-year term for corruption, and his elder brother, Chon Ki-hwan, is standing trial on similar charges.

Chon and his wife have been living in self-imposed exile at a remote Buddhist monastery since Chon apologized for the corruption of his relatives and his misrule and left Seoul in late November last year.

28 April 1989

Prime Minister Kang Yong-hun Interviewed
*SK2604114589 Seoul Television Service in Korean
 1247 GMT 24 Apr 89*

[Interview with Prime Minister Kang Yong-hun by reporter Sin, director of the Korean Broadcasting System political desk, videotaped on 24 April; place not given]

[Text] [Sin] The current situation is chaotic. It seems to us that the whole country is adrift. The exercise of public power by the government authorities, which have assumed a hard line attitude with Rev Mun Ik-hwan's visit to Pyongyang and the labor dispute at the Hyundai Heavy Industrial Company as an occasion, and the moves of workers, students, and off-stage dissidents who are countering the exercise of public power alike are ill-boding developments. Watching such developments the people are feeling ill at ease. Defining the current situation as a national crisis, the political circles have expressed, though belated, their will to bring all pending issues into the political sphere and to discuss them there. What does the government think of the current situation? How will the government cope with the current situation? In this hour we will meet Prime Minister Kang Yong-hun and ask him about these problems.

How are you, prime minister? Thank you very much for your being with our audience tonight. More than 4 months have passed since you assumed the post of prime minister. Haven't you had trouble in performing your duty?

[Kang] Yes, more than 4 months have passed since I assumed this post. I have been very busy, so I have been unaware of the passage of time.

[Sin] I understand that recently you made a trip to major cities throughout the country in order to have a dialogue with the people. What was the cause of the people's discontent?

[Kang] I think our recent trip to major cities was a good opportunity for the people to meet with the prime minister and ministers concerned and to deliver their frank opinion, not their discontent. It was also a good opportunity for the government to explain its policies to the people.

[Sin] Rumors prevail that workers will wage a general strike on 1 May, May Day. The people feel uneasy about this. The majority of our people want to prevent such a general strike at any cost. Do you have any good idea that can not only prevent the general strike but also solve the workers' demands to some extent?

[Kang] I have heard there are destructive forces in our society that are attempting to paralyze the people's livelihood and to overthrow the present government and free democratic system by inspiring workers across the country to wage nationwide joint strikes. The government has established all possible steps against this. The government's stand on labor-management relations and

disputes is firm. The government has encouraged workers and entrepreneurs to solve their disputes by peaceful means. However, the government will sternly punish those entrepreneurs who perpetrate illegal labor activities and those workers who perpetrate violence and destruction. Anyway, the government is making all possible efforts to solve labor-management disputes and to improve labor-management relations.

[Sin] The campus problem is also one of the problems that we must worry about. Of course, the problem of rectifying the present college entrance examination system and the problem of rearranging high school-group districts in cities are important. However, no less important is the need to solve the disturbances at some universities, including Korea University. Some universities have suspended their classes. Some people view such an extreme situation in which universities have to close their gates and to suspend classes as a crisis of the state. What is your plan to normalize such a campus situation?

[Kang] The government's basic policy is that the school authorities and students should solve all campus issues themselves. Nevertheless, universities have failed to solve their problems peacefully and by themselves. Some universities have suspended classes. Students have occupied the offices of their president. Some violent students have destroyed school facilities. Such a phenomenon is indeed heart-rending. Of course, the government wants these campus disturbances to be solved by the joint efforts of university authorities and students. However, in case universities fail to solve such campus disturbances by themselves and request public power in order to bring the campus chaos under control, the government will inevitably have to exercise its public power in response to the request. In fact, the government, the school authorities, and the people alike do not want to exercise public power. However, the government and the people alike will not tolerate some radical students who are openly attempting to turn university campuses into revolutionary bases.

[Sin] Now I would like to hear your opinion on the question of reunification. Some hold that our reunification policy has been shaken because of Mun Ik-hwan's visit to Pyongyang and that our reunification policy does not accord with the 7 July declaration. Some other people indicate that the government put extreme emphasis on its northern policy and the need for exchange with the North with an eye toward the midterm assessment and that as a result the people have come to have impetuous expectations toward reunification. What do you think about this?

[Kang] It is inconceivable that our government's reunification policy has been shaken in the wake of Rev Mun's visit to Pyongyang. The basic purpose of the 7 July declaration was to restore and develop the essence of our national community through exchanges between the North and the South under the principle agreed upon

between the authorities of the two sides and, thus, to provide a foundation for the peaceful reunification of the country. One thing that I would like to clearly indicate here is that in the course of establishing the reunification policy we should accept and accommodate the broad opinion of the people. We have made efforts to accept and accommodate the people's opinion thus far. However, the main body which executes and carries out the reunification policy is precisely the government. Our people should know this fact.

[Sin] It is true that the so-called Mun Ik-hwan incident created confusion among the people with regard to the government's reunification policy. Don't you think that the government should bear responsibility in this regard?

[Kang] The North Korean strategy toward South Korea uses a legal means, an illegal means, a peaceful means, or a violent means to create a revolutionary atmosphere in South Korea. This is the basis of the North Korean strategy toward South Korea. In other words, the North Korean strategy changes very often. Our people have misunderstood such frequent changes in North Korean strategy as the inconsistency of our government's reunification policy. We know this was because of our government's insufficient public information activity toward the people on its reunification policy. We feel responsibility for this point.

[Sin] People hold that the arrest of Professor Yi Yong-hui and the investigations of the cadre members of HANGYORE SINMUN are suppression of the press. What do you think about this?

[Kang] It is inconceivable that the present government can suppress the press. If the people think the government can suppress the press, this is a big mistake. Speaking of the case of Professor Yi, he planned to visit North Korea without the government's approval in violation of our existing law. Because of this he has been under investigation according to legal procedures. It is utterly wrong and unjust to view such legal procedures against an individual who has violated the law as suppression of the press.

[Sin] There have been controversies about the Joint Public Security Investigation Center which has been established under the excuse of liquidating the leftist forces. People say that the center is perpetrating excessive investigations. The opposition parties and the dissident organizations are calling for the immediate dismantlement of the center, declaring it to be an illegal organization. What do you think about the investigation center?

[Kang] I have heard people alleging that the Joint Investigation Center is an illegal organization. I know our prosecution office has already refuted such an allegation. The Joint Public Security Investigation Center is composed of the police, the Agency for National Security Planning, and other government organs having judicial power according to the Criminal Procedure Law and the

Law on the Prosecutors' Office. It has been organized to conduct more effective and cooperative investigations among these governmental organs under the prosecution office. The government's consistent policy is that any forces which attempt to destroy public security order and to overthrow the government and the free democratic system should be and will be sternly punished.

[Sin] I do not know whether this interview has been conducive to fully explaining to our people about what they want to know. The people's demands are increasing and their voices are various. We know that under such a situation, it is very difficult to solve the problems facing the government today. However, it is true that the people feel uneasy about today's situation. Therefore, we expect that the government will take active measures so that our people can lead their routine life in peace.

[Kang] We should clearly know the true colors of the forces that attempt to overthrow our government and the free democratic system. We should also prevent the beautiful land from being destroyed by such destructive forces at any cost. Democratization cannot be achieved at one time as insisted on by those who advocate mass revolution. Democratization in other countries needed a long period of 200 to 300 years. Our situation is different from this. In other words, our country is accelerating to consummate this great democratization task in the shortest period of time. Therefore, we should know the truth that in order to consummate this task it is imperative for us to advance step by step. So, our people should not be impatient but should unite as one.

[Sin] Thank you.

Security Agents Crack Down on Illegal Strikes
SK2804015689 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
28 Apr 89 p 3

[Text] Security agents have arrested 30 leading unionists and dissidents including Song Kye-son, 41, chairman of Samyang Oils & Fats Company's trade union, and Chong Kum-chae, 31, a labor counselor, in an intensive crack-down on illegal violent strikes.

The Joint Public Security Investigation Headquarters announced yesterday that it had arrested 30 people in all—19 unionists and 11 dissident labor activists since it launched investigations into the illegal walkouts last Tuesday.

The investigators also arrested three business representatives including Son Ui-mu, 51, president of Wonil Industrial Co., holding them responsible for wages in arrears and "camouflage" shutdowns.

Seventeen people were arrested by the joint investigation team before the clampdown, charged with masterminding and instigating illegal strikes.

Song, investigators alleged, had since March 17 led an illegal work stoppage in the oils and fats company, browbeating workers into staying clear of the workshops.

He is also suspected of incarcerating those who wanted to work, according to the probing result.

He is also charged with obstruction of duty in connection with the hurling of petrol bombs at riot police who hastened to the strike scene.

Chang, director of the labor counselling office at the Panwol Industrial Complex, is charged with illegally intervening in Anyang Electronics Co. and two other firms in the industrial estate over the past one year, the investigators alleged.

Son of Wonil Industrial was put under formal arrest for giving walking papers to 61 unionized workers under the pretext that he would have to shut down the factory being hard up for money.

The probe team alleged that Kim Hak-su, 53, representative of Sangwon Coal Mine Co., had failed to pay wages for six months from last September.

Wages overdue reach about 230 million won, according to the probing.

Yu Son-ho, 77, president of Tongyong Mine Co., was arrested charged with bilking employees of roughly 73 million won in wages.

Police moved in to discourage the workers from continuing an illegal violent strike at Samyang Oil & Feed Co. last Saturday.

The security investigation headquarters sent riot police in at Yuhun Electronics Co. in the Panwol Industrial Complex so that they might disperse violent striking workers.

Police led away 37 strikers from the scene for probing.

Business Leaders Bid To Calm Labor Disputes
SK2804075089 Seoul YONHAP in English 0739 GMT
28 Apr 89

[Text] Seoul, April 28 (YONHAP)—South Korea's business leaders, in a bid to calm raging labor disputes on the eve of expected May Day demonstrations, have promised fair distribution of profits and open management.

Heads of five major business bodies, in a joint news conference Friday, said employers will explain management decisions to workers to create an environment of mutual trust.

"We are determined to avoid trouble through dialogue with labor without interference from outside forces and respecting legal procedures," they said. They also pledged to allow employees to share further profits and to increase productivity and wages through investments.

They said they are responsible for the pain the nation is currently experiencing due to serious labor conflicts and expressed their determination to solve the situation. They appealed to workers for help in coping with the crisis, in which the nation's exports are slowing down and a growing number of small businesses are going bankrupt.

The five business leaders were Yu Chang-sun, chairman of the Federation of Korean Industries; Kim Sang-ha, president of the Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry; Hwang Sung-min, president of the Korea Federation of Small Businesses; Pak Yong-hak, vice president of the Korean Traders Association; and Kim Chang-sung, vice chairman of the Korea Employers' Association.

Their announcement comes amid spreading clashes between workers and riot police across the nation and predictions of a general strike on May Day.

Seoul National Students Boycott Classes
SK2804020489 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
28 Apr 89 p 3

[Text] Students at 15 departments at Seoul National University [SNU] went into a five-day class-boycott yesterday in protest against the government's crackdown on dissidents and reform-minded labor unionists.

The SNU student move took on a charted course as student council leaders last week decided not to attend the school temporarily to form a "student-worker" coalition timed with the May Day celebrations.

About 3,000 students gathered at the university's Acropolis Plaza and called for their schoolmates to join in the class-boycott. They denounced the government for its preemptive measure in the form of the arrest of a group of key dissident figures and union activists.

In a "sympathetic boycott" to build up forces to counter the alleged government suppression, student activists also strengthened the inter-university drive to overthrow President No Tae-u.

The call for the boycott has gained forces with students at 50 out of 106 departments at the university and is expected to extend to other universities.

Radical student groups at four other Seoul universities are boycotting classes from today through next Monday so as to tighten the so-called student-labor alliance.

Meanwhile, 13 university students in Pusan and Ulsan in Kyongsangnam-to decided yesterday not to attend classes through Mya 1 and instead to have a rally at Pusan National University.

Students in Cholla and Chungchong provinces are likely to follow suit.

Student activists plan a massive rally on the eve of the centennial of International May Day on the campus of Yonsei University.

The rally will be followed by a massive gathering of workers on the Yoido Plaza on Sunday.

* President No Authorizes Police Use of M-16's

* 'Tough' Countermeasure
41070107 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean
23 Mar 89 p 3

[Article by reporters Min Pyong-uk and Kwon Sun-tae: "Super-Tough Prescription To Cope With Leftist Violence"]

[Text] The decision adopted at the 22 March meeting of cabinet ministers concerned with public safety to permit use of weapons as a self-defensive measure against the so-called "forces attempting to overthrow the establishment" deserves attention because it is the toughest-ever government countermeasure.

The government has decided to allow the use of weapons if rioters attack public facilities or set fire to them, and to mobilize illegal power against places serving as strongholds of the forces of violence and against places being used as a factory or storehouse of privately made bombs, without granting sanctuary, whether it be a party building, a church, or a school campus. This policy is, in fact, tantamount to declaring an "all-out war to defend the establishment."

The target of this all-out war is none other than the "leftist forces of violent revolution." At the ministerial meeting on public safety, these forces were characterized as follows: "In the past, taking advantage of the radical process of democratization, they masqueraded as a democratic force. Now they have become a force which is spreading riotous and subversive activities, shouting anti-U.S. and antigovernment slogans and throwing fire bombs.... They are a force committed to acts benefiting the enemy, with their goal being the staging of a communist revolution by overturning the free democratic system."

The consensus at the meeting was that this force has widely penetrated various social strata, including school campuses, labor, publishing and cultural organizations, religious circles, and opposition parties.

At the meeting, president emphasized that "we have to subdue the violent leftist forces, with the realization that, should we fail to protect and preserve the system of free democracy, we would lose everything, including freedom."

What was confirmed at the ministerial public safety meeting was, in a word, that our present society has become a battleground between the forces dedicated to guarding the free democratic system and the forces bent on founding a communist society by overthrowing this system and by staging a class revolution, and that if the forces of democracy should retreat, they would lose everything.

There is no need to point out whether it is reasonable to define the present society as a bipolar society, an arena of competition between two opposing forces.

However, it should be noted that while the so-called "violent leftist forces" have penetrated various social strata and expanded their influence so much that they have now become the target of an all-out war, the government should be held responsible for having failed to delve into the cause of such penetration and working out countermeasures, as well as for having failed to inform the public of the leftist moves.

Recently, there has been a spate of demonstrations and strikes by workers demanding higher wages and better working conditions; and disturbances caused by a coalition of students, labor, and dissidents have grown more and more violent. But it should also be noted that the government has failed to present sufficient proof and explanation as to whether these strikes and disturbances were aimed ultimately at a class-oriented communist revolution.

In his 20 March special statement to the public, President No gave this as the first reason for having put off the promised midterm appraisal of his performance: "The violent leftist forces would intensify their acts of violence and subversion, using the midterm appraisal as a foothold for overturning the free democratic system."

These words of President No are construed as meaning that if the midterm appraisal were to be carried out as originally intended, it would entail major social unrest.

Since the inception of the Sixth Republic, the government has seized every opportunity to stress "establishment of law and order," "strengthening of state power," and "fears for growing rampancy of the leftist forces."

However, it cannot be overlooked that these often repeated expressions, together with "the utterly uneasy social phenomena," have been viewed by the public as if they were routine occurrences.

Interpreting this effort on the part of the government, observers say that in order to achieve unity, there is no alternative for the government but to come up with a theory of necessity and pinpoint the "powerful enemy" and oppose him all-out.

It seems that the government of the Sixth Republic, now that it has relieved itself of part of its political burden by indefinitely postponing the midterm appraisal, has now decided to crack down on the "violent leftist forces," in an effort to remove social unrest and the dissonance of public opinion.

In the past, the government seized every opportunity to express its determination to crack down on leftist forces and restore state power. One example is President No's "special directive on public peace" issued on 28 December of last year.

It is noteworthy that in making its latest announcement on "tough countermeasures" against violence, the government deliberately emphasized that these measures represent a "prescription of a drastic medicine" permitting the use of MK-16's if privately made bombs or Molotov cocktails are thrown at police stations and other public buildings, and thus has raised the level of reaction to violence.

However, as a matter of fact, chances are very slim that the directive permitting use of weapons will be actually carried out. Accordingly, in all probability, the directive has been intended as a "threat." Therefore, it is possible that the declaration of the super hard-nosed policy of "not hesitating to fire" may become a point of political controversy.

Speaking of the question of using weapons, at the national conference of metropolitan and provincial police bureau chiefs on the morning of 22 March, Cho Chong-sok, director general of the Korean National Police Headquarters instructed that "in case of fire bomb attack on a police box, the police should counter the attack with the determination not to hesitate to use even weapons." At the Blue House cabinet meeting held on the afternoon of the same day, an "instruction permitting the use of weapons" was adopted, making the instruction Cho had given earlier in the morning tougher still.

In this connection, at the press conference held on 22 March, Director General Cho told reporters that the instruction in question is meant as a warning that "in case of fire bomb attack on a police facility, the police should not watch with their arms folded, but should counter actively." He added that "however, in the worst case in which policemen were killed, the use of weapons is permissible from the standpoint of exercising their right of self-defense." Thus he did not rule out the possibility of using weapons.

Nevertheless, some observers point out that the current law concerning the execution of policemen's duties permits the use of weapons, although in a very limited scope, and now, by stressing the right to use weapons, the government is arousing unnecessary misunderstanding and controversy.

The criticism arising not only within the police force but also among the public is that the police decision adopted at the 22 March conference to distribute M-16's—which are weapons of war using a bullet with a large radius of gyration and hence highly lethal—to police substations and police boxes to replace existing carbines is a "dangerous idea," open to misunderstanding.

This criticism is founded, among other things, on the fact that the M-16, being a weapon which has highly lethal power and which produces a fatal result when used, is not fit for police use, under circumstances where ordinary citizens are not allowed to carry or use weapons.

In fact, last year 185 police facilities throughout the country were attacked by fire bombs. So far this year, instead of dying down, fire bomb attacks on police boxes and other police facilities have taken place frequently. According to some police officials, including those in South Cholla Province, the government has become powerless in some areas.

* Law Enforcement Needed
41070107 Seoul HANGUK ILBO in Korean
24 Mar 89 p 2

[Editorial: "Renewal of State Power and the M-16—Strict Implementation of Law Is the Only Right Way"]

[Text] The 22 March conference of ministers concerned with public safety, presided over by President No, vowed not to leave unchecked any longer violence committed by the "forces committed to overturn the government institution."

The meeting adopted a super get-tough policy permitting use of arms against anyone attacking or setting fire to public facilities, and calling for mobilization of state power against places being used as strongholds by forces of violence or places where Molotov cocktails or privately made bombs are manufactured or stored, without granting any sanctuary, whether they belong to a political party, a church, or a school.

Over the past year, we have expressed our concern time and time again that, riding the wave of democratization and liberalization, Molotov cocktails have been flying everywhere and the behavior pattern of those attempting to ram through their demands by illegal means of violence has been rampant everywhere in our society. As a matter of fact, if violence becomes more rampant with each passing day, and "forces of violence attempt to overturn the present establishment," then it is quite natural that the government should be held primarily responsible for this state of affairs.

It is a fact that, seeing the recent rampancy of violence and the deterioration of public safety, public opinion is astir, raising the question: "What is the government doing?"

However, the announcement by the director general of the National Police Headquarters of the government's decision to allow the use of weapons against violence and to supply M-16's to the police has stirred up fears of another dimension.

A weapon on hand is handy to use. I hope that the authorities will coolly consider the possibility that policemen detailed to the site of a violent demonstration, or under attack with Molotov cocktails, inasmuch as they too are human beings, will be tempted, emotionally and momentarily, to use their weapons, and if they do use weapons, it will result in a great many casualties. Needless to say, we believe that the government has worked out detailed guidelines in accordance with the Law on Policemen's Duty, but in view of the capacity of an assault weapon like the M-16, the government should seriously reconsider its decision to supply the M-16 and its ammunition.

We would like to present our views as to why state power has become so impotent and how to restore it.

First, on so many occasions during the period of the Yusin rule and the Fifth Republic, legal power was used in unethical and immoral ways. Even criminals have human rights. In the case of "violators of emergency laws," they were escorted even by unlawful means to the police station for questioning and interrogation and were even put to torture. In this way, the minions of the law served as ladies in waiting for the powers that be.

Second, we cannot but point out the fact that under such circumstances, there came to be widely spread in our society a climate in which those who merely called for democracy and the right of survival were dealt with tolerantly, even when they violated an existing law. In other words, there emerged the idea that for the sake of the struggle for democracy, it is quite all right to set fire to a police box or some other government building, or a company building, or an automobile; that is, a way of thinking which justifies violent means when the end is right.

Maybe we cannot assert that our country has been completely turned into democracy, but at least it is undeniable that it is moving in that direction.

In our opinion, now is the time for the government, particularly the police who are field agents exercising state power, to take responsibility for strictly implementing and enforcing the law. The police, instead of arresting violators of the law only on the orders or instructions of the powers that be as they have done in the past, should have a sense of responsibility to enforce the law in dealing with anyone who clearly violates existing laws, such as anyone attacking a police facility, or anyone manufacturing or possessing fire bombs.

We are of the opinion that if there is a "left-leaning force" seeking to overturn the existing establishment, it should naturally be dealt with in accordance with the law

while cracking down on street violence and disturbances of public peace and, to this end, the principle of relying on evidence should be strictly observed.

Strict law enforcement on the basis of evidence is more urgent than ever before.

We believe that if state power is exercised in a thorough-going and responsible manner in accordance with pertinent laws, including the Law on Policemen's Duty, then it is possible to exercise this power without resorting to the use of weapons, particularly without supplying an offensive weapon like the M-16.

* Political Parties React

41070107 Seoul HANGUK ILBO in Korean
24 Mar 89 p 3

[Article by reporters Cho Chae-yong and Yi Yong-song: "The Shift in Government Attitude to Super-Toughness and the Reaction of Various Parties"]

[Text] In the wake of the super-tough stand taken by the government, including its decision to exercise the "right of self-defense" to crack down on violent leftist forces and protect public facilities, the opposition camp has shown a concerted reaction critical of the decision, and the issue of the "right of self-defense" is suddenly emerging as a focus of political controversy, replacing the issue of the "interim appraisal."

The government's super-tough policy—which has come out of the blue at a time when the ruling and opposition camps were unable to find a solution to the pending political issue touched off by indefinite postponement of the midterm appraisal—is enough to throw the political scene into confusion once again, apart from the legitimacy of the new policy. As a matter of fact, in the wake of the government announcement, the political scene has been thrown into confusion with no clue in sight to solutions for various pending issues.

Adverse Effects Feared

Commending the government decision to exercise strong state power, the DJP [Democratic Justice Party] welcomed it as a "timely measure designed to preserve the establishment" and decided to work out its own follow-up measures.

Commenting on the decision, made on 22 March at the ministerial public safety meeting presided over President No, to "permit the use of arms in case of attack or incendiaryism committed against public facilities" and to "invoke legal authority if a political party or religious organization becomes a stronghold of violence," the DJP hailed it, saying that it signifies a determination to restore state power for the purpose of preserving the establishment.

In the past, the government has stressed the need to establish law and order and enhance state power, but very little has been achieved, due in part to the political reality that the ruling party is in the minority, and in part to laxity in social discipline. However, in the DJP's judgment, the time is ripe for such enhancement because, among other things, a common ground has been laid between the ruling and opposition parties with regard to achieving free democracy, with the decision to put off the midterm appraisal as the momentum, and because the majority of the public is strongly demanding that "state power be firmly established."

Quite a few in the DJP, however, fear that any implementation of the right of self-defense will be likely to have adverse effects, although a common ground has been laid on the whole with regard to the question of permitting invocation of state power. Some of them point out that the Law on Policemen's Duty has a provision for the right of self-defense, but if the M-16's supplied to police stations and police stands are used not for "warning" or "defensive" purposes, but for killing, then it may outrage public opinion.

On the contrary, hard-liners stress their position that, with the bill on Molotov cocktails stalled in the National Assembly, the government is left with no choice but to take tough measures to crack down on the violent leftist forces and to preserve the establishment. Accordingly, the prevailing view is that the government's determination in the year since inception of the Sixth Republic to strengthen state power has been a "precautionary order," whereas the radical prescription spelled out following postponement of the interim appraisal is a "mobilization order."

Moreover, it is the position of the DJP that it can no longer concede to the opposition's intent to make a political issue out of the government's get-tough policy. The DJP is determined to take this opportunity to restore the authority of state power.

Delicate Power Struggle

Regarding the government decision to strengthen state power, the PPD [Party for Peace and Democracy], as its official stand, is strongly demanding its immediate revocation, on the grounds that it is an act of throwing cold water on the conciliatory mood of the political scene. Privately, however, it is taking a wait-and-see attitude because, in its judgment, the government's get-tough policy is largely a result of a delicate internal struggle for power within the ruling camp.

At their meeting on the afternoon of 23 March, PPD executive officers took this party stand: "The get-tough policy taken by the government at a time when efforts are being made to achieve democratization through dialogue, with the postponement of the interim appraisal as a momentum, is an act which is bound to drive the political scene into catastrophe.... Inasmuch as great

perseverance is required for the realization of democratization, the government should be patient and correct the wrongdoings of the Fifth Republic and realize democratization. We want to stress that this is the only short cut to political stability."

The PPD plans to call the National Assembly Home Affairs Committee into session so that, in accordance with party policy, PPD assemblymen may press the government for revocation of the get-tough policy by calling into question the legitimacy and hidden intent behind this policy.

However, despite this official stand, most PPD party executives are of the opinion that there are two sides to the reasons for the latest government measure. On the one hand, the measure signifies that President No has acceded to persistent pressure from some quarters of the party to defend state power; on the other hand, the measure is a last recourse intended to ease strong reaction within the ruling party to the way the Chong Ho-yong case has been handled.

Interpreting the latest government measure, one PPD party executive went so far as to say that the measure was intended by President No as an "alibi" against the complaints of hard-liners within the ruling party. In the judgment of this party official, because DJP hard-liners have reacted keenly to the handling of the case of assemblyman Chong Ho-yong, to growing violent labor disputes, and to acceleration in the spread of leftist thought since the postponement of the interim appraisal, and because they have begun to openly question President No's competence to "preserve the establishment," President No had no alternative but to declare a get-tough policy as a means of pacifying the hard-liners within the party.

Therefore, in the PPD view, inasmuch as the latest government measure has strong characteristics of a pacification measure intended to subdue internal opposition within the party, and also as a covering fire for President No himself, chances are slim that it will be translated into action.

M-16's Supply Beyond Comprehension

In view of the fact that the government's declaration of its intention to "use state power without recognizing any sanctuary" has immediately followed its decision to postpone the interim appraisal, the RDP [Reunification Democratic Party] has expressed misgivings about the hidden intention behind it and has shown a sharp reaction by saying that it is an "inimical act of blackmail against all the citizenry."

At the 23 March RDP executive meeting, RDP President Kim Yong-sam expressed his longstanding conviction that "any violence, whether rightist or leftist, is of no service to democratization, and that minor violence will lead to major violence." However, he scored the latest

government measure by declaring: "Nevertheless, it is self-contradictory that the present administration—which, by postponing the interim appraisal of its performance, has admitted its inadequacy in cleaning up the wrongdoings of the Fifth Republic and settling the Kwangju issue—has first come out with a hardline measure against the public."

The RDP criticized the government measure by saying that carbines and other current means of self-defense are sufficient for the police, and yet the government has decided to supply M-16's to police stands and other police facilities, and this is "clearly an act of armed demonstration against the public." The party said that this is a "short-sighted action" that will court reaction on the part of dissident groups and lead only to a higher incidence of violence.

According to the RDP, the current law on punishing acts of violence and the recently revised law on assemblies and demonstrations are sufficient to punish Molotov-cocktail throwers. The RDP pointed out that it is beyond comprehension that, at a time when a common ground for stamping out violence is expanding, as indicated by the agreement at the recent conference of the presidents of the three parties to enact a "Law on the Prevention of Fragmentation," the administration has come out with a threatening attitude by deciding to supply M-16's to the police and to "search out leftist strongholds."

At the same time, the RDP is of the opinion that if the violent leftist forces are the enemy of society, the administration should look at the contradictions in the social structure, the breeding ground for such forces; but it is relying on countervailing measures designed only to cure the symptoms, thereby accelerating the tendency of the government to become more and more powerless.

Low Tone of Criticism

The NDRP [New Democratic Republican Party], which has long demanded firm establishment of state authority, termed as excessive the government decision to permit use of weapons if public facilities are attacked, and it is on guard against the possibility that, when an occasion arises for such use, it will lead to an unexpected development.

On the whole, NDRP officials have had a critical reaction, saying that "they should not suppress or threaten democratic forces under the pretext of cracking down on leftist forces." But the intensity of their reaction is, as expected, very mild compared with other opposition parties.

The 23 March meeting of NDRP executives, presided over by the party president, Kim Chong-pil, touched on the government decision very lightly, merely pointing out that "caution should be exercised in using weapons," and President Kim made no direct comment on this matter.

This may be viewed as a graphic reflection of the NDRP's customary perception of leftist forces. However, some say that when they recall that, after his recent Blue House talks with President No, NDRP President Kim "openly" announced that at that meeting there was complete agreement concerning how to deal with the question of leftist tendencies, it seems that Kim had already anticipated in concrete terms an offensive against the leftist forces by the pan-conservative forces. This does not seem to square with the statement issued the previous day by the party spokesman issued.

NDRP officials give the impression that they give equal stress to the proposition that "from the point of view of maintaining law and order, any legitimate use of state power is quite justifiable" and to their misgivings about the danger inherent in the use of weapons. They take the issue in hand from the concept of the "right of self-defense," and in doing so, the only issue for them is whether the government decision is "excessive."

* 'War' Declared on Violence

41090107 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean
23 Mar 89 p 3

[Article by reporter Yi Sang-chol: "Implications of the Declaration Permitting the Police To 'Invoke the Right of Self-Defense'"]

[Text] President No Tae-u has at last declared war against the forces of violence bent on destroying the establishment.

At the 22 March Blue House conference of public safety-related ministers, presided over by President No, the most potent prescription since inception of the Sixth Republic was adopted for preserving the establishment.

As symbolized by the measure to permit the police to "invoke the right of self-defense against anyone attacking or setting fire to a public facility," the 22 March conference demonstrated the resolute determination of President No and the administration to preserve the establishment, in view of the fact that the measure is more than idle talk.

It is no exaggeration to say that the decision adopted at this meeting was a manifestation of government resolve against the violent leftist forces. First, concerning incendiarism perpetrated against public facilities, the conference decided to allow the police to use weapons if it is necessary to invoke their right of self-defense. This decision signifies a shift from a patient, defensive posture to that of an offensive defense.

In addition, the decision permits the police to pursue to the end anyone committing an act of illegal violence or incendiarism or seizing public facilities and to deal with such an offender in accordance with the law. The decision also stipulates that strong state power be invoked against any "stronghold" of the forces committed to

violent class revolution. This signifies that the government will invoke state power against school campuses and other places being used as sanctuaries for those manufacturing Molotov cocktails and as hideouts for fugitives from the law.

By putting on the crackdown list not only acts of violence but also speech and behavior sympathetic to the views of North Korea as well as agitation for communist revolution in defiance of the institution of free democracy, the government makes it clear that its determination this time is not meant merely for treatment of the symptoms but is aimed at uprooting the violent leftist forces.

At the 22 March meeting, it was stressed that strong state power will be exercised against the "scene" of any labor dispute which is political in nature and transcends the bounds of a wage dispute. The decision thus indicates that the government intends at the same time to operate on the diseased parts penetrated by the leftist forces of violence.

Although not mentioned in the announcement of 23 March, the government is said to be planning to redouble its efforts to track down and search out the "headquarters" and "command posts" of violent leftist forces still hidden underground.

As a consequence, it is expected that a gale of formidable state power will sweep school campuses, strongholds of hardline dissidents, which are regarded as the bases of violent leftist forces and as sites of "extralegal scenes" rampant with violence and lawlessness.

To be sure, the "heavyhandedness" of President No and his administration stems from the public fear—and the awareness of the urgency of the situation—that if the leftist forces of violent revolution were left any further unchecked, there would be the danger that the institution of free democracy itself might collapse, as pointed out time and time again by President No.

Apparently, the government decision was prompted in particular by the problem of the Hyundai Heavy Industries workers, who have been on strike for more than 100 days, and also by the problem of the Seoul subway union workers who have continued their sit-in at an opposition party building.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that President No's decision of 22 March was not a remedy prescribed on the spur of the moment in response to these current troubles. It came as a "forewarned process" which he had intently waited to set in motion and which he finally decided to put into action, believing that this is the right time.

In announcing on 20 March the indefinite postponement of the interim appraisal, President No cited the violent and subversive actions of violent leftist forces as the first and foremost reason for the impossibility of making an interim appraisal.

He declared that the government "will achieve a stable society by first checking violent subversive activities designed to destroy the democratic order, and various illegal collective actions." Thus he made it clear that the area on which the government from now on would put foremost emphasis in its prescription for coping with the current situation would be the cracking down on the violent leftist forces.

This is eloquent proof that President No and the government have thought hard and long before coming up with the decision to crack down on the violent leftist forces. This is because, in the face of the anticipated charges from some circles of having reneged on the public pledge, the president recently announced his decision to postpone the midterm appraisal, and now has followed up with a pledge to crack down on the violent leftist forces, and this fact may be interpreted as an expression of his determination to stake his political fortune on the issue of the violent leftist forces.

Accordingly, it is expected that, in consideration of these circumstances, President No and his administration will give encouragement so that their decision may be implemented with an indomitable determination. Needless to say, it is not correct to predict that the supply of weapons to police stations will lead straight to "unconditional firing." It should be surmised that the government itself is well aware of what the worst consequences of such a contingency would be. The government decision may safely be presumed to be a "last warning" prior to horrible firing.

In this sense, as a matter of fact, we can hardly jump at the conclusion that the declaration of war will result in a radical remedy of all ills. This is because, on the one hand, in the rapid process of democratizing over the past year or more, the so-called "left-leaning forces" have turned into the "left wing," and their ideological and action-conscious operations have spread extensively over all spheres of social life and they have become entrenched as a considerable "force to be reckoned with." On the other hand, it is because the silent conservative forces, not to mention the countervailing state power, have been so shriveled in the process of democratization that it is questionable how effectively the will of the upper echelon of officialdom to act will be.

However, the prevailing view is that a major stumbling block will be the attitude of the opposition parties that dominate the current political scene where the ruling party is in the minority.

This is because judging from the position and political interest of some opposition parties which are sitting astride the fence between the institutional political forces and the radical dissident forces, it is too obvious that the government's "heavy-handed move" will first encounter strong opposition from these fence sitters. Upon hearing the government announcement on its decision to permit the police to invoke their right of

self-defense against fire bomb throwers, the three opposition parties opened a volley of fire in unison against the government, and this provides a clue to what the political weather will be like in the days ahead.

Accordingly, it is expected that the heightening mood for dialogue engendered by the ruling-opposition agreement to postpone the interim appraisal will lapse for the time being due to the government's decision to crack down on the violent leftist forces. Moreover, we cannot rule out the possibility that the political scene will be in turmoil, caught in a vicious cycle of ruling-opposition confrontation.

Particularly, it is feared that in the event that reckless firing should occur in the process of the crackdown, the political situation may face an irreparable catastrophe.

It is still unpredictable to what extent the government—which more than ever needs to maintain the mood of dialogue in order to settle the political controversy over repair of the wrongdoings of the Fifth Republic—will be able to achieve its crackdown goal in the face of such opposition and “feedback.”

This is because the consensus is that without sympathy and partnership on the part of the majority of the people and the opposition parties, President No's determination, which he has arrived at after a long period of cogitation, will hardly produce a good result.

*** Newcomers Move Into Political Power Circle**
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[Article by Kwon Yong-ki: "The Standard-Bearers for the Shifting of Political Generations: Emerging Political Elites Eyeing the Post-No/Three Kims Era"]

[Text] Rising Demand for Political Generation Shift

Judging from the results of various public opinion polls taken since the last two general elections, it appears that none of the three Kims of the opposition camp can count on being successful in the next presidential election even if they should decide to run again. Pretty much the same applies to President No Tae-u as well except, in his case, he will not be able to run again due to the constitutional constraint limiting the presidency to one 5-year term.

At this juncture, the question of "Will the three Kims of the opposition camp run again in the next presidential election? Who will be the DJP's next presidential candidate?" must be a matter of great concern to the people as a whole. Admittedly this concern seems to have been held in check during the past year, overshadowed by such pending issues as righting the wrongs committed during the Fifth Republic and getting to the bottom of the Kwangju incident. Nevertheless, the prospect for the next likely candidate to assume the national helm and

the accompanying process of inevitable changes in the lineup of the leadership group on the political scene—i.e., the political elites—are a matter of ongoing concern to the people at all times.

Moreover, the changes currently being experienced by our society are such that they may very well be termed revolutionary in nature, and the task of having these revolutionary ardors and energies properly channeled and moving toward the realization of a democratic society falls on the political sector. It is, therefore, to be expected that the political sector will be undergoing a transformation at a pace even faster than in other sectors. If any politician expects politics to be dictated by a handful of political leaders and the next presidential election which is 3-4 years away to be conducted in a situation little different from today's, he is making a gross miscalculation. When all other sectors are changing, there is no way for the political sector alone to remain unchanged.

The craving of the people for a fresh look in politics will converge as a call for the emergence of new political elites fit for the 1990's above all else. Such craving for change is likely to lead to a demand for a shakeup not only of the top leaders of political parties but also of other influential figures on the political scene. The pending interim appraisal of President No's performance and implementation of the local self-governing system—the two most important political issues yet to be resolved—will undoubtedly prove to be the variables having significant catalytic impact on the emergence of new political elites and the exeunt of politicans of the old era.

The people's craving for new political leaders has been clearly reflected in the results of various public opinion polls.

In a poll of 1,500 eligible voters nationwide, taken on 10 December last year by the Press and Cultural Institute of Sogang University, 24.9 percent of the respondents said that they "would vote for someone other than No and the three Kims if a presidential election were held today." The poll revealed that the number of voters withholding their support for No and the three Kims was higher than the number supporting each of the four political leaders. Several polls taken by Gallup of Korea thus far have consistently shown that some 20 percent of those surveyed are holding back their support for No and the three Kims.

Signs of Emerging Political Elites for the New Era

Although still pretty much latent, the formation of a new political leadership or a mid-level group destined to lead our politics in the coming era is already showing budding signs even within political circles. The less-than-satisfactory generation shift in the political sector thus far has been due to the weakness of the alternative political force.

Nevertheless, the sirocco-like frenzy of National Assembly hearings, kicked off by the hearing on the affairs of the Ilhae Foundation conducted by the assembly's ad hoc committee looking into the improprieties of the Fifth Republic, has demonstrated a possibility for the emergence of new political elites fit for an era of open politics.

In the early seventies, against the backdrop of Pak Chong-hui's scheme to perpetuate his dictatorship through a constitutional amendment paving the way for his third term in office, within the opposition rose a call for "standard-bearers in their forties" which gained not only moral justification but momentum as well; likewise, the now-expected emergence of new political elites in time for the nineties, an era in which dialogue and compromise rather than confrontation and a democratic and reunification-oriented thought process will be in demand more than anything else, can be considered more than logical in some sense.

As it is the task of the militants to destroy the bastion of dictatorship, so it is the domain of a different kind of "specialist" to build a new structure on the site of ruins. One of the special features of the last National Assembly election was that a massive number of political newcomers emerged victorious while the so-called big-name politicians suffered losses. Of the 299 total elected for the 13th National Assembly, 56.2 percent or 168 members were first-time winners; that so many political newcomers with professional background as lawyers, professors, and movement activists debated at this National Assembly was a precursor of what was in store for the political arena. It was mostly these freshman members of the assembly who proved to have star qualities at the hearings, during which not the rowdy combatant type but those politicians with good manners and outstanding ability to develop a logical argument distinguished themselves.

One measure of the nation's level of political development may very well be found in the degree of ease and spontaneity with which its people can tick off the names of their next-generation political leaders. To put it plainly, it boils down to the question of how high or low the possibility is of someone totally unexpected suddenly emerging as a political leader.

In that sense, the prospect is strong that our future political leaders will be coming out of a group of political elites befitting a new era of open politics. Those influential figures who had played important roles in a bygone era may still vie for top leadership positions in political parties or even for the supreme power of the state, but all such moves will, in the end, prove to be transitional phenomena.

Of course this does not necessarily apply to all of the prominent figures currently on the political scene. For many among them are, even in comparison with political newcomers, blessed with all the conditions conducive to their emerging as leaders of the coming era. But if they are to retain their influence during the years ahead and into the next century, they must have latent capacities to

transform themselves in keeping with the changing times. Once they prove incapable of demonstrating political leadership in the changing society of South Korea, regardless of how splendid their political careers might have been in the past or how high up they may be in party hierarchies at present, they will be helpless in the face of the raging torrent of changes and will inevitably be swept away. In this context, in the course of the National Assembly's inspection of the affairs of the state and conduct of ad hoc hearings, the performance of some of the prominent members of the assembly drew a scathing review by the public, and this is a fact that calls for a close examination.

Although still under the surface, a formative movement of new political elites, who are clearly making motions at the bottom rung of the political ladder, is bound to have an enormous impact on future internal affairs of all political parties with respect to competitive selection of party officials, the matters related to the party's sphere of influence, and eventually even the selection of their next presidential candidates. It seems that these fledgling political elites will be coming to the fore in the not too distant future. What follows is an attempt to track down these subterranean developments that are quietly in progress now.

Signs of Factional Split Within the DJP [Democratic Justice Party]

An interesting phenomenon marking the current trends in the political world is this: In stark contrast to the past norm, it is the ruling DJP that is increasingly showing unmistakable signs of breaking into factions, while in the case of the opposition camp the factions that used to exist have in effect been dissolved and it is individual opposition members of the National Assembly who have been distinguishing themselves.

Since the birth of the Sixth Republic, the state of affairs within the DJP has been marked by ever-growing influence on the part of the Taegu/Kyongbuk connection [commonly referred to as "the TK Division"] with several splinter groups trying to contain each other.

Within the DJP, although the TK Division constitutes its mainstream, a new mainstream group, whose membership overlaps considerably with that of the TK Division, has suddenly come to the fore, claiming to be the personal bodyguard unit for President No Tae-u. Meanwhile, those who are from the central region of the country and who have consistently been the independent voice within the party since the days of the Fifth Republic now constitute the nucleus of the nonmainstream group.

More recently, even the TK Division itself has been showing signs of an internal split into two or three branches. First of all, there is the Kyongguhoe (a group made up of DJP members of the National Assembly who are from the Taegu/Kyongbuk region) led by Assemblyman Chong Ho-yong; this group constitutes the largest

lineage within the party. Then there is Kim Yun-hwan, the DJP's floor leader in the National Assembly, whose relationships with members of the Kyongguhoe became somewhat strained over the selection of Pak Chun-kyu as the party's chairman, who is now demonstrating an independent stance as leader of the new mainstream group. The new mainstream group, although most of its members belong to the TK Division, is being differentiated from Assemblyman Chong's lineage because of its unabashed display of "absolute loyalty" to President No.

Additionally, Pak Chol-on, assistant to the president for policy who also belongs to the TK Division, is forming a power base of his own with up-and-coming young members of the National Assembly from the Yongnam region [North and South Kyongsang Provinces] as its centripetal force.

Meanwhile, the middle-of-the-road faction, made up mostly of those from the Seoul area, which has increasingly been voicing independent views, is being led by DJP Secretary General Yi Chong-chan. Members of this faction have continued to advocate various intraparty democratization measures such as an early competitive election of a vice president; in so doing, they are making a concerted effort to ensure for themselves a niche with moral justification. At the last reshuffle of the DJP's leadership lineup, without regard to President No's own wishes, Secretary General Yi's name was raised for consideration as a candidate for the chairmanship, and in that connection, several influential groups within the party quietly attempted to form an alliance. These events can be viewed as the indications of change within the DJP with profound implications.

In yet another development, DJP members of the National Assembly from the Kyonggi region, with Home Affairs Minister Yi Han-tong as their rallying point, are getting together among themselves frequently but discreetly, and are keeping a close watch on the general drift of the situation.

Although the above represents an attempt to examine the general picture of power distribution within the DJP, the peculiar organizational physiology of the ruling party makes it extremely difficult to clearly identify not only its front runner for the next presidential race but also its mid-echelon political elites.

This difficulty can be easily understood if one recalls the complex power games that had preceded the party's nomination of then-Chairman No Tae-u as its candidate to run in the last presidential election. The difficulty was also made apparent by certain events in the course of the DJP's selection of its officially endorsed candidates to run in the last National Assembly elections—events such as the nonendorsement, and the resulting overnight downfall, of such in-house heavyweights as Kwon Ik-hyon and Kwon Chong-tal, both of whom were incumbent members of the National Assembly, and the failure

to receive the party's endorsement by a considerable number of incumbent members of the National Assembly who were marked as Yi Chong-chan's flock.

Making or changing alignment for reasons of geographical or school ties or of tangible advantages is still the physiological norm of those within the ruling circle. Nevertheless, it is expected that even within the DJP, before long someone will emerge to assert his preeminence as the party's standard-bearer; already there are discernible signs here and there within the party, portending the emergence of new political elites.

Young DJP Members of the National Assembly Are Likely To Form Policy Groups

At present, the DJP's upper echelon and its real power-house group, the TK Division, are believed to be favoring a constitutional amendment for the adoption of a cabinet-responsible system of government. This is clear judging from former Chairman Yun Kil-chung's remarks made in Manila, Philippines, regarding a constitutional amendment in favor of the cabinet-responsible system of government, and the remarks suggestive of such a constitutional amendment made by Chairman Pak Chun-kyu at a gathering hosted by the Kwanhun Club last December.

Nevertheless, in terms of its justifiability to the people and considering the political dynamics of a four-party rivalry as it exists today, the idea of such a constitutional amendment can be considered as having not much of a chance for success.

Eventually when the time comes to recognize the inevitability of having to face the next race for the supreme power still under a presidential system of government, the DJP will have someone groomed who will be willing and ready to lead the party with a voice clearer than the one being heard now. That time is most likely to come during the next year, which is the midway point of President No's tenure.

The predominant view within the DJP is that President No will become a lame duck much sooner than his predecessors did. In the case of President Pak Chong-hui, there was no lame-duck period because he was in complete control until his death. But there was no denying that even President Chon Tu-hwan, who had wielded absolute power and had planned to remain as the party's president after leaving office, could not escape a fair amount of limitation as a lame duck. In the case of President No Tae-u, he committed himself more firmly to a single term than did President Chon, and objective observations leave no doubt about his leaving the office after a 5-year term. Thus, even for the DJP it will become impossible to rely solely on President No during the last 1 or 2 years of his tenure.

Looking ahead with these assumptions, the prospect is that the DJP's next presidential candidate will come from among either the present factional bosses within

the party or influential figures of the ruling sector outside the party. Nevertheless, the possibility is strong that a new crop of leaders, who are to have a dominant voice within the party in the coming days, will emerge from those of the younger generation with a faculty for rational thinking. But the peculiar physics of the ruling party has thus far obscured youthful DJP members of the National Assembly from progress in any individual name recognition. Eventually, however, even within the ruling party, those who strive toward politics based on popular acceptance and rationality will gain the advantage over the rest.

In terms of groups, it is a fair assumption that the group consisting of the second-generation members who joined the DJP subsequent to the 29 June declaration has a brighter potential than the first-generation group that had a role in the Fifth Republic. One executive of the DJP said, "Those who built their political foundations during the Fifth Republic will gradually lose their strength; hence, most of those who currently hold executive positions within the party are destined to be automatically eliminated from the party's leading group." Another leading official of the party, who is from Seoul, made this prediction: "The coming rise and fall of personnel within the DJP will prove to be more dramatic than in any other party."

It is nearly impossible to specifically name those among the DJP personages, except for leaders of various factions, who may deservedly be considered as belonging to an up-and-coming elite group. This is due to the paucity of such individual actions or moves among them that merit objective evaluations. Nevertheless, it is the prevailing view among youthful DJP members of the National Assembly that policy research groups will be formed within the party as early as before the end of this year, and certainly by sometime next year at the latest. They point out that, although actual moves in that direction have been kept concealed while the inquiries by special committees are in progress for fear of giving the appearance to the enemy of an internal split, the atmosphere is already ripe enough as evidenced by frequent meetings and dialogues being held among young and promising DJP members within and outside the National Assembly. Once the inquiries by special committees are completed and the interim-evaluation issue is settled, they predict, different voices advocating reforms and rational approaches to politics will organize themselves into separate policy groups to compete, against one another in good faith.

But one influential DJP member of the National Assembly, who also holds an executive position within the party, had this to say: "Because regional ties are the most important factor in the workings of the party, such policy groups—even if they are formed—are not likely to have any significant impact on the party's operations."

Ability and Trust Must Go Hand in Hand

The situation within the opposition sector is entirely different from that of the DJP's. Within the opposition

camp, many of the veteran members of the National Assembly, who are proud of their impressive past record, are showing signs of decline. On the other hand, there are many others who, despite their freshman status in the National Assembly, have an influence on the management of their respective parties. It was some of these opposition legislators who, in the course of the National Assembly's investigations of state affairs and ad hoc hearings, have emerged as masses-oriented politicians worthy of the era of open politics and have often caught the public's attention. Of course, in each of the opposition parties the authority of the incumbent leader—one of the three Kims—is still intact and any move that directly challenges this authority is hard to detect.

In the case of the Party for Peace and Democracy [PPD], President Kim Tae-chung's authority and decisionmaking power can be considered as almost absolute. This is the reason, according to the general opinion within and outside the party, why the PPD, in comparison with the Reunification Democratic Party [RDP], lacks diversity and has fewer individuals who stand out. Some within the party are even voicing the criticism that President Kim is meddling too much in working-level affairs.

There are within the PPD individuals who have, since the party's founding, been demonstrating their "real abilities" in the handling of legislative activities and party affairs; they may be grouped into several categories.

First, there is a group of the party's executive officials who are Tonggyo-dong's direct- or semidirect-line followers: they are Vice President Cho Yun-hyong; Secretary General Yi Chae-kun; Floor Leader Kim Won-ki; Deputy Secretary General Kwon No-kap; and Han Kwang-ok, chief of the president's secretarial staff. This group is playing the most pivotal role within the party's power structure as it stands today. This does not mean, however, that all its members are either solidly united as a single power entity or even of the same political disposition. These men owe their present status to the combination of President Kim's "trust" in them and their "loyalty" to him; as such, when the winds of generation shifts blow in earnest over the opposition camp, it is these men who are in a favorable position to emerge as the new leadership group.

But in the event the generation shifts should occur amid criticism against President Kim, the question of whether these men can still make it to the top on their own merit is yet to be answered. Assemblyman Kwon No-kap, representative of the direct-line Tonggyo-dong followers, enjoys a status within the party that makes him almost like President Kim's alter ego and has not only the ability to make independent judgment of situations but the capacity for organization as well; he is regarded within the party as the man fully capable of regrouping President Kim Tae-chung's direct-line followers and fulfilling the role of the group's central figure in the post-Kim days.

In the case of Assemblymen Cho Se-hyong, chairman of the PPD's International Affairs Committee, and Chong Tae-chol, chairman of the National Assembly's Standing Panel on Education and Information, it is generally believed that, although their abilities are recognized by President Kim, they are not being completely submissive to President Kim's authority. Assemblyman Chong Tae-chol, for example, was broadly rebuked within the party for his remarks—"The people of this country look upon Kim Tae-chung and Kim Yong-sam, the two opposition leaders, as holders of absolute power; they treat the two Kims as if they were shamans,"—remarks which he made last January at a PPD policy seminar.

Assemblyman Cho Se-hyong, too, despite his being frequently called upon by President Kim to handle various tasks, is viewed by those in the party's power faction as a man of questionable "loyalty." That he is subjected to this kind of atmospherics within the party was clearly illustrated early this year, when his expressed interest in running for the chairmanship of the PPD's Seoul branch—a position that would have given him a favorable edge in the mayoral election of Seoul—was squashed by Secretary General Yi Chae-kun, who assessed him as a man "with an adequate level of ability but shallow depth." Nevertheless, Assemblyman Cho is generally considered to be a man with the potential to grow, who can in due time meet the challenge of internal changes demanded of the party.

Assemblyman Cho, who is 56 years old, has the following strong points: First, although a native of Chonju belonging to the PPD, which must rid itself of the all-Honam [the Cholla region] image, he is largely untainted by this image because he represents a local electorate (the Songdong B District) in Seoul; second, he has the reputation of being a rationalist who can accurately assess any given situation.

Despite their being held in check by the party's power faction, Assemblymen Cho Se-hyong and Chong Tae-chol are looked upon with great expectations by youthful PPD members of the National Assembly because of their earned image of willingness to challenge established authority. "If a situation arises where a challenge to the party's established authority is called for, the expectation at the present time is that Assemblymen Cho Se-hyong and Chong Tae-chol will be the ones to spearhead the challenge," said one PPD assemblyman belonging to the "Pyongminyon," organized by a group of former popular opposition figures who joined the PPD and were elected to the National Assembly.

Rising Influence of the Pyongminyon Members

In addition to those elements cited above, there is another group, made up of PPD's first-term members in the National Assembly, which has the potential to become a new political elite within the PPD. The PPD has a total of 71 seats in the National Assembly, 42 of

which are filled by first-term members. Of these first-term members, those who have especially been asserting their preeminence are the members of the Pyongminyon, the factional group made up of former popular opposition figures.

The Pyongminyon, or the "Pyonghwa Minju Tongil Yonguhoe" [The Peace, Democracy, Reunification Research Society] in full, was formally recognized as an official research circle of the party at the PPD's enlarged executive staff meeting held on 26 January 1989. The Pyongminyon thus became in effect the very first intra-party faction to be formally recognized in the annals of our political parties; as a result, its stature within the PPD rose sharply. Its membership is made up of the following 11 PPD members of the National Assembly: Mun Tong-hwan and Pak Yong-suk, both of whom are PPD's vice presidents, Yi Sang-su, Yi Hae-chan, Chong Sang-yong, Yi Chol-yong, Pak Sang-chon, Kim Yong-chin, Yi Chan-ku, So Kyong-won, and Pak Sok-mu.

To tell the truth, for the past 1 year since its inauguration on 12 March 1988, conscious of the watchful eyes of the party's old guards on the newcomers from the popular opposition sector, the Pyongminyon has maintained a posture of "circumspection, biding its time," although its members have filled quite a few executive positions in the party. But it was in the course of the National Assembly's inspection of government agencies and ad hoc hearings, which dominated the political scene during the second half of 1988, that these PPD members of the Assembly with the popular-opposition background and their staff aides who used to be activists teamed up and put on quite a performance; as a result, the Pyongminyon's strength and voice within the party received a sudden boost, which eventually led to the party's formal recognition of the Pyongminyon.

Among the group of PPD members of the assembly with the popular-opposition background, the party's spokesman Yi Sang-su and Assemblyman Yi Hae-chan may be singled out as the two who are attracting a good deal of attention both within and outside the party. These two men enjoy the special confidence of President Kim Tae-chung; one may say that they have all the right credentials to become the central leaders of the party.

Assemblyman Yi Sang-su (age 43), a human-rights lawyer who rose to fame as the defense attorney in the sexual torture case involving Miss Kwon In-suk, is doing a splendid job as the party's spokesman; he has the support and cooperation both within and outside the party. He said, "The question of who will emerge as the new political leader is likely to be settled depending on the definitive future direction of the party's still-evolving policy and ideology and on how the party's constitutional disposition is going to change." He presaged that the ideology and policy of those who joined the party from the popular opposition sector will materialize only within the framework of the PPD, never outside it. He also stated, "Now is the time for the party to seek

diversity by encouraging the active presence of factions with different ideas; the party should seek to bring in even more new faces as a means of its survival."

Assemblyman Yi Hae-chan was a central figure in the popular opposition movement, serving in such positions as deputy chief of the policy staff of the "Mintongnyon" [Federation Mass Movement for Reunification] and a member of the executive committee of the National Movement Headquarters. When the Mintongnyon came out in support of candidate Kim Tae-chung in the last presidential election but qualified its position as one of "critical support," it was Yi Hae-chan who elucidated the rational basis of that position. At age 37, he appears to still lack maturity as evidenced in the "faked photograph incident" which he instigated during the recent National Assembly hearings concerning the Kwangju incident. Nevertheless, he is widely credited with being the most zealous in preparing for the Kwangju hearings. Assemblyman Yi offered this analytical view: "Many first-term members of the National Assembly have been distinguishing themselves in the handling of the assembly's inspection of government agencies and committee hearings, not because of their professional expertise but rather because of their greater sincerity and issue-consciousness."

Meanwhile, PPD Vice Presidents Mun Tong-hwan and Pak Yong-suk, who are more or less fronting the Pyongminyon as its chairman and vice chairman, respectively, have been given certain responsible roles on the strength of the Pyongminyon's ascendancy. Mun has demonstrated his ability as chairman of the National Assembly's ad hoc committee on the Kwangju incident. Pak, too, is said to be strengthening her voice within the party as a result of her vigorous performance in the assembly. The consensus among the Pyongminyon membership is that, when the time for transition comes, Vice President Pak, rather than aging Vice President Mun, is likely to represent the Pyongminyon and assume the centripetal role within the party.

Rapidly Emerging Policy Team

The Reunification Democratic Party, relatively speaking, is made up of a broader range of personnel and it has the kind of atmosphere that allows diverse voices to be heard within the party. That may or may not be the reason but people are saying that the power distribution within the RDP is too scattered—it is everywhere. For one thing, the influence of those leading or elder members of the party who used to be labeled as belonging to the Sangdo-tong faction is gradually diminishing, whereas on the ascendancy are the voices of those newcomers who have been invited into the party or of those members who for the first time have won the seats in the National Assembly.

One first-term RDP member of the assembly remarked, "Those members of the assembly who have the professional capacity and who are in charge of the actual work are increasingly gaining broader discretionary power."

The RDP is credited with having produced more "stars" in comparison with other parties in the course of the National Assembly hearings. It is this kind of diversity on the part of the RDP that may be the contributing factor to the high rate of popular support the RDP is enjoying as reflected in a recent poll.

At present, the fastest rising star within the RDP is Hwang Yong-tae (age 54), chairman of the RDP's Police Council. He was serving as president of the University of Foreign Studies when, just before the 26 April general elections, he was invited into the RDP at President Kim Yong-sam's suggestion. His performance as the team leader of the RDP's Policy Council has gained Assemblyman Hwang the image of a "rational, conservative parliamentarian." When he first joined the party, initially as a vice president, Hwang was the butt of criticism within the RDP, partly for his record of having served as assistant vice minister of the Economic Planning Board during the Democratic Republican Party [DRP] regime and partly for being "someone who has never once been subject to tear gas." But he has since established himself as the person whom President Kim Yong-sam wants to have close by whenever an important decision is to be made; it was Hwang who accompanied President Kim on his two recent visits to Japan. As a result, in a sarcastic twist of the old intraparty expression "Tong-yong on the left, Hyong-u on the right" ["Tong-yong" is RDP Vice President Kim Tong-yong, "Hyong-u" is RDP's floor leader Choe Hyong-u; "left" and "right", stand for "the Minister of the Left" and "the Minister of the Right," the two highest ranking ministers next to the prime minister in the olden days—the "prime minister" in this case is of course RDP President Kim Yong-sam], a new expression "Pyong-tae on the left, Pyong-tae on the right" ["Pyong-tae" refers to Hwang Pyong-tae] is . . . penly going around within the party.

Next to Assemblyman Hwang, another person who has gained a foothold into the party's "new real power" group is Vice President Kang In-sop (age 53) who also chairs the party's Development Committee; Kang is not a member of the National Assembly. Kang was invited into the party and was simultaneously appointed as a vice president in a lightning move taken at the RDP's national convention held in the wake of the 26 April general elections. He is a man of solid journalistic background, whose career included a stint as an editorialist for the TONG-A ILBO. As the party's chairman of the Development Committee, he is responsible for public-opinion surveys and playing the leading role in the formulation of the party's mid- and long-term development plans; he also serves as chief editor of the party's organ. Mr Kang is contributing in more ways than one to the defining of President Kim's political line as well as to the promotion of external public relations work on President Kim's behalf. He and Assemblyman Hwang Pyong-tae have recently run into a formidable backlash from the conservative force within the party.

There are some who, despite their being part of the old-guard group of the party, are continuing to gain

influence and voice in the 13th National Assembly: Vice President Yi Ki-tae, Secretary General So Sok-chae, Pak Kwan-yong who is chairman of the National Assembly's Special Committee on Reunification, and Kim Tok-yong who is chairman of the RDP's National Youth Committee can be cited as the cases in point.

Assemblyman Yi Ki-tae (age 52) used to have a formidable faction of his own and at times even challenged the party's leadership; in short, he had steadily built up his own power base. Before the last presidential election, when the two Kims [Kim Yong-sam and Kim Taechung] broke up, Yi gathered his own faction members of the National Assembly and together they opted to remain in the assembly as independents. On the eve of the 26 April general elections, however, his faction was forced to be dissolved entirely and he was obliged to join the RDP. He has since regained his influence as a result of his smooth and successful handling of the activities—the hearings on the affairs of the Ilhae Foundation, for example—that are under the purview of the National Assembly's Special Committee to Investigate the Improprieties of the Fifth Republic, of which he is the chairman. Especially in his handling of the hearings on the Ilhae Foundation affairs, which were televised, he demonstrated an outstanding skill as the presiding official, for which, it is believed within the party, he received quite an accolade from the public.

Secretary General So Sok-chae (age 54) has a great deal of authority delegated to him by President Kim Yong-sam; he is in complete charge of the party's internal day-to-day affairs and is showing an outstanding administrative ability.

First-Term Members Solidifying Positions Using Hearings as Stepping Stones

In the case of Assemblyman Pak Kwan-yong (age 51), not only is he an influential third-term member of the National Assembly, he is also counted as a man with an outstanding ability to assess situations and possesses a rational mind.

That is why he is a regular participant in the drafting of President Kim Yong-sam's speeches to be delivered at the National Assembly and materials for press conferences. His energetic activities in the party and the National Assembly, in such capacities as chairman of the party's Special Committee on National Reunification, a member of the party's Development Committee, chairman of the National Assembly's Special Committee on Reunification, and a member of the South Korean contingent to the North-South legislators' talks, make him one of the most noteworthy figures among the top-level members of the National Assembly.

Assemblyman Kim Tok-yong (age 48), who had long shared joys and sorrows with President Kim Yong-sam as his chief of secretarial staff, has cast off his rather subordinate image as "President Kim's alter ego" and is

now emerging as the frontrunner of a new elite group. Assemblyman Kim still is one of the few within the party with whom President Kim Yong-sam feels comfortable enough to entrust even matters of a secret nature; he is also reputed to be a man endowed with the capacity for making an independent assessment of given situations and possesses organizational ability as well. Even before becoming a member of the National Assembly, he was referred to as a man whose stature was "equivalent to a third-term member of the National Assembly"; now, even though only a first-term member, he is already serving on the party's political affairs committee.

Moreover, as chairman of the party's National Youth Committee and a member of the party's Development Committee, both of which are charged with the important task of modernizing the party, Assemblyman Kim is deeply involved in the affairs of the party.

Another special feature—if "special feature" is the right word—of the RDP is that many of its first-term members in the National Assembly are distinguishing themselves—men in their forties and early fifties who are likely to assume the central role in a move toward generation shifts within the opposition sector if and when such a move turns serious. It is these men who have already earned "laurels" for their roles in the National Assembly's inspection of government agencies and conduct of hearings; they are drawing attention within the party as well, where their professional expertise has placed them in partial charge of substantive affairs of the party.

To begin with, there are Assemblymen Kim Kwang-il, No Mu-hyon, and Yi In-che who can be counted as those who have secured popular political bases for themselves thanks to their roles in the National Assembly's hearings.

Assemblyman Kim Kwang-il (age 49), who had already acquired fame as a human-rights attorney, has secured a firm footing within and outside his party as a result of his performance in the National Assembly's hearings on the Kwangju incident. He is widely regarded as a man capable of a bridging role within the RDP, grafting those newcomers with the popular-opposition movement background with the old-guard opposition politicians. Assemblyman Kim, noted for his array of qualities such as logic, resiliency, and demagoguery befitting of politician of the people, is being referred to as "a new leader" even among first-term members of the National Assembly.

Assemblyman No Mu-hyon (age 43), too, received high marks from the public for his role in the hearing on the Ilhae Foundation affairs.

His unique logic and flood of terse questions during this hearing earned him a popularity rating of 22.7 percent in a poll taken by Gallup of Korea jointly with the CHOSON ILBO. A human-rights attorney by profession who was active in the popular-opposition movement, Assemblyman No now holds the chairmanship of the party's

Special Committee on Labor-Management Issues; he enjoys an unchallenged position in the party as the specialist in labor affairs. He has been a focus of public attention since he made an open statement that he "would move over to a progressive party as soon as one was formed."

Assemblyman Yi In-che (age 40), another lawyer by profession, not only demonstrated a knack for interrogation during the hearing on the Kwangju incident, but he is also credited for having done much to enable the RDP contingent on the hearing panel to receive a favorable review despite the relative disadvantages it had to contend with, such as insufficient materials to work with, as compared with the PPD contingent. Specifically, he is credited for having played the role of executive secretary for the RDP contingent on the panel, having done his homework thoroughly, and having helped, behind the scenes, his fellow members of the team. He is serving as the RDP's whip in the National Assembly and is deeply involved in substantive legislative activities such as the matter of amending the law governing political funds.

Assemblywoman Kang Sin-ok (age 53), although a first-term member who is considered still an up-and-coming person in political circles, is playing an active role in the RDP as chairman of its Human Rights Protection Committee, the position accorded her on the strength of her impressive background in legal circles as a human-rights attorney. Noted for her rationality and drive, Assemblywoman Kang is playing the centripetal role for other members of the National Assembly with a legal background such as Assemblyman Kim Kwang-il.

There are some other first-term RDP members of the National Assembly who are charged with substantive responsibility in areas of their respective speciality and are said to have a strong voice in those areas within the party: Assemblymen Pak Tae-kwon on the farm-belt issue, Paek Nam-chi on the issue of ensuring police neutrality, and Kim U-sok on the pollution issue are the cases in point. In addition, those individuals close to President Kim Yong-sam, such as Choe Ki-son, chief of President Kim's secretarial staff, are considered as potential candidates to form the RDP's next-generation leadership core.

Old Guard Dominates the Republican Party

The personnel composition of the New Democratic Republican Party [NDRP] is dominated by former members of the old DRP, former bureaucrats from the Third Republic era, and first-term members of the National Assembly who are mostly from South Chung-chong Province. This peculiar personnel composition is widely believed to be the cause for the conspicuous absence within the NDRP of anyone with a strong voice or influence other than those prominent members of the National Assembly—the old-timers from the Third Republic days—who now hold power in the party.

The NDRP's core leadership group is made up of President Kim Chong-pil at the top followed by Vice Presidents Yi Pyong-hui, Yi Chong-kun, and Ku Cha-chun; Kim Yong-hwan, chairman of the Policy Council; Choe Kak-kyu, secretary general; Kim Yong-chae, floor leader; and Yi Hui-il, chief of the Planning Staff. Vice President Yi Pyong-hui, a classmate of President Kim's at the Korean Military Academy (8th class) and a sixth-term member of the National Assembly, has consistently walked the same path with President Kim. Not only the principal vice president but also chairman of the Special Committee on Party Development, it is he who leads the party in the absence of President Kim; he is considered as President Kim's most trusted close associate.

Kim Yong-hwan, chairman of the party's Policy Council (formerly a finance minister), who has been the leading force behind the NDRP's evolution as a party of policy, is said to enjoy President Kim's deep confidence. Secretary General Choe Kak-kyu, who is in charge of the affairs of the party, has a strong voice within the party. He is credited for having demonstrated an outstanding ability during the deliberation of the budget bill at the last regular session of the National Assembly—it was he who, people say, almost single-handedly took charge of the matter of adjusting figures and calculations contained in the budget bill, making good use of his past experience as a minister of trade and industry.

Floor Leader Kim Yong-chae is actively discharging the considerable authority delegated to him by President Kim in devising the party's strategy to deal with the National Assembly and in overseeing a great deal of the activities within the assembly that are of interest to the party. He is also a frequent participant in various debates as the party's representative; he is reputed to be the NDRP's theoretician.

Yi Hui-il, chief of the Planning Staff, a former minister of agriculture and fisheries, is considered an economic expert. He is playing an important adviser's role for President Kim on such matters as making assessments of given situations.

As to whether there will be a new elite group emerging within the NDRP, observers agree that the question still bears watching a while longer before it can be answered.

Independents in the Limelight

Among the independents in the National Assembly, those who show the growth potential to become political leaders of the next generation are Pak Chan-chong and Yi Chol. Outside the National Assembly, former Assemblyman Hong Sa-tok deserves to be included in the same category. All three of these men argued for "solidarity" when the two Kims were splitting; when their voices went for naught, they opted to become independents: they belonged to the so-called "signatory-faction members of the assembly."

Of the three, the one who unquestionably outshines the others is Assemblyman Pak Chan-chong (age 50). He is a fourth-term assemblyman, who once served as chairman of the Police Council of the old Democratic Party; he is one of the leading politicians. He was also a human-rights attorney who, during the days of the Fifth Republic, never shirked the opportunity to argue for the defendant in significant political cases. His penetrating judgment and eloquent tongue were demonstrated to the fullest during the hearings on the Kwangju incident. Even as a member of the 13th National Assembly, he has been an unceasing advocate of the consolidation of the opposition and a generational shift. Last year he published a book critical of one No and three Kims, entitled "I Am Obliged To Speak Out Now." Recently he has been preparing to publish a sequel entitled "I Am Obliged To Act Now."

Believing that the consolidation of the opposition will come sooner or later, he has formed an organization called "One Nation Democratic Citizens Movement Council" and is using it as a vehicle to clamor for "consolidation of the opposition and exeunt of the two Kims" at every opportunity.

Former Assemblyman Hong Sa-tok (age 46), an advocate of solidarity for the Democrats, ran for the National Assembly from Kangnam-B District in Seoul only to lose. Despite his election failure he has not slowed down his political activity and is, for that reason, receiving attention from those in political circles. A man of sharp critical power and a master of rhetoric with flawless logic, Mr Hong has openly declared his intention to run for mayor of Seoul when the local autonomy system became a reality. He is continuing the effort to convince others of the need for the exeunt of the two Kims and consolidation of the opposition camp. Although without

a seat in the National Assembly, Mr Hong is in charge of the "Radio Column" program on MBC [Munhwa or Cultural Broadcasting Corporation]; he is also busily taking part in various debates and lectures—all in an effort to foster his political influence.

Assemblyman Yi Chol (age 41), another supporter of the "solidarity" argument who won a seat in the 13th National Assembly as an independent, is still calling for the consolidation of the opposition camp. On the strength of his outstanding performance during the National Assembly's inspection of government agencies and hearings on the media, Assemblyman Yi is viewed as a potential leader for the opposition camp of tomorrow. It was he who, at the hearing, made public for the first time two confidential internal documents prepared by the Culture and Information Subcommittee of the National Security Council, entitled "Press Posture Purification Plans" and "The Results of the Purification of the Media"; for this act, he was cheered by the public. Often referred to as "a running assemblyman" for his busy style, Assemblyman Yi is a man of orderly logic who has the ability to get at the core of any given issue; he is generally regarded as a politician who shines in the era of open politics.

It is fair to say that whether or not these independents, in and outside the National Assembly, who are making great strides in their respective ways, can fully realize their political potentials will depend on how much momentum the cause they advocate—"exeunt of the two Kims and consolidation of the opposition camp"—will gather. For, although their individual abilities are more or less recognized not only within political circles but by the general public as well, if they are to emerge as political leaders, something more will be required of them: the ability to organize and the capacity to lead.

Burma

'Goodwill Delegation' Leaves for Bangkok

*BK2804073789 Rangoon Domestic Service
in Burmese 0630 GMT 28 Apr 89*

[Text] A Burmese goodwill delegation led by Lieutenant General Than Shwe, Army commander in chief, left Rangoon by special plane at 0800 this morning to visit Bangkok, Thailand, at the invitation of General Chawalit Yongchaiyut, acting supreme commander of the Royal Thai Armed Forces and commander in chief of the Royal Thai Army. The delegation was seen off at the airport by Gen Saw Maung, Defense Forces chief of staff.

The delegation was also seen off at the airport by Rear Admiral Maung Maung Khin, Navy commander in chief; Major General Tin Tun, Air Force commander in chief; Maj Gen Aung Ye Kyaw, adjutant general; Maj Gen Phone Myint, quartermaster general; Maj Gen Sein Aung, chief of No 1 Bureau of Special Operations; Brigadier General Tin U, chief of staff of Army; Brig Gen Myo Nyunt, commander of the Rangoon Command; Colonel Than U, judge advocate general; Mr Thongchan Chotikasathian, Thai ambassador to Burma; Naval Captain Chuchat Kasathira, [Thai] military attaché; and senior military officials.

Members of the Burmese goodwill delegation headed by Lt Gen Than Shwe, Army commander in chief, were: Maj Gen Chit Swe, chief of No 2 Bureau of Special Operations; Brig Gen Khin Nyunt, director of the Defense Services Intelligence; Brig Gen Maung Aye, commander of the Eastern Command; Colonel Abel, director of the Defense Services Procurement; Col Thein Han, commander of the 88th Light Infantry Division; Captain Than Nyunt, Navy chief of staff; Col Thein Win, Air Force chief of staff; and senior military officials.

Ministry Announces Formation of Joint Venture

*BK2704083889 Rangoon Domestic Service
in Burmese 1330 GMT 26 Apr 89*

[Text] "Notification No 1/89 of the Ministry of Trade of the Union of Burma, dated 26 April 1989—the 6th day of waning moon of Tagoo, Burmese Era 1351"]

[Excerpt] Formation of the Union of Burma Joint Venture Corporation Limited No 1.

Using rights granted under the 1950 Special Companies Act, this notification has been issued in accordance with the three basic principles of trade—to work with interests of the Union of Burma and its citizens; to ensure trade does not burden the majority of the people; and to work toward a system which is not based upon profit alone, but is based on long-term development of commerce.

The notification has been issued in connection with the formation of a local joint venture corporation with joint capital from the people and trade organizations under the Ministry of Trade to ensure price stability in domestic trading of commodities and economic progress and success of Burma.

It shall be called the Union of Burma Joint Venture Corporation Limited No 1.

The initial members of the corporation composed of representatives from the people and from the trade organizations under the Ministry of Trade are as follows:

A. From the side of the people:

1. U Yu Saing, No 15, Thantaman Road, Dagon Township.
2. U Khin Maung Ohn, No 115, Minye Kyawzwa Road, Ahlone Township.
3. U Ei Khon, No 85, 111st Street, Mingala Taungnyunt Township.
4. U Aung Thein, No 321, U Wizara Road, Sanchaung Township.
5. U Bo Sein, No 70A, Inya Road, Kamayut Township.
6. U Li Shan Khaw, No 2/294, Shwedagon Paya Road, Dagon Township.
7. U Kyaw Za, No 57, 5th Street, Lamadaw Township.

B. From the side of the trade organizations under the Ministry of Trade:

1. Managing director, Myanma Agricultural Produce Trading.
2. Managing director, General Mercantile Trading.
3. Managing director, Myanma Department Stores. [passage omitted]

League for Liberal Evolution Deregistered

*BK2704160289 Rangoon Domestic Service
in Burmese 1330 GMT 27 Apr 89*

[Text] 1. The Commission for Holding Democratic Multiparty General Elections of the Union of Burma announced today that Burma's League for Liberal Evolution, which has its headquarters at No 127, Aung Chantha Street, No 2 Ward, Mayangon Township, Rangoon Division, was registered by the commission under Announcement No 150 on 29 November 1988.

2. However, following a unanimous decision by the Central Executive Committee of that party and a request by all members of that committee, including the chairman and the general secretary, to deregister the party, the elections commission hereby announces the deregistration of Burma's League for Liberal Evolution with effect from 27 April 1989.

[Signed] By the authority vested in me, Aye Maung, secretary, Commission for Holding Democratic Multiparty General Elections.

Aung San Suu Kyi Views Current Situation
BK2804091189 Bangkok THE NATION in English
28 Apr 89 p 8

[From THE NATION's "Around the World" column:
"Situation in Burma"]

[Text] Aung San Suu Kyi, secretary general of the National League for Democracy [NLD], in an address sent to the Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand, described the situation in Burma; excerpts:

The political climate of Burma in recent weeks has been such as to raise grave doubts with regard to the sincerity of the State Law and Order Restoration Council's [SLORC] pledge to bring about free and fair elections. The atmosphere is charged with repression and the crescendo of arrests mounts with every passing day. It is estimated that there have been over 1,000 arrests since the beginning of March, of these some 300 are members of the NLD. The great majority of those who are arrested are charged with attempting to break the peace, an accusation which is used systematically as a weapon to crush the movement for democracy.

There is today a frightening lack of communication between the Armed Forces and the civilians of Burma. It is well-known that an intensive campaign based on false allegations is going on within the Armed Forces to engender resentment and hatred of all those involved in the movement for democracy.

The NLD has called time and again for dialogue between the SLORC and the political parties. Unless there is a frank exchange of views it will not be possible to allay the fear and mistrust which exists on both sides.

It is a tragedy that the people of Burma should be made to suffer for their belief in the inherent dignity of man.

'Prominent' Student Leader Flees Rangoon
BK2704100089 Bangkok THE NATION in English
27 Apr 89 p 4

[By Yindi Loetcharoenchok]

[Text] A prominent student leader and chairman of the second largest political party in Burma fled government suppression to the Thai-Burmese border last week hoping to take up armed struggle against the Saw Maung military regime.

Moe Thi Zun, chairman the student-led Democratic Party for New Society (DPNS), said in an interview early this week at a border area that the situation in Rangoon as well as other big cities was still tense and more students were expected to flee to the jungle areas controlled by ethnic Burmese rebels.

The DPNS leader, who headed underground student movement called All Burma Federation of Student Unions (ABFSU) last year, said he decided to flee because Rangoon still prohibited all political movements and continued to arrest students.

"Although I still want to live in Rangoon, I decided to leave for security reasons," he said, adding that he was once warned by the military against any political activities.

He said Min Ko Naing, another key student leader during last year's uprising, along with some ten other students, who were arrested last month, were still in prison. But he could not confirm if they were tortured and whether they were at the infamous Insein jail, a military torture centre north of Rangoon.

The student leader said he still wanted to see Burma achieve democracy but "now I realize that peaceful means won't work. That is why I decided to turn to armed struggle."

He said Burmese people were losing faith in opposition parties which they thought could neither work for their well-being nor provide security. The Burmese have started to believe in change through violence rather than peaceful political means, he added.

He, however, admitted that both the people and the students were still waiting for an opportunity to take to streets to demand democracy again. "If the opposition leaders can give the right direction, they will, I believe, demonstrate again."

He said armed soldiers are still everywhere in Rangoon and other big cities such as Mandalay. He added that bunkers were being built in military areas and armoured personnel carriers were roaming the capital.

Moe Thi Zun said the people did not believe there would be free and fair elections as promised by the government.

He claimed he was being monitored by the military just like Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD) which is currently the most popular opposition party. He said the government would not touch her due to her popularity.

Aung San Suu Kyi, despite overwhelming public support, was still harassed by the army while campaigning in upcountry, according to Moe Thi Zun. They cut off her communication lines, and armed soldiers sometimes barred her from campaigning, he said.

The student leader said what he wanted now was an interim government composed of people who harboured good intentions for the country and mass support. "They could be intellectuals, politicians, workers, students or peasants but not members of the National Unity Party (NUP)," a new name of the Burma Socialist Programme Party.

He said he believed that Ne Win still had strong voice and power in the present regime. Speculation that Saw Maung was manipulated by Ne Win went strong last month after the latter showed up during the Armed Forces Day celebrations, he added.

The leader said he knew the problems of students taking refuge in the minorities' controlled areas along the Thai-Burmese border and vowed to reunite them and seek unity among all the revolutionaries who wanted to see democracy in Burma.

Moe Thi Zun, 26, a physics graduate of Rangoon University, who managed after the third attempt to reach a Karen camp of Thay Baw Bo opposite Tak's Phop Phra District last Friday, declined to reveal the number of students planning to leave Rangoon and the route of his four-day journey to the border saying those waiting to come out might take the same route.

He said he and another friend faced only minor problems during the journey on the Moulmein-Chaung Hna Khwa route where the Burmese army set up six checkpoints. He added that he managed to escape by disguising himself as a construction worker carrying construction materials and wearing worn-out clothes.

He added that he had already submitted his resignation from the DPNS chairmanship and asked the party to elect a new leader. Moe Thi Zun first appeared in the 1988 student march but became popular after June 21 when he stepped up on stage to give anti-government speeches and organized mass demonstrations.

Meanwhile, the ASSOCIATED PRESS reported from Rangoon Tuesday that Burmese authorities recently arrested some 30 members mostly students and other youths, belonging to Aung San Suu Kyi's NLD party for anti-government demonstrations, sources in the party said.

They were arrested for chanting anti-government slogans and staging anti-government plays during the Burmese new year festivities that ended April 17, the sources said.

The sources, who demanded anonymity, said there were indications of more arrests before the proposed re-opening of the schools in June.

In September, the armed forces commander, Gen Saw Maung, took power in a coup and his troops killed hundreds of people in crushing the demonstrations for democracy.

Wa Commission Issues Message to Communist Party

BK2704145289 (Clandestine) Burma Nationalities Broadcasting Station in Burmese 1145 GMT 27 Apr 89

[“Declaration of the Wa Region Provisional Military Commission to the Central Committee of the Burma Communist Party”—dated 11 April 1989]

[Text] To: The Central Committee, Burma Communist Party [BCP]:

In accordance with prevailing conditions at home and abroad, the people of all nationalities ardently wish for self-reliance, self-rule, peace, and liberty. Hence, we forward this declaration to you.

Looking back at the past, we see the BCP leading us—the people of all nationalities in the Wa Region—in their determined and unyielding struggle against all enemies. Conditions were good before 1979. But what has the situation come to now? No progress whatsoever is being made. Why?

In our opinion, it is because some leaders are clinging to power and are obstinately pursuing an erroneous line. They are divorced from reality, practicing individualism and sectarianism, failing to study and analyze local and foreign conditions, and ignoring actual material conditions. Pursuing an erroneous line of [words indistinct] dogmatic thinking in particular, they have cheated the people of the Wa Region, and through lies and propaganda have dragged us into their sham revolution. In our view, they sacrificed the interests of the party and the people of all nationalities to further the interests of individuals and a small minority.

When things were not in favor of the people, they took advantage of the situation—like vultures who delight at the sight of a dying man; but when the situation was not in their favor, they fled abroad. Although we, the liberated people, are presently facing all sorts of difficulties, we shall continue to grasp the practical aspects of the revolution as a whole and shall unite with all the other forces that sympathize with us. We have proven under the present situation that we can be masters of our own destiny.

Individuals with evil intent practice subjectivism and sow division. If it is in their interests, they would stop at nothing. In sum, they will meet a sad end, because this is history.

How can an enemy armed with modern weapons be defeated by an empty ideology and through military methods that do not integrate theory with practice? We, the people in the Wa Region, never kowtow before an aggressor army whether it be local or foreign. Although we are very poor and backward in terms of culture and literature, we are very strong in our determination [words indistinct].

What became of the lives of people in the Wa region following the wresting of power by (?an evil-minded) individual within the BCP at a certain time in the past? It was a hard life for the people. The burden on the people became heavier with more taxes being levied. We faced grave hardships. Can the people avoid staging an uprising under such a situation?

We shall choose our own path and shall prevent ourselves from drowning in a sea of problems. We have decided to take a path that is in harmony with our people, that is practical, peaceful, sovereign, progressive, self-reliant, and prosperous. This is the declaration of the people of the Wa Region.

We do not desire bloodshed, and hence we have made this declaration. What we would like to warn you of in particular is that he who starts a blood-letting incident shall be treated as our enemy.

[Signed] The Provisional Military Commission of the people of the Wa Region. Dated 11 April 1989.

Thai Police Report Karen Attack on Myawadi

BK2704142089 Hong Kong AFP in English 1411 GMT
27 Apr 89

[Text] Bangkok, April 27 (AFP)—At least 13 people were killed Thursday and many more were feared dead in fighting between Burmese Government troops and ethnic Karen insurgents who attacked a town on Burma's border with Thailand, local Thai police officers said.

The officers reached by telephone said that the dead in the attack on Myawadi, opposite Thailand's city of Mae Sot, 420 kilometers northwest of here, included 12 Burmese civilians and 1 Thai.

Thai Border Patrol Police (BPP) 346th company commander, Lieutenant Colonel Siri Ratthana, based in Mae Sot, said that 20 Burmese and 1 Thai had been injured in the fighting.

He quoted Burmese refugees who fled across the border as saying some 180 houses had been burned down when Karen National Union (KNU) guerrillas launched a heavy mortar and rocket barrage on Myawadi, subsequently making hit-and-run commando infiltrations into the town.

The refugees said many people had not been accounted for and were believed to have died in their burning houses, he said.

Lt Col Siri said the guerrillas, based in jungle strongholds at Pha Lu camp, about 10 kilometres south of Myawadi, and at Kormura camp, some six kilometres north of the town, had coordinated their attacks from both directions.

The guerrillas began bombarding Myawadi with 81-mm mortar rounds and 2.75 mm rockets just after midnight Wednesday, he said.

The KNU is one of Burma's dozen ethnic minority insurgencies allied in the National Democratic Front (NDF), which has been fighting for autonomy against the central government in Rangoon since Burma gained independence from Britain in 1948.

Major Manit Subsai-on, commander of a paramilitary BPP unit dispatched to the Thai border to prevent "a spilling-over" of the fighting into Thailand, said some 4,500 Burmese civilians have fled across the Moei border river from Myawadi into Thailand's border district of Tha Sai Luat, south of Mae Sot.

The refugees have been accommodated at two Buddhist monasteries on the outskirts of Mae Sot, and would be allowed to return home "when the situation is safe," he said.

Maj Manit said the KNU had attacked Myawadi because the Burmese army had since early this week deployed the bulk of its 33rd and 44th Light Infantry Divisions, numbering 3,000-4,000 men, to besiege a KNU stronghold at Wang Kha camp, leaving less than 200 men to defend Myawadi.

Burmese troops on Tuesday shelled Wang Kha, one of the KNU's most important outposts in Burma's eastern Karen State, some 20 kilometres north of Mae Sot.

It was not known how many casualties the KNU had suffered at Wang Kha, where the fighting was continuing Friday, Maj Manit said.

Burmese refugees told Thai authorities that "Karen infiltrators" had opened fire in Myawadi with automatic weapons at "anyone carrying a gun, civilians and soldiers alike," Maj Manit said.

He said the refugees charged that Karens had destroyed many houses with rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), killing the occupants still inside.

The refugees also said the guerrillas lobbed hand grenades into bunkers where people were hiding under their wooden houses. Some civilians were "roasted to death" when the burning structures collapsed on them.

Other Thai sources said the "stench of burning human flesh" had drifted across the Moei River to the Thai side of the border.

Maj Manit said some 30 medium-sized trucks fully loaded with goods belonging to Thai merchants were also destroyed by the fire. Total damage to Myawadi was estimated at around 160,000 dollars.

Twelve wounded Burmese refugees were being treated in Mae Sot hospital, the officer said.

Cambodia

Hen Sen Interviewed on Current Issues

BK2704023589 Bangkok THE NATION in English
27 Apr 89 p 8

[“Views” of Hun Sen, premier and foreign minister of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), as told to NATION correspondent Kawi Chongkitthawon “recently” at the Office of the Council of Ministers in Phnom Penh]

[Text] On talks between Hun Sen and Khmer resistance leader Prince Norodom Sihanouk scheduled for May 2 in Jakarta:

"I cannot say yet whether the discussion will lead to some degree of success that would represent a positive development or would lead to failure, to be followed by pessimism. So it is like a married couple who have divorced and then they get back together again. At this juncture, I am not sure the reunion will bring the same degree of happiness as before the divorce or not.

"The negotiations which were cut off for some time are going to resume. For me, the negotiations have made some progress, even though it was not so impressive. It is a kind of progress that we have expected. We have already reduced the gap that has separated us, especially regarding the Vietnamese troop withdrawal. Therefore, on this issue there will be no more bargaining.

"At the Paris negotiations (last year), Sihanouk told me clearly that after the completion of a Vietnamese troop withdrawal, he would stop receiving military aid from the outside. Now we have made that offer (a complete Vietnamese troop withdrawal) to Sihanouk already, and there is still no sign of an imminent end to the external military assistance (to the Khmer resistance parties)."

On an international control mechanism [ICM] to supervise the troop withdrawal, cessation of external military aid and implementation of agreements in a peace settlement:

"If the other side does not like what we have proposed, we are ready to negotiate. Sihanouk has proposed six countries for the ICM. India would be the chairman, which is similar to my proposal. With regard to the ICM, which is different from ICC (an International Control Commission), we don't object to this because at JIM-2 (the second round of the Jakarta Informal Meeting), we talked about a flexible body to handle control and supervision. The other side proposed that the mechanism be organized by the UN. We proposed a role for the UN secretary-general. There can be a compromise between these two positions."

On Sihanouk's condition that the PRK be dismantled before the post-settlement general elections:

"First, the dissolution of the PRK would bring about chaos which the Khmer Rouge could take advantage of; it will lead to the continuation of civil war and an attempt by the Khmer Rouge to return to power. Second, dismantling the PRK would be a violation of the rights of the Kampuchean people. Those who have the right to dissolve the PRK government are the people of Kampuchea, through elections. Third, it would be unjust. In the past 10 years, the other side has been trying to overthrow us by every means, political, economic, and other means. But they have failed.

"I propose to set up a high council of leadership, or any mechanism of that sort, which would be independent. It would have the mandate to implement the peace settlement terms that have been reached. It would draft the election law and hold the elections. The elections will not

be held under the rule and law of the PRK. We just keep law and order in everyday life. This council would perform its duty with assistance from the ICM. The military will maintain its status quo during the ceasefire. The new elected government will have the mandate to organize the armed forces; it may reorganize and keep them or dissolve them altogether.

"We must permit the Kampuchean people to share power. I am prepared to become a farmer, if we lose in the elections. I will not set up any political party or wage any war against the elected government. I will not do anything to go against the verdict of the people."

On the composition of the high council:

"It should be made up of four parties, each on an equal footing with the three other factions. Sihanouk could be the chairman of the council and the three deputy chairmen might be Khieu Samphan, Son Sann and myself."

On Prince Sihanouk:

"Sihanouk's strength right now is that he can count on the support of many foreign countries. The biggest supporter of Sihanouk is China.

"His biggest weakness is that he has no support inside the country. His alliance with the Pol Potists made the Kampuchean people fear him and his alliance. During his first round of negotiations with me, when he began to back away from the (CGDK) coalition government and later on completely resigned, his prestige increased a little bit. After numerous changes of mind, he resumed the leadership of the alliance. If we talk about the game, he has given me an edge, frankly speaking. In this country, people are still very fearful of Pol Pot so when they hear of Sihanouk's alliance with Pol Pot they despise him (Sihanouk)."

Main concerns following a complete Vietnamese troop withdrawal:

"I can give a better answer if we have the accurate position of the Thai government. If the Thai government stops its support of the Khmer Rouge after the pull-out, I can say that this war will not expand. Rather, it will shrink. Thailand can play an important role, by preventing civil war or allowing it to happen in Kampuchea. If Thailand stops providing assistance to Pol Pot, then a civil war will not happen in Kampuchea, and Thailand will have contributed to peace. But if Thailand continues to provide assistance to this group, there could be isolated cases of fighting in some areas.

"I don't think or believe that the key to peace in Kampuchea is in the Chinese hand. Rather, it is in the Thai hand. The Thai people do not want to see a civil war in Kampuchea. I believe that Thailand will adopt an appropriate attitude in order to contribute to peace in Kampuchea.

"Thailand made a promise at Jakarta to stop aiding the other side after all the Vietnamese troops have been withdrawn. Thai leaders made the same promise during my visit to Bangkok last January as well. I believe Thailand will not be like Pakistan in the Afghanistan problem."

On contacts with Thai leaders:

"It would be difficult to say that there is contact. It is also difficult to say there is no contact. We have to look at the prevailing reality because a few years ago there was a possibility of clashes between the Thai and PRK troops. But right now, in border areas where the Thai and PRK armies are face to face, they are very quiet. So it is a good thing, except in certain areas where the Thai army is behind the (CGDK) coalition government's forces.

"That was the result of my meeting with Premier General Chatchai Chunhawan. It was also the result of the good policy of Thai Army chief Gen Chawalit Yongchaiyut, who does not want to see any fighting between Thailand and its neighbouring countries. I support the policies of these two Thai leaders. We have been building a very good bridge of understanding between our two countries."

On the repatriation of Kampuchean refugees:

"We should not wait until we have a political solution to repatriate the Kampuchean refugees. Right now we have received quite a number of families each month, who have sneaked back from the Thai border. Refugees do not want to stay in those border camps; they want to return. That's why we have signed an agreement with the UNHCR [United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees] and discussed the issue with Premier Chatchai. Inside Kampuchea, we have set up four reception centres to help those returnees. In Sisophon, Siem Reap, we will take care of those returnees from the Thai-Kampuchean border. In Phnom Penh, we will care for the old and handicapped who return by air. The centre in Kompong Som is for those who return by sea. In this programme, the UNHCR and the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] will help us. We can receive any number of returnees."

On US Congressman Stephen Solarz's visit to Phnom Penh and President George Bush's Kampuchean policy:

"Solarz's visit could be regarded as a good one. He was the one who opposed the return of Pol Pot. But he has made a big strategic mistake. Right now, he is trying to start a civil war after the Vietnamese troop pull-out. He is preventing an early political solution in Kampuchea. While the Vietnamese troops are leaving Kampuchea, other countries have promised to stop the military aid to resistance groups. Solarz, however, proposed to the Bush administration to provide military aid to the non-communist Khmer parties of Sihanouk and Son Sann.

Although Solarz does not want a return of Pol Pot, he is in fact helping the return of Pol Pot because the US military assistance will go to Sihanouk and Son Sann, the allies of Pol Pot.

"The US has a way to hurt us. We will surely never fail to react. President Bush has taken a step backwards from the policy of the Reagan administration."

On amendments to the Kampuchean constitution:

"Our constitution [was] promulgated in 1981. The situation is not the same anymore. It is like a child who was three years old then, and is 10 years old now. Now the child needs a new shirt that fits. We need to amend our constitution, which covers a number of issues involving economic, foreign and social policies."

On food production:

"Rice production has increased over the past few years. We have enough resources. But there are places where there are surpluses and other places where there are shortages because of the uneven population distribution. That's why we have asked for help from humanitarian international organizations, to help relieve the shortages where there is insufficient rice production."

On budget deficit and inflation:

"The budget deficit is about 8 percent of our total spending. At the moment, our inflation rate is not a matter of concern, but it is not good either. The inflation is caused by both objective and subjective factors. The first cause is that we spend a lot of money to buy grain from the farmers. But the commodities we could sell to the people are in short supply. The objective cause is the influence of the international market, because our price of rice is lower than the international level. That's why members of parliament asked for a stable price for local commodities. My answer is, once the price inside Kampuchea is the same as the world market, the price will become stable."

Che Sim Speaks at Ceremony in Takeo
*BK2704074789 Phnom Penh Domestic Service
in Cambodian 0430 GMT 26 Apr 89*

[Speech by Chea Sim, Central Committee Political Bureau member and chairman of the National Assembly and the National Council of the Kampuchean United Front for National Construction and Defense, at a 22 April ceremony to inaugurate a ritual hall and school building at the Tep Pranom Monastery in Ang Prasat Commune, Kirivong District, Takeo Province—recorded]

[Text] Upon arriving in Kirivong District, we have seen many new changes thanks to the efforts and leadership of the people's committee, the party committee, and the provincial and district people's revolutionary committees, as well as other [words indistinct] throughout Takeo

Province who, mustering all of their physical, mental, and intellectual strength, have stood firm before the situation and the two major tasks of national defense and reconstruction.

In the past 10 years of our rebirth, all of the achievements [words indistinct] scored by the Cambodian people, as well as by the entire people of Kirivong District, are very impressive. In the near future, Kirivong District will certainly become an outstanding, model district among all districts in Takeo Province. This is a great pride to our Kirivong District.

Moreover, I wish to inform all of you about the situation in this new stage of our Cambodian revolution which we are facing in our efforts to settle various problems.

Venerable clergy, beloved uncles, aunts, and compatriots:

It is true that the search for a political solution emanates from the goodwill of our People's Republic of Kampuchea [PRK] and its flexible stance and attitude. We want a political solution. We want to put an end to the bloody war in Cambodia and want the Cambodian people to live peacefully and happily so that we will be able to mobilize all of the people's forces to build a nation. It is true that after liberation, what a nation needs most is sufficient and complete security and stability. But the situation of our Cambodian revolution in the past 10 years was contrary to this; we have been confronting both peace and war, both the defense and construction of our country, (?and) a political solution to the Cambodian problem. At a time when the situation of the Cambodian revolution is at a stage in which fighting must take place along with negotiation in order for the negotiation to achieve the greatest results, we need to attack the enemy forces even more vigorously in order to make them even weaker and more demoralized, and lose their fighting power even more seriously. Moreover, we must implement our clemency policy by appealing to the forces in the enemy ranks to return to live with their families and the revolution. These are the essential tasks we must carry out.

Concerning the political solution, our PRK has continuously endeavored to seek a political solution to the Cambodian problem. This is genuine goodwill and a flexible stance and attitude of our PRK in seeking real justice and happiness for our people and an end to the bloody war in the Cambodian land.

Judging from and through the discussions and all of the conditions put forth by all groups in Jakarta, we can see that the three opposition groups always resorted to many schemes in their strategy to topple the PRK [words indistinct]. For example, the stance that Samdech Sihanouk set forth and tried to impose on us. Our PRK side cannot accept Samdech Sihanouk's whole idea. The other side always adheres to whatever demand we cannot accept. For example, Sihanouk demanded that the PRK be dissolved before the elections. Venerable clergy, all uncles, aunts, and compatriots present here, are we

willing to dissolve the PRK before the elections? We have been controlling the state power for more than 10 years now. The state power is in the hands of every Cambodian, who are responsible for our own destiny. The enemy's strategy, its strategic scheme in demanding the dissolution of the PRK before the elections [words indistinct] topple our PRK.

We have stressed clearly that if we dissolve the PRK before elections, it would be tantamount to committing suicide. It would be tantamount to opening the way for the return of the genocidal Pol Pot regime.

However, all the venerable clergy must be well aware of Samdech Sihanouk's stance. We have all along been well aware of Sihanouk's stance. It is tricky, cunning, and wavering. Today he said this. Tomorrow, he will say something else. Earlier, he resigned from his position in the tripartite Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea [CGDK]. But, now he has resumed the post in this tripartite CGDK. Previously, he seemed to sever his link with the CGDK, seemed to move a little bit away from the genocidal Pol Pot-Leng Sary-Khieu Samphan regime. But now, Sihanouk has returned to put up with the genocidal Pol Pot-Leng Sary-Khieu Samphan regime again; he has willingly rejoined the tripartite CGDK. He has even taken up the post of chairman of the national defense council. This is just a smokescreen to conceal the genocidal regime. His acceptance of these two positions is tantamount to opening the way for the return of the genocidal regime.

Are all venerable clergy, uncles, aunts, compatriots, students, and teachers willing to allow the genocidal regime to return? We have not yet forgotten our misery under the genocidal regime. Our rancor, all of our people's rancor, is still seething. Therefore, we must closely consider whether or not there will be a political solution. There are only a few months left from now to September. The PRK's announcement on 5 April 1989 on the withdrawal of the Vietnamese army volunteers not later than September 1989 did not mention the issue of whether there is a political solution or not. But, after this, countries in the world analyzed the announcement and surmised that this withdrawal of Vietnamese army volunteers is a unilateral withdrawal, a withdrawal even if no political solution is reached.

I would like to inform all the venerable clergy, uncles, aunts, and compatriots that in the situation of our Cambodian revolution, there will be no problem of whether there is a political solution or not. We will still continue to make efforts to reach a political solution, but a political solution can be reached only after the three Cambodian opposition parties agree to compromise and are willing to make mutual concessions. However, the three groups demand that we make concessions too excessively, to the point that we cannot make them. This is what we must consider. From now until September 1989, the PRK party and government and our Cambodian people throughout the country must assume total

responsibility by ourselves without the Vietnamese Army volunteers or Vietnamese experts. We must be responsible for everything ourselves. Thus, all people and all clergy must take responsibility for ourselves. To realize our tasks, to be able to take the responsibility, I would like to draw the attention of our participants to some measures as follows:

The first point is that in order to successfully carry out our offensive in the new situation, we must have strong political measures. Most importantly, we must educate our people so that they will have the highest level of political consciousness. We must make efforts so that every one of us takes part in national defense and construction, our entire nation can clearly distinguish friends from foes, and our people become the combined forces in the tasks to defend and rebuild our country.

The second point concerns military measures. The main military measure is the building of our Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Armed Forces [KPRAF] in the three categories—regular, regional, and village and commune militia forces—which are the innate forces directly responsible for defense work. Who are responsible for this task? All the people are the ones to carry out this task, to decide on and be responsible for it. To build the armed forces with sufficient quantity and quality depends on all our people. It requires them to make sacrifices by allowing their husbands and offspring to serve in the three armed forces—regular, regional, and militia forces.

Moreover, concerning all provinces and cities throughout the country, each province is itself responsible for the defense of the territory, state power, security, social order, and every people's peaceful life. Villages and communes also have the same responsibility as the provinces. Each village is responsible for its own area. Any village, any district is responsible for its own. Each of our people must be responsible for all of these destinies. We cannot let other nationalities and countries do this on our behalf. They can help us only for a fixed period of time. For example, all of the Vietnamese Army volunteers will be withdrawn in September 1989 whether there is a solution to the Cambodian problem or no. Thus, we must be responsible for ourselves.

In addition to this, we must correctly and splendidly implement our front and rear policies. If we can correctly and splendidly carry out these front and rear policies, we will certainly be able to build armed forces with sufficient quantity and quality which are capable of assuming the responsibility.

Who will do this and who is to implement it? Who is responsible for this task? Every person is responsible for this task under the leadership of our Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party and our Kampuchean people's revolutionary state power. This state power is the state power of the people. Leading cadres at all levels are the

offspring of the Cambodian people. The KPRAF, including the police force, are also the offspring of the Cambodian people. They work in the service of the Cambodian people's interests. Every Cambodian person must regard all members of the armed forces and cadres at all levels as his own offspring.

If we understand this—and this is possible—it would become a great force of broad national union for rallying immense forces to totally ensure national defense and reconstruction. This is an essential task that we must carry out.

In the same military measure, in addition to building the armed forces, we must continue to vigorously attack the enemy along the border as well as in the interior of the country, particularly within the interior of our Takeo Province and Kirivong District. We must do our best so that the enemy will not be able to enter Takeo Province. Therefore, we must know how to use the combined forces, including the force of every Cambodian.

In addition to attacking the enemy militarily, we must also carry out a political movement to persuade the forces in the enemy ranks to give themselves up to our revolution. We have carried out this work for the past more than 10 years and we will continue to implement this measure even more vigorously. We must appeal not only to the forces within enemy ranks, but also to the neutral forces and even those forces opposing us—calling on them to join our revolutionary forces. All these are important measures to which we must pay attention.

We know that all the uncles and aunts present here have also offered their sons and husbands to serve in the armed forces. [applause]

'Decision' Issued on Industries, Handicrafts
*BK2804110189 Phnom Penh Domestic Service
in Cambodian 2300 GMT 25 Apr 89*

[“Decision on state policy toward small industries and handicrafts within the framework of the family-run, privately held, collective, and joint state-private economic sectors” adopted by the recent second national conference of party cadres, held in Phnom Penh—date not given; read by announcer]

[Text] I. Objectives and Requirements:
Our country's industrial development must start from small industries and progress toward the big ones. This is the process of transforming a self-sustenance economy into a market-oriented economy. For this reason, the party regards vigorously promoting the production of consumer goods and the means and tools for production and widening service activities as an economic and social strategy of great significance for both the immediate and long-term periods in the country's advance, aimed at tapping all kinds of potentials, such as capital,

equipment, domestic and foreign raw materials, vocational know-how, inventive ideas, labor force, and production means; giving society the amounts of merchandise necessary for production, daily consumption, and export; helping to meet employment needs and provide technical and vocational training for the workers; and, step by step, creating a basis from which to advance toward production of scale, enabling the state to increase its income, mobilize capital for the production bases, train management cadres and skilled workers, circulate goods, and solve other livelihood problems in the society.

II. Principles:

In order to expand the activities of small industries and handicrafts, the state must encourage and create the conditions for the people, cadres, personnel, and workers to vigorously develop the family-run, privately-held, collective, and joint state-private economic sectors, and must strengthen and expand the state-run economic sector so that it can fulfill its role as the genuine foundation of the national economy. The state must recognize the right to equality and permit people to engage in production and exploitation businesses that conform with party policy, and must motivate all economic components into making full use of their potentials, steadily increase and develop production forces, broaden production and circulation of goods throughout the country, and gradually broaden the market with foreign countries. The state must see to it that there exist specific laws, orders, regulations, and guidelines regarding production and exploitation within the framework of the family-run, private-held, collective, and joint state-private economic sectors.

The state guarantees that it will not nationalize or dissolve these production and exploitation bases provided their activities are in conformance with party policy and state laws. The state does not interfere in the production and exploitation work of small industrial and handicraft bases, and must create facilitating conditions for these bases both during the time their permits are being sought and their operational period. The owners of small industrial and handicraft bases have the duty to correctly implement party policy and strictly abide by the law.

III. Policy Toward Small Industries and Handicrafts Within the Framework of the Family-Run, Private-Held, Collective, and Joint State-Private Economic Sectors:

1. Categories of businesses and goods permissible for production and exploitation:

Encourage all economic components to open small industrial and handicraft businesses and engage in various services which are useful to society and not harmful to national security and the social order.

Focus on promoting the production of necessary consumer goods, such as food, clothing, furniture, school equipment, traveling gear, and other necessities for livelihood, cultural materials, and art works. Promote traditional handicrafts, such as the trade of goldsmith and so on. Encourage the production of all types of agricultural implements, the processing of farm produce, the production of transportation means and construction materials, and repair services. Encourage the production of goods for export and goods to replace imports. Pay attention to promoting service businesses which serve the social life. At the same time, come up with strict measures banning a number of productions and businesses, such as the production and repair of weapons, the production of a number of explosives and chemicals, counterfeiting, and so on.

Specific orders and guidelines should be issued regarding businesses and productions that affect public health, the environment, and state-run production and exploitation, and businesses dealing with the use of explosives, energy, natural resources, and major raw materials.

2. Science and technology:

It is necessary to encourage and promote science and technology for small industrial and handicraft production bases in order to improve the production system, techniques, and specialization. Import additional production equipment and machinery aimed at increasing production in terms of number, quality, and good appearance. Economize on raw materials and parts. Diversify production. Production bases have the right to sign contracts with scientific and technological research individuals or institutions to purchase their technology and scientific and technological cooperation inside the country or with foreign countries. It is imperative to encourage citizens who use capital provided by their relatives and friends living abroad to set up production networks with advanced technology by implementing the import-tax exemption or reduction policy. Pay attention to accelerating study and research on sciences and technology by granting bank loans for the import of necessary instruments.

The state encourages the discovery of new technologies and new products, confers certificates of invention, and grants permission to sell these certificates according to state procedures. It is permissible for craftsmen to get technical training at state-owned factories and enterprises during their period of training on industrial techniques, or to go abroad for further training at the personal expenses of the craftsmen or of the owners of production and exploitation bases.

3. Policy toward the Protection of Small Industries and Handicrafts:

According to his labor, capital, and technical possibilities, every citizen may engage in production and exploitation businesses in whatever form, within the framework of the family-run, private-held, collective, and joint

state-private economies, and enjoys the protection and facilitating conditions provided by the state for production and exploitation activities.

Each production and exploitation base has the right to possess its own production means and other resources and the right to make all legally acceptable decisions on production and exploitation work and on its own products.

The state must recognize lawful competition among the production and exploitation bases, and encourage both the quantitative and qualitative increases in the production of goods in response to the preference of the consumers and for export. Each production and exploitation base having legal competency in society and ownership over legally procured properties, personal estates, and real estate is protected by law. Encourage all economic components to participate in joint ventures or to voluntarily contract to go into joint ventures with the economic bases. This is aimed at broadening production and exploitation.

Privately held, collective, and joint state-private production and exploitation bases must first secure state permission before they can be activated. The state must create facilitating conditions for examining and granting permission in a timely manner to all requests to do lawful businesses, recognize and protect trademarks and labels of goods, and punish the producers of counterfeit goods.

4. Policy on equipment, raw materials, and replacement parts:

Locally available equipment, raw materials, and replacement parts:

The state must have plans to grow industrial crops and exploit timberlands and aquatic products to be able to gradually supply state-owned small industrial and handicraft production bases. Encourage small industrial and handicraft bases to invest in developing the sources of raw materials. The state must have plans to supply some important equipment and raw materials to small industrial and handicraft bases. Besides, the state permits the owners of production and exploitation bases to purchase equipment and raw materials directly or through joint ventures with the provinces or cities within specific limits so as to avoid an unconstrained, monopolistic, and anarchical rush to find and get them. Separate limits will be set concerning tobacco leaves, latex, and rubber. Taxes on raw materials should be levied only once at their places of origin. Localities with sources of raw materials should be given a proportionate part of the taxes to encourage preservation and development of the sources of raw materials.

Imported equipment, raw materials, and replacement parts:

Producers may procure equipment, raw materials, and replacement parts from foreign countries by using hard currency or exporting and bartering their products, by

getting them from relatives and friends living abroad, or by purchasing them from legal companies engaged in the import and export business.

5. Capital Sources:

The state encourages family-run, privately held, collective, and joint state-private small industrial and handicraft production bases to operate on their own resources that can be supplemented by bank loans or loans in hard currency from relatives and friends living abroad and reimbursed in the forms of personally owned hard currency or in products that are allowed to be exported; and to buy state-owned hard currency for the import of machinery, equipment, raw materials, and replacement parts and for paying the wages of foreign experts.

6. The Work Force:

Allow privately held, collective, and joint state-private small industrial and handicraft bases to hire additional workers and experts proportionately to the real needs and the prevailing conditions. Contracts must be made between the owners of the production and exploitation bases and the workers on the basis of consensus. The owners of the production bases and the workers must abide by the work safety and social security rules. The collective mass of workers and production bases must set up trade unions according to the directives of the Kampuchean Federation of Trade Unions.

7. The Circulation of Products:

Production bases have the right to freely sell products whose raw materials have been procured by the bases themselves, products turned down by the state, and products exceeding production contracts with the state. Regarding the made-for-export goods, the production bases may put them on sale at state-owned trading shops to get hard currency or export them.

8. Taxes:

In order to promote small industries and handicrafts, it is imperative to give favorable treatment more to the production and service businesses than to the trading businesses. Avoid imposing multilevel, multiple taxes, and prevent all negative phenomena.

The production and exploitation bases have the duty to implement the state policy on taxes. Pay attention to easing up or lifting altogether taxes on bases producing farm tools, production tools, export goods, and goods to replace imports and bases which accept goods for production for a fee or which sell its products to the state.

IV. Organized Implementation:

All party and state institutions and mass organizations at all levels must launch an organized campaign to spread this decision as widely as possible among the masses of people so that they can vigorously participate in production and exploitation. The Council of Ministers must give a specific instruction on how to effectively implement this decision.

Returnees Reported in Kompong Cham Province
*BK2804095589 Phnom Penh SPK in French 0400 GMT
28 Apr 89*

[Text] Phnom Penh, 28 Apr (SPK)—The Province of Kompong Cham, some 100 km northeast of Phnom Penh, welcomed back to the fold 137 returnees, including 66 Pol Potists, during the 1st quarter of this year. These returnees handed over to the local authorities 61 assorted weapons and other war materiel.

Hun Sen 'Expected' To Support Sihanouk
*OW2804040089 Tokyo KYODO in English 0320 GMT
28 Apr 89*

[Text] Hanoi, April 28 KYODO—The prime minister of the Vietnam-backed Kampuchean Government, Hun Sen, is expected to propose that Kampuchean resistance leader Prince Norodom Sihanouk be named head of state of a new Kampuchea after the completion of Vietnam's troop pullout by September 30, according to an authoritative Vietnamese source.

Hun Sen will make the proposal when he meets with Sihanouk for their peace talks in Jakarta on May 2-3, the source said. He is also expected to tell Sihanouk that his government is ready to change the official name, national flag, and anthem of the country into the new ones suitable for a new Kampuchea, the Vietnamese source said.

The forthcoming Jakarta peace talks between the leaders of the two warring Kampuchean groups are expected to be a major turning point leading toward a political solution to the 10-year Kampuchean conflict, the source said.

Sihanouk, president of the three-party resistance coalition opposing the Hanoi-backed Heng Samrin government in Phnom Penh, had earlier made it known that he would not reach any conclusions on Hun Sen's proposals but would only listen to the proposals during the Jakarta talks.

Indochina watchers also believe that Sihanouk and Hun Sen will discuss a plan to hold a general election in the new Kampuchea after the Vietnamese pullout, under the supervision of an international peace-keeping organization.

The same Vietnamese authoritative source said his government has great hopes of Japanese Government assistance to new Kampuchea.

Touching on an earlier joint statement released by Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos on April 5, the Vietnamese source said the three Indochinese countries are flexible regarding the composition of an international peace-monitoring organization for Kampuchea.

Under the joint statement, the Indochinese side proposed an international monitoring group based on the 1954 Geneva Agreement, involving India, Poland, and Canada.

The Vietnamese source, however, said the Indochinese group will not necessarily stick to those three countries, indicating that there is room for compromise on the members of the proposed international peace-keeping organization for Kampuchea.

So far, China has said that Vietnam should not select members of such an international group but it should be formed at the initiative of the United Nations.

Sihanouk Rejects Hun Sen's Elections Plan
*BK2804074889 (Clandestine) Voice of the Khmer
in Cambodian 0430 GMT 28 Apr 89*

[Text] Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, president of the Cambodian coalition government and of the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia, said the Cambodian coalition government would categorically reject and consider null and void the general elections announced by Hun Sen of the Heng Samrin regime, regarding them as illegal and unacceptable. The samdech made this remark in a statement released on 27 April in which he stressed that it is the votes to be given by the foreign lackey regime to the more than one million Vietnamese living in Cambodia that will make these elections an act of betrayal against the Cambodian nation and people. He pointed out that the Heng Samrin regime propped up by the Vietnamese Army has no right whatsoever to organize general elections in Cambodia. Therefore, the Cambodian coalition government that he heads would reject and declare nonvalid any general elections to be conducted outside the framework of his five-point proposal drawn up for a definitive settlement of the Cambodian problem.

Lately, the Heng Samrin regime announced that general elections would be organized within three months following the Vietnamese military withdrawal.

Samdech Norodom Sihanouk said the declaration announcing the Vietnamese troop withdrawal by the end of September 1989 was nothing more than a joke because the withdrawal would be conducted without control and supervision of the United Nations, which is the sole reliable body.

The samdech planned to visit Thailand this Friday before continuing his trip to Indonesia on 30 April for talks with Hun Sen of the Heng Samrin regime.

Soviet, Chinese Officials Talk in Beijing
*BK2604134489 (Clandestine) Voice of the Khmer
in Cambodian 0430 GMT 26 Apr 89*

[Text] The spokesman of the Soviet Embassy in Beijing disclosed that talks between Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev and Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Tian Zengpei continued Tuesday, yesterday, in preparation for the Sino-Soviet summit meeting to be held from 15 to 18 May.

Igor Rogachev arrived in Beijing on Saturday to hold talks with Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Tian Zeng-pei, who is a specialist on Soviet Affairs. The spokesman did not disclose what points these two officials are discussing. There are only 3 more weeks to go before Mikhail Gorbachev arrives in Beijing for the summit meeting with Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping.

Observers believe that the Cambodian issue, which is a major obstacle to Sino-Soviet rapprochement, is the most important item on the agenda of the talks. The Soviet Union is the most important provider of military and economic assistance to Vietnam in its occupation of Cambodia and war against the Cambodian resistance forces [words indistinct]. It is not known when Gorbachev's talks will end.

The Chinese news agency reports that General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Zhao Ziyang, currently on a visit to North Korea, said in Pyongyang [words indistinct] major issue to be discussed at the Sino-Soviet summit. Zhao Ziyang told North Korean President Kim Il-sung that Moscow is in a position to do something for a political solution to the Cambodian problem.

Laos

Leaders Attend Second Day of FLTU Congress
BK2704145789 Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao 1200 GMT 27 Apr 89

[Text] As reported earlier, the second national congress of the Federation of Lao Trade Unions [FLTU] continued for the second day this morning.

At the session, the congress heard views expressed by more local and foreign delegates. Present as honorable participants sitting in the presidium of the meeting were Comrade Kaysone Phomvihan, general secretary of the party Central Committee and chairman of the LPDR [Lao People's Democratic Republic] Council of Ministers; comrade members of the party Central Committee Political Bureau—Nouhak Phoumsavan, Phoumi Vongvichit; and other party and state leaders.

Most of the delegates expressing views at this morning's session of the congress were from foreign countries. Only two local delegates delivered statements during the morning session.

Consecutively giving their views at the congress this morning were: the head of the delegation of the Hungarian Trade Unions Central Council, the head of the CSSR trade union delegation, the head of the delegation of the Hungarian Trade Unions Central Council, the head of the delegation of the Mongolian Trade Unions Central Council, a representative of the Cuban workers delegation, the head of the delegation of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the head of the delegation of the All-Korea Federation of Trade Unions, the head of the

delegation of the Sandinist Workers Federation, the head of the delegation of the Thai National Labor Council, and the head of the delegation of the Asia-Pacific Trade Unions Coordination Committee.

In their views expressed at this morning's session of the congress, the foreign delegates stressed the important roles and responsibilities of trade unions and laboring people in each country in standing side by side with the people of the world to fight for peace, independence, democracy, and tranquility and against the arms race carried out by the capitalist superpowers. They also pledged to give sincere support, cooperation, and assistance to the Lao trade union organizations and laboring people of all strata in the tasks of defending and building the country into a prosperous entity.

Resolution Adopted at Closing

BK2804034689 Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao 0213 GMT 28 Apr 89

[Resolution] adopted at the closing ceremony of the second national congress of the Federation of Lao Trade Unions held in Vientiane on 28 April—read by Mrs Amphonnali Keola, deputy secretary of the congress]

[Text] The second national congress of the Federation of Lao Trade Unions was convened in Vientiane from 26 to 28 April with the participation of 371 delegates, including 280 full delegates.

1. The congress heard and discussed the political report on the orientation and tasks undertaken by the first FLTU Executive Committee, analyzing certain weak points and remaining shortcomings which must be overcome by all of us in the immediate future so that a guideline will be created for our activities in the years to come. The congress heard a lecture given by our beloved and respected comrade, General Secretary Kaysone Phomvihan. We regard this lecture as a significant direction for Lao trade union movements in the immediate and long-range future.

2. The congress studied, discussed, reached complete unanimity on, and approved the amended FLTU regulation, regarding it as the standard for consolidating and developing trade union organizations into strong and all-round bodies. The amended FLTU regulation becomes effective officially on 28 April, 1989.

3. The congress conducted a vote to elect the new FLTU executive committee to organize a triumphant and fruitful execution of the direction and foreign and domestic tasks stipulated in the political report.

4. The FLTU congress pledged to cooperate with the Lao Front for National Construction, the Lao People's Revolutionary Youth Union, the Federation of Lao Women's Unions, and other organizations in organizing the implementation of the fifth, sixth, and seventh resolutions adopted by the fourth Lao People's Revolutionary

Party Central Committee, as well as the state laws, regulations, and plans. It pledged to exert efforts to train the Lao workers and laboring multiethnic people to become masters of their own destiny with a high level of cultural, technical, and scientific standards. It also pledged to consolidate and upgrade the worker-peasant alliance and alliance among the people of all strata.

5. Our Lao workers pledged to exert efforts to closely strengthen the solidarity, special relations, and all-around cooperation among Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia, and to increase our solidarity and all-around cooperation with the workers and laboring people in the USSR and other fraternal socialist countries. We pledged to promote our solidarity with international trade unions organizations as well as with workers and laboring people throughout the world, and stand ready to fight together for peace, peaceful coexistence, and international cooperation.

Philippines

Aquino Denies Reported Laurel-Bush Meeting

HK2704133789 Manila Radio Veritas in Tagalog
1300 GMT 27 Apr 89

[Text] President Aquino has denied reports that Vice President Salvador Laurel has met with U.S. President George Bush. In a statement, the president said that the only executive official she thinks Laurel met was Acting Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs William Clark Jr.

Earlier, Laurel's aide said in an interview that the vice president was summoned by a senior official to meet Bush, and added that the meeting was not publicized because of protocol problems. He did not say what had been discussed by Laurel and Bush.

Salonga Favors Early Resumption on Bases Talks

HK2604100189 Manila Radio Veritas in Tagalog
Company DZRH in Tagalog 0800 GMT 26 Apr 89

[Text] Senate President Jovito Salonga said that the early resumption of the U.S. bases' negotiations would greatly help the Aquino government. Cesar Chavez of Mobile 9 has the details:

[Begin recording] [Chavez] It is better if the resumption of the U.S.-R.P. [Republic of the Philippines] military bases agreement takes place before the year is over. In this way the senators can give their opinions regarding the issue. This was Salonga's reaction to President Aquino's statement that the bases negotiations may resume before the year ends. He said the earlier this is done, the more sectors that can participate with the government in issuing a stand on the military bases. The bases treaty ends in 1992.

[Salonga in English] I would welcome a discussion on the bases at the earliest possible time so as to give a chance to all the participants, not only the immediate participants but also the people, to have their inputs on the bases question. I think this is so fundamental that the president would be well advised to take into account the opinions of the various sectors [words indistinct].

[Chavez] Salonga believes that Mrs Aquino's statement on the resumption of negotiations could be linked to the U.S. Government's invitation for a state visit. [end recording]

Labor Chief Assails Treatment of Base Workers

HK2704094589 Manila Radio Veritas in Tagalog
Company DZRH in Tagalog 0800 GMT 27 Apr 89

[Text] A Cabinet member has criticized the U.S. Government for its unequal treatment of Filipino workers inside its military bases in the country.

In his speech before the Rotary Club of Manila, Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon assailed the U.S. Government for allegedly not giving equal opportunity to Filipino base workers. Drilon claimed that most Filipino workers are qualified to occupy certain positions, but these were only given to American nationals. He said that the government cannot ignore this, hence, he has urged those concerned to give priority to the working conditions of the base workers in the next bases labor agreement talks.

[Begin Drilon recording] What we want is, should there be a negotiation, that the interest of our workers at the bases should be given utmost priority because they are our countrymen. There are about 60,000 workers at the bases, but only about 22,000 are on the U.S. Armed Forces payroll, while the remaining 48,000 are on the payroll of Filipino contractors. [end recording]

Aquino Optimistic About Appeal

HK2804103189 Manila Radio Veritas in Tagalog
0900 GMT 28 Apr 89

[Text] President Corazon Aquino is optimistic the United States will react positively to the accusation by Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon that the Filipino workers at Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base were being discriminated against. Earlier, Secretary Drilon claimed that there is a different pay scale for the 60,000 Filipino workers at the bases.

The president issued the statement in an interview with Malacanang newsmen where she also announced that in view of the forthcoming labor day celebration, she will meet with some 150 labor leaders in order to discuss programs directly benefitting the labor sector.

Here is an excerpt of the interview where the president spoke on labor, oil price and wage hike issues:

[Begin recording in English] [Reporter] Secretary Drilon said the American treatment of Filipino base workers is unjust, [words indistinct].

[Aquino] Well, I have mentioned this, as a matter of fact, to Ambassador Platt because Secretary Drilon had asked for my assistance with regard to some of the issues that they were having problems with. So I hope that the American side will listen to the appeal of Secretary Drilon so that we can resolve this matter as soon as possible.

[Reporter] Any development on the oil price hike of P [peso]1 per liter in June? Have you decided on this?

[Aquino] No, that is not in June. I had said before that the price increase will probably come after July because I had emphatically told them that this will have to come at least after the beginning of the school year. So, the increase will probably be effective on August 1.

[Reporter] What measures will you take in case Congress [words indistinct] on the minimum wage issue before May 1?

[Aquino] Well, I think that Speaker Mitra has already said that they will not be able to finish it before May 1, but I hope that soon after they will be able to come up with an agreement...and to an agreement with the Senate. And hopefully, they will take into consideration our administration bills.

[Reporter] Ma'am, will you meet with labor leaders on May 1 and announce labor benefits?

[Aquino] I will be meeting them. In fact, they will be here for breakfast, I mean, about 150, I think. And I will be announcing some of our programs which will directly benefit our labor sector.

[Reporter] Ma'am, how true is this report by this group that's called the Colonel Nick Rowe Brigade that had warned that all Soviet and Chinese nationals are supposed to be giving support to the CPP-NPA [Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army]?

[Aquino] Well, in fact, yesterday General de Villa was here, and he did not mention anything about that case. I had just been inquiring from him into his reports about the status of the investigations on the Nick Rowe killing. [end recording]

Work To Begin on Land Near Clark Air Base
*HK2804043589 Quezon City Radyo ng Bayan
in Tagalog 0400 GMT 28 Apr 89*

[Text] The government will begin work on the 10,000 hectares of land near Clark Air Base in preparation for the withdrawal of U.S. military facilities in 1991. The funds used to set up the infrastructure for this project will come from the sales of Fort Bonifacio and Camp Crame lands. This plan is contained in a study carried

out by an interagency group headed by Leonardo Mariano. Possible projects to be set up in the base are: an export-processing zone, international retirement zone, corporate farms, an international airport, and an aircraft maintenance complex.

Rowe Killing Said To Narrow Bases Options

HK2804083289 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY GLOBE in English 28 Apr 89 p 4

[Editorial: "Talking About a Bases Treaty"]

[Text] Whatever else it was designed to accomplish, the assassination of Colonel Rowe may have compelled Mrs Aquino to begin talks this year with the United States about a new bases agreement after the current MBA [Military Bases Agreement] expires in 1991. A new basing arrangement is, of course, the last thing which the communist rebels want; but the talks, scheduled for sometime this year, will at least bring the national debate on the bases to a head, something which they no doubt welcome.

In announcing her decision, Mrs Aquino was careful to stress that the Rowe slaying had not influenced her in any way. This may be true or this may be a case of denying the Left any satisfaction from having forced her hand. In any case, whatever led her hand to the deed is less important than the decision to negotiate itself.

In the view of Mrs Aquino and her foreign affairs secretary, that decision does not erase her options-open policy, by which she had managed to stonewall up to now national debate on the issue. This is at best a half-truth.

Even the most generous reading of this decision must sooner or later acknowledge the fact that one major option has been closed by it: and that is non-renewal of basing arrangements after 1991 for reasons of national sovereignty, pride, and non-involvement in superpower rivalry.

No matter how much Secretary Manglapus splits hairs over the question, the options that remain for our government have narrowed to a few. The bases talks may still fail to produce an agreement, but that would only be because the parties could not agree on the terms. More likely, because this is exactly what the Aquino administration wants, an agreement will be reached after a decent period of haggling and threatening each other, and then Mrs Aquino or Manglapus will forthwith report to the nation how the good of the country and the national interest prevailed in the negotiations.

In a way, this has always been the direction to which Mrs Aquino has been paddling, even while she was proclaiming to the heavens the openness of her options. A decision to close the bases always looked remote in the horizons of her presidency in the light of the administration's persistent importunings to Washington for money and support.

But such as it is, a decision to end the options-open stance is infinitely preferable to a posture of indecision, while the clock is ticking away closer to 1991. Taken close to the MBA's termination, a decision to negotiate would only have brought on railroaded talks.

We agree with Senator Salonga that the stage is now set for a full-scale discussion of all the issues relating to the bases. And it can include not just the narrow options on the negotiation table, but the very abortion of the talks themselves and the possibility of non-ratification of a new bases treaty.

Detained Rebel Leader Comments on Rowe Slaying
HK2704040589 Manila Far East Broadcasting Company in English 2300 GMT 26 Apr 89

[Text] The killing of U.S. Army Colonel James Rowe shows that the New People's Army [NPA] has shifted to quality targets. This was the statement made by Rodolfo Salas, alias Kumander Bilog, alleged chairman of the Communist Party of the Philippines, in a newspaper interview. Salas was arrested in September 1986 and has remained in detention in Camp Crame ever since. He said the killing of Rowe proves that the NPA is implementing a recent decision to shift to quality targets in its urban operations. He said the killing of the U.S. Army official is a political gain for the rebels, compared to other targets in the past, including the three American servicemen who were gunned down by their hitmen in October 1987 outside Clark Air Base in Angeles City. According to Salas, the impact of Rowe's slaying should prompt the Americans to question their government's intervention in Philippine affairs.

Letter Issued by 'Colonel Nick Rowe Brigade'
HK2804032589 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY GLOBE in English 28 Apr 89 p 1

[“Letter” issued 28 April by Colonel Nick Rowe (CNR Brigade)]

[Text] Col Nick Rowe Brigade
Manila Philippines
April 26, 1989

Two months ago, REMIGIO NEPOMUCENO, a Filipino businessman was brutally murdered in Angeles City by the military arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines, the New People's Army. His only mistake was to organize a Pro-American Bases Rally, in pursuit of the Constitutionally guaranteed RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY and FREE SPEECH. In the same breath the CPP/NPA/NDF [Communist Party of the Philippines—New People's Army—National Democratic Front] thru their political fronts, have openly organized and staged Anti-American Bases rallies but remained unmolested.

To the CPP/NPA/NDF, however, any peaceful assembly of men expressing contrary sentiments, HAVE NO RIGHT TO LIVE. They simply rule by the BARREL OF THE GUN and wield the power of life and death over ordinary and FREEDOM loving citizens.

April 21, 1989, COL JAMES NICHOLS ROWE was treacherously felled by Communist bullets. He was murdered simply because he was an American. NICK ROWE had no blood debts against anybody but the NPA killed him as a manifestation of their hatred to the SYMBOL OF DEMOCRACY. The United States must not impose AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC IDEOLOGY on us Filipinos and when they do, any American becomes a fair game to the CPP/NPA/NDF.

But sad to say the CPP/NPA/NDF are forgetting that their very own COMMUNISM is a borrowed ideology from KARL MARX of RUSSIA and MAO of the PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA whom they owe their allegiance, no matter how deep a denial they make. From the RUSSIANS and CHINESE COMMUNISTS they get financial assistance and military training. TO US, THEREFORE, ANY RUSSIAN AND CHINESE COMMUNIST IS A FAIR GAME ALSO.

Let this be a warning to all RUSSIANS and CHINESE COMMUNISTS now in the Philippines whom we know provide direct assistance to the CPP/NPA/NDF, including DENMARK from where JOSE MARIA SISON, the Chairman of the Communist Party of the Philippines, is safely soliciting funds to overthrow and change our present DEMOCRATIC system of government.

[Signed] JOSE SAGRADO LIWANAG
COMMANDER
CNR BRIGADE

Soviet Union Denies Charge
HK2804050389 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY GLOBE in English 28 Apr 89 p 1

[By staff writer Dionisio Pelayo]

[Excerpt] A newly formed rightist group named for the fallen U.S. Army Col. James “Nick” Rowe has threatened to kill Soviet and Chinese nationals staying in the country in retaliation for the assassination of the Joint United States Advisory Group officer in Quezon City last Friday.

In a statement dated April 26 and distributed to the news media yesterday, the “Col. Nick Rowe Brigade” accused both the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China [PROC] of providing financial assistance and military training to the communist New People’s Army, which has claimed responsibility for the Rowe murder.

The statement was signed by a certain Jose Sagrado Liwanag, who styled himself as commander of the ultra-rightist brigade.

28 April 1989

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The statement said: "The CPP/NPA/NDF [Communist Party of the Philippines—New People's Army—National Democratic Front] are forgetting that their very own communism is a borrowed ideology from Karl Marx of Russia and Mao of the People's Republic of China (to) whom they owe their allegiance, no matter how deep a denial they make."

It continued: "From the Russians and Chinese they get their financial assistance and military training. To us, any Russian and Chinese communist is fair game also."

The Soviet embassy, through a certain Consul Makharov, dismissed the threat as "irresponsible."

Makharov said the embassy is not taking any precautionary steps because it is the duty of the Philippine government to protect foreign nationals in the country.

He also denied that the Soviet Union is providing financial aid and training to local communist rebels. In fact, he said, the Soviet government has condemned the killing.

No one at the PROC embassy was immediately available for comment. [passage omitted]

Manglapus 'Concerned' by Threat
HK2804094189 Manila Manila Broadcasting Company DZRH in Tagalog 0800 GMT 28 Apr 89

[Text] The Department of Foreign Affairs as well as the USSR and PRC Embassies in Manila are deeply concerned about a reported threat issued by an unknown organization called the Colonel Nick Rowe Brigade to kill Soviet and Chinese officials in order to avenge the killing of U.S. Army Colonel James Rowe.

Speaking at a regular press briefing to diplomatic reporters, Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul Manglapus said that the news is alarming, adding that it is exactly the kind of thing that a democracy like the Philippines is seeking to avoid. According to Manglapus, the present administration is endeavoring to broaden democracy to enable all elements, whether leftist or rightist, to participate in the country's democratic process.

Manglapus also said that the government hopes to see leftist elements laying down their arms and taking part in a political dialogue in the country. He added that both leftists and rightists should establish their own respective parties instead of forming gangs.

Meanwhile, U.S. Embassy spokesman Jerry Huchel said they are still probing the source of a report about the Colonel Nick Rowe Brigade. He also said that U.S. Ambassador Nicholas Platt has been informed of the report but did not give further details.

Here is a statement from Manglapus.

[Begin Manglapus recording in English] If it is true, it is unwelcome news. It is the kind of polarization that a democracy like ours would like to avoid. The reason why we try to broaden our democracy is to [words indistinct]. That is the reason why part of the government's vision is that eventually the extreme left forces will decide to lay down their arms and participate fruitfully in a political dialogue in this country. [passage indistinct] I hope that both the extremes in this country will follow that path - will organize themselves peacefully as political parties participating in the electoral process rather than forming gangs for mutual extermination. [end recording]

Senate Rejects Proposal To Drop Sabah Claim

HK2804041989 Baguio City Mountain Province Broadcasting Company in English 0330 GMT 28 Apr 89

[Text] The Senate, in a 2-hour caucus yesterday, reached a consensus rejecting Malacanang's proposal for an outright renunciation of the Philippines' claim to Sabah. Senate President Jovito Salonga said the country's claim to Sabah cannot be dropped without a firm commitment from the Malaysian Government that it will stop the persecution of Filipinos in Sabah and that it will settle the proprietary rights of the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu.

Australian Hawk's Economic Scheme Welcomed

HK2804120589 Quezon City Sports Radio 738 in English 1100 GMT 28 Apr 89

[Text] President Aquino today said she welcomes the proposal of Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke for wider economic cooperation in the Asia and Pacific region.

The president made the statement to Richard Woolcott, secretary of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, who called on her at Malacanang. Woolcott is in Manila for a 3-day visit as part of an Asian tour to raise support for the proposed economic scheme of Prime Minister Hawke. Hawke has proposed an intergovernmental vehicle for regional economic cooperation in Asia and the Pacific designed to support extended trade and other forms of cooperation.

Military Actions Drive Thousands Away in Negros

HK2804045189 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY GLOBE in English 28 Apr 89 p 7

[By Jaime Espina]

[Text] Bacolod City—At least 1,000 people have fled their homes in the hinterlands of Sipalay town, some 176 kilometers south of Bacolod City, to escape being caught in massive military operations launched in an attempt to destroy New People's Army (NPA) force who overran the "Alpha" company headquarters of the Army's 7th Infantry Battalion in nearby Barangay Caningay, Candoni, last April 18.

This was learned from members of the Negros Relief and Rehabilitation Center [NRRC], a non-governmental organization engaged in relief services for internal refugees. The group was called by Negros Occidental Department of Social Welfare and Development [DSWD] chief Mrs. Josefina Labatorio to aid the refugees.

The NRRC members who rushed to Sipalay last Sunday were, however, not allowed to proceed to Barangay Cabadiangan of the same town where the refugees fled.

According to the team members, they were stopped by Army soldiers led by a certain Captain Jueswe who advised them not to proceed to the village for their own security as massive military operations were going on.

Instead, the team went back to the town and left 142 relief packs of mongo beans, rice, dried fish and noodles with the local DSWD.

Thailand

Military Reports 'Evidence' of SRV Pullback
BK2304041889 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English
23 Apr 89 p 3

[Text] Aranyaprathet—There is evidence of a Vietnamese troop withdrawal from the area opposite the territory under the control of the Eastern Forces, Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila said yesterday.

While touring Chanthaburi on Friday, ACM [Air Chief Marshal] Sitthi was told there had been no sign of a withdrawal opposite Chanthaburi and Trat.

"But here, I was told by military officials that Vietnamese troops have pulled away from the border, and the Heng Samrin forces moved up to take their place," ACM Sitthi said.

"The Vietnamese forces based near the Thai border now have moved 15-20 km from our border," he said.

ACM Sitthi said he was also briefed on the Thai military assessment of Heng Samrin forces' capability which is "inferior to the Khmer Rouge fighters, and about compatible with the Khmer People's National Liberation Front."

Despite the Vietnamese pullout, fighting continues as Heng Samrin and resistance forces battle for strongholds.

When the Vietnamese troops pull away, they often pass on their arms to the Heng Samrin forces, although heavy artillery and tanks were taken back deep within Kampuchea.

SRV Urged To Keep 'Promise'
BK2404011589 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English
24 Apr 89 p 6

[Editorial: "Vital To Watch Hanoi's Pullout"]

[Text] Events continue to stumble towards what seems to be an inevitable agreement on peace in Kampuchea. The day-to-day news is not always good, but on the whole a wide range of negotiations encompassing a good deal of the world point to a military cease-fire and an interim political solution down the road. Some experts believe an agreement could be signed this year.

Anytime is a good time for peace in our unfortunate eastern neighbour. Since the political overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk more than 19 years ago, Kampuchea has suffered a horrible fate. Its years of "peace" under the Khmer Rouge from 1975 to 1978, in fact, made many Khmer wish that war would return. It did, with the Vietnamese invasion, and has continued to this day. Organised brutality has cost the lives of several million Khmer.

But it is clear several important questions remain to be solved. These go beyond the purely internal matters that Khmer must settle for themselves, ranging from the name of the "new" Kampuchea to the rules for general elections that all parties seem to agree are necessary.

Other countries including Thailand have a stake in any Kampuchea agreement, which in any case will be "guaranteed" by many outsiders, including ASEAN member countries. For example, a major question already occupying officials is the future of the Khmer Rouge. One could hope that this group has no future at all, but it appears that as the major military force of the Kampuchean resistance, the Khmer Rouge will be awarded a stake in their country. The size of that stake, and its potential for causing problems, is an important point.

Vietnam's future in Kampuchea has been little discussed. The announcement by Hanoi on April 5 that it will withdraw its remaining 70,000 or so soldiers from Kampuchea by the end of September was rightly greeted with applause from most quarters. Just as rightly, many countries and officials warned against premature celebration.

In the past, Vietnam's communist leaders have promised to withdraw their forces from many battlefields. Then, as their own official histories now state, they left many soldiers and political commissars behind, often disguised as innocent traders or farmers. Indeed, the current leader of Vietnam, communist party boss Nguyen Van Linh, was one of those who secretly stayed in South Vietnam after the communists claimed in 1956 they had withdrawn all their men to the north.

Resistance leader Prince Norodom Sihanouk claimed recently that Vietnam has already begun preparations for a similar operation in today's Kampuchea. He charges that Vietnamese troops are being absorbed into the Heng Samrin army; that Vietnamese advisers remain in control of most Khmer ministries and departments, and that more than one million Vietnamese have settled in his country in the past 10 years.

These are difficult claims to confirm, especially since few want to call Vietnam a liar without concrete proof. But combined with Vietnam's past actions, these claims make it clear that a competent international supervisory contingent must be part of any Khmer peace agreement. Such a group, with adequate staff, should be specifically charged with ensuring that rules concerning Vietnam's withdrawal are neither bent nor broken.

Like many countries, Vietnam has a stake in Kampuchea's future. But its stake must not be all-pervasive. The past 10 years of war and turmoil was instigated by Vietnam's invasion. Hanoi now must allow both Kampucheans and the rest of the world to confirm that it is keeping its promise to get out of Kampuchea. And stay out.

Differing Views Discussed

BK2404120389 Bangkok MATICHON SUT SAPDA
in Thai 16 Apr 89 p 6

[Article from "Choeng At" column: "Three Groupings in the Chatchai Government With Different Lines of Thought About the Indochina Problem"]

[Text] With respect to the joint decision of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia on the complete pullout of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia by September 1989,

1. It must be followed up in order to see whether Vietnam matches its words with deeds. This is the view of the secretary general of the National Security Council and also of an academic who is among the prime minister's policy advisers. The reason is because Vietnam is not trustworthy.

2. It is a tactical move by Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to avoid being accused of acting under orders and pressure from the Soviet Union and China, given the forthcoming Sino-Soviet summit, which might be the case if they waited until after the summit to announce the withdrawal.

3. It reflects the fact that Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia are facing problems in economic and social development, and they realize that they will only encounter more difficulties if they persist in waging the war and fanning up tensions in the region. They will never be able to bring new hope and give a better life to their people if they do not let the fighting end, allow peace to be established, and give priority to economic development and trade relations instead of political and military obsessions.

Although the joint decision on the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia declared by the three countries—which are tied by "special bonds"—may look like a military retreat, it is, in fact, a strategic retreat which is meant to be a political offensive, especially in the context of international politics. This should be given special attention.

The Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia will leave Cambodia free from war and fighting and will give the opportunity to the four Khmer factions to negotiate among themselves in order to achieve a compromise on peace and the formation of a four-party coalition government.

More importantly, it will boost the bargaining power of the Hun Sen faction which, from now on, will look like the prime mover in achieving progress toward a peace settlement.

The conflict and fighting in Cambodia is complicated not only because Cambodia is divided into four factions—the Phnom Penh Government of Hun Sen, the Khmer Rouge, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, and the Khmer Serei faction of Son Sann, but also because each of the four factions is under the influence of world powers which once had interests in Cambodia and now want to regain their influence. They are the Soviet Union, Vietnam, China, the United States and France. The Cambodian problem, therefore, cannot be treated in isolation simply by approaching the four Khmer factions without taking into account the role played by those powers with interests and influence over Cambodia.

Meanwhile, the historical links between Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia must not be overlooked. Their relations can be summed up in the words of Lao party General Secretary Kaysone Phomvihan in the October 1985 publication of the Propaganda and Training Board of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party's Central Committee. He Said:

"In the history of our country, every step taken and every victory scored by our nation under the talented leadership of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, the continuator of the noble task of the Communist Party of Indochina..."

This means that Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia fought shoulder to shoulder in the struggle for national independence against France and the United States. The struggle was at first waged under the banner of the Communist Party of Indochina which later spawned the Communist Party of Vietnam, the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, and the Communist Party of Kampuchea.

The "special" bond among the three Indochinese countries, although viewed by outsiders as a factor of manipulation by big brother Vietnam under the patronage of

the Soviet Union, is something which really exists because it is the historical outcome of a long relationship as well as the policy of the present day.

The problems in Cambodia, which have dragged on since January 1979, stem from the defeat of the United States and its hirelings in April 1975, the subsequent failure and the erroneous policies adopted by the Pol Pot clique, which was closely associated with China, and its final toppling by the military intervention of Vietnam and Laos.

The emergence of the Khmer Rouge, the Khmer faction of Prince Norodom Sihanouk and the Khmer Serei of Son Sann, was nothing but an accidental outgrowth of the united fronts backed by either China, the United States or France.

As for Thailand, it also cannot avoid the political impact exerted by world powers. Although we have only one government, that is, the government led by General Chatchai Chunhawan, there are three groupings with different thoughts on the policy and approach toward Indochina. The first grouping encompasses the thinking of Gen Chatchai and the prime minister's team of policy advisers. Another grouping represents the long-established traditional thinking of the National Security Council and officials of the Foreign Ministry. Their mouthpiece is the foreign minister himself and the Social Action Party. The third grouping reflects the thinking of General Chawalit Yongchaiyut, army commander in chief and acting supreme commander.

The groups around Gen Chatchai and Gen Chawalit seem to have a similar outlook in various respects, such as turning the Indochinese battlefield into a marketplace. However, the moves by the military leadership to forge better relations with the indochinese countries have created suspicions among the prime minister's policy advisers who doubt whether those officers have ulterior motives. On the other hand, the hard line espoused at the Foreign Ministry and the National Security Council, which still mistrust Vietnam and the Soviet Union while looking favorably toward the United States and China, is too stiff to bend with the thinking of Chatchai and Chawalit.

For Thailand, the problem of Cambodia does not concern only what role it should play in order to create benefits for the country and the people, but also how Thailand should try to unify the thinking of the three groups to the advantage of Thailand's place in international politics.

As the administration is moving ahead swiftly and smoothly in the conduct of its foreign policy, members of parliament, meanwhile, should perform their duties properly by checking and preventing mistakes. They should not let things go unchecked.

Prince Sihanouk Arrives for Official Visit
*BK2804134789 Bangkok Army Television Channel 5
in Thai 1300 GMT 28 Apr 89*

[Text] President of the Democratic Kampuchea Prince Norodom Sihanouk and Princess Monique, his wife, arrived at the Air Force Headquarters Airport at 1800 today for an official visit to Thailand as guests of the Thai Government. They were welcomed at the airport by Foreign Minister Air Chief Marshal Sitthi Sawetsila; Khunying Thida Sawetsila, wife of the foreign minister; Deputy Foreign Minister Second Lieutenant Praphat Limpaphan; and senior officers of the Armed Forces. Prince Norodom Ranariddh, Prince Norodom Sihanouk's son, and leaders of the CGDK [Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea], were also present to welcome Prince Norodom Sihanouk. During his visit to Thailand, Prince Norodom Sihanouk will meet Prime Minister General Chatchai Chunhawan tomorrow morning. In the afternoon, he will have an audience with his majesties the king and queen at Chitlada Palace. He will fly to Jakarta, Indonesia on 30 April.

Prince Norodom Sihanouk told reporters that he felt happy with the friendly welcome extended by the Thai Government, especially his scheduled audience with their majesties the king and queen.

PRK Defense Minister Invites Investments
*BK2704094589 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English
27 Apr 89 p 18*

[By Suwit Suwit-sawatdi]

[Text] Kampuchea's Defence Minister Tie Banh has called on Thai businessmen to invest in his country's timber, hotel and tourism, agricultural goods-processing and fishery industries.

Mr Tie Banh, also chief of the Kampuchea-Thailand Economic Cooperation Commission, said in an interview in Phnom Penh: "We are willing to specially welcome Thai businessmen wanting to invest in Kampuchea."

He suggested that Thai businessmen desiring to invest write to the Kampuchean Prime Minister's Office to obtain more information, adding: "As a coordinator of this matter, I will swiftly consider the case."

He said the Phnom Penh regime had already allowed 30 Thai vessels to fish in Kampuchean waters. "We are willing to expand the number of vessels after reviewing the performance of these ships, depending on whether the Thais are satisfied with the result," he said.

In addition, a Thai merchant has won a concession to buy 3,000 cubic metres of Kampuchean timber.

Mr Tie Banh said a number of Thai firms planned to invest in his country, including Loxley Bangkok Ltd which will begin to build an automatic telephone system in Kampuchea next month, the Siam Cement Group which will overhaul beer and cement factories in Kampuchea, the Saha Union Group which will install two floating hotels from Australia and Thai Airways International which will fly from Bangkok to Phnom Penh.

The Kampuchea-Thailand Economic Cooperation Commission has also been set up following the visit of Phnom Penh Premier Hun Sen to Bangkok in January.

Mr Tie Banh complained that so far the commission had not progressed as well as expected because of confusion over the Thai membership.

"We, the Kampuchean side, named Kampuchean members as members of the commission right after our Premier returned from Bangkok, but so far there has been no progress from the Thai side."

He added that his administration was considering building a commercial airport on Koh Kong, opposite Trat, to facilitate the transport of goods. "Koh Kong is in the radius of international air routes. But we need funds to finance the project," he said.

'Direct Contacts' With Phnom Penh Favored
BK2704065589 Bangkok THE NATION in English
27 Apr 89 p 8

[Editorial: "The PRK's Existence Is an Undeniable Fact"]

[Text] One school of thought, to which the Thai Foreign Ministry apparently belongs, has it that all direct contacts with the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) regime of Hun Sen in Phnom Penh must be avoided because they could be wrongly construed as a recognition of the PRK, which is not recognized by Thailand, ASEAN and the UN.

Another school of thought, to which some policy advisers to the Prime Minister are major proponents, sees nothing wrong in establishing direct contacts with the PRK because the PRK is, at the very least, one of the four Khmer parties which will have a significant role to play in resolving the internal aspect of the Kampuchean conflict.

Prime Minister General Chatchai Chunhawan obviously agrees with his policy advisers and thus he invited Hun Sen for an unofficial visit to Bangkok last January.

Hun Sen seemed to enjoy and benefit politically from the international limelight of his visit to Bangkok. He has requested an invitation to stop in Bangkok on his way to and from a meeting with Prince Norodom Sihanouk in

Jakarta early next month. Hun Sen told a group of Thai parliamentarians that he would like to keep the prime minister abreast of all latest developments in the Kampuchean question.

The prime minister has tentatively agreed to invite Hun Sen for an unofficial stopover after his Jakarta meeting. This decision was reportedly made after consulting with Foreign Minister ACM [Air Chief Marshal] Sitthi Sawetsila.

Hun Sen may once again be in the international limelight when he calls on the prime minister early next month. But on the other side of the same coin, the prime minister as well as Thailand could benefit from Hun Sen's presence here too. The prime minister will have an opportunity to probe Hun Sen's thought and, perhaps, find out what can be done to bring about an early political settlement in Kampuchea. Hun Sen's request for an unofficial invitation to Bangkok could also be seen as his show of appreciation of Premier Chatchai's policy of turning Indochina from a war zone into a trade zone by, among other things, restoring peace to Kampuchea.

As the frontline state in the Kampuchean conflict, Thailand has the right to adjust its policy toward this conflict whenever some adjustment is necessary to enhance national security and improve the prospect of a political settlement in Kampuchea. Establishing direct contacts with the PRK is one such adjustment.

It is unrealistic to refuse to talk to the PRK by pretending that it doesn't exist. The UN can deny legal recognition to the PRK but it cannot deny the PRK's existence. Remember the UN used to deny recognition to China during 1949-71 too.

If direct contacts necessarily imply legal recognition and approval of the way a government came to power, then all those countries trading and dealing with Burma now—including Thailand, China, Malaysia, Singapore and Japan—must have approved of the way the Burmese regime of Gen Saw Maung suppressed pro-democracy demonstrators with violence after the coup last September. Yet the Thai Foreign Ministry is a leading proponent to establishing direct contacts with the Saw Maung regime before free and fair general elections are held in Burma.

Direct contacts with the PRK cannot be seen as a denunciation of the policy of putting pressure on Vietnam to withdraw all of its troops from Kampuchea. In fact the policy has already worked in convincing Vietnam to pull out all of its troops from Kampuchea by September (at least such a pledge has been publicly made), and thus it is time for Thailand to adjust its policy.

Direct contacts with the PRK, therefore, constitute a realistic and timely adjustment to the improving situation in Kampuchea.

Further on Ambush of Border Traders Reported
BK2804020189 Bangkok THE NATION in English
28 Apr 89 pp 1-2

[Text] The bodies of at least 30 Kampuchean killed in an ambush near the Thai border on Wednesday [26 April] were found and shown briefly to a group of Aranyaprathet-based reporters yesterday. The Thai military, however, denied reports that people had been killed in the incident.

The reporters, accompanied by Khmer-speaking Thais, brought a wounded Kampuchean who survived the attack to officials of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC officials then delivered the injured man to an ICRC-run hospital in Khao I-Dang refugee camp in Ta Phraya, in Prachin Buri province.

The wounded Kampuchean told the reporters his 70-member group was attacked by soldiers of the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) as they were returning to Kampuchea after selling cattle to Thais inside Thai territory.

Relief workers at Khao I-Dang said 56 wounded were being treated at the hospital.

Figures for the dead and wounded remained inconclusive. Some reports said as many as 60 people may have been killed, and 38 injured, in the ambush.

The reporters were shown the dead bodies and the wounded man at a site some five kilometres inside Kampuchea. The survivor warned of possible danger to the reporters, who stayed at the scene for only five minutes and counted roughly 30 corpses.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant General Narudon Detpradityut, spokesman of the Supreme Command, denied press reports that there were people killed in the ambush. He told a press conference that 40 Khmer resistance guerrillas had been injured when Vietnamese soldiers attacked them inside Kampuchea. He said the incident had not involved border smuggling.

But the surviving Kampuchean, whose legs were hit by gunfire, told the reporters that he and other members of his group had been ambushed as they crossed the border after selling 120 head of cattle to local Thais.

He said he believed the PRK soldiers had attacked because they felt they had not received a fair share of money due from the transactions. The group was led across the border by about 40 paid Khmer Rouge guerrillas, he said.

The bodies of the 30 Kampuchean were riddled with bullets, according to a reporter who visited the scene. He said he saw badly-damaged radio sets scattered in the area.

The surviving Kampuchean said a group of PRK soldiers fired upon the smugglers again early yesterday morning but he said he had managed to escape. He said some in his group had bought the radio sets with money earned from the sale of the cattle.

The reporters said two Thai soldiers of the Burapha Task Force awaited them on their return trip to Aranyaprathet. The Thai soldiers demanded that the reporters turn over their films.

The reporters then met another group of Thai soldiers who confiscated their note books. The soldiers told the reporters that they could reclaim their belongings from officials at the headquarters of the Burapha Task Force in Watthana Nakhon District, Prachin Buri.

One of the reporters said the route they walked to meet the Kampuchean bodies was a new one used for smuggling by Thais and Kampuchean. He said both sides of the passage are ridden with land mines.

The reporter said there were no Thais among the killed or the wounded.

Meanwhile, Narudon said a shell fired by PRK soldiers fell into Site 2, a camp of 179,000 displaced Kampuchean in Prachin Buri. He said four Kampuchean were injured and two houses were damaged.

US Vice President Dan Quayle is due to meet the displaced Kampuchean at Site 2 next week when he visits Thailand as part of an Asian tour.

Committee Fails To Define Borderline With Laos
BK2704080389 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English
27 Apr 89 p 6

[Text] Phitsanulok—Thailand and Laos have again failed to fix a common borderline around the controversial Ban Romklao village, sources said yesterday.

Laotian negotiators had insisted on using a waterway to support their claim that the village is in Laos, the sources said.

Members of the joint Thai-Laotian technical subcommittee for border demarcation flew by helicopter earlier this week to inspect border areas, including mountain ranges and waterways, near Ban Romklao in Chat Trakan District.

The joint team found only a single wooden demarcation post as all others had been destroyed by fire.

The Thai side, led by Prakit Rotchanaphroek, chief of the Foreign Ministry's Treaty Department, referred to a map made in 1960 while the Laotians, led by Boonkde Sangsomsak of the Laos Foreign Ministry, insisted on using a French map made in 1907.

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The Thais argued that the Huang River should be a demarcation line dividing the two countries but the Laotians insisted on using the Huang Paman waterway which is a tributary of the Huang and runs deep into Thai territory, the sources said.

The subcommittee will resume attempts to reach agreement on the borderline next month.

Thai and Laotian forces clashed in a month-long battle for Ban Romkluo early last year.

Commerce Minister Cancels Burma Visit
BK2404104389 Bangkok THE NATION in English
24 Apr 89 Afternoon Edition p 3

[Text] Commerce Minister Subin Pinkhayon has cancelled his trip to Burma this week following outcries over the visit to Rangoon by Deputy Foreign Minister Praphat Limpaphan early this month, an informed source said.

The source said the visit, scheduled between April 27 and 29 and aimed at strengthening trade ties between the two countries, was postponed indefinitely.

Praphat led a 49-member delegation to Burma to discuss a wide-range of issues from bilateral economic cooperation to the exploration of investment opportunities in the socialist country run by the Saw Maung government.

Praphat's delegation was the largest foreign mission to visit Rangoon since Gen Saw Maung assumed power in a bloody coup last September.

The students charged that the visit was tantamount to Thailand's implicit recognition of a government shunned by the international community for its disrespect of human rights. They also accused the government of putting more emphasis on trade opportunities than moral principles.

PRC Tank Manufacture Joint Project Confirmed
BK2304085789 Bangkok THE NATION in English
23 Apr 89 p 2

[Text] Phatthaya—A joint Sino-Thai project to manufacture tanks and spare parts has been approved by the Defence Ministry.

Head of the Defence Industry Department Lieutenant General Chao Khongphunsin said the project between Sugo Engineering Co Ltd and China North Industry Corp requires an investment of 100 million baht.

But he said the venture cannot begin yet because the Chinese still have some problems concerning their capital investment.

The factory would initially manufacture spare parts for Chinese-made T-69 tanks and would later expand operations to cover the assembling of tanks for armed forces of both countries and interested countries too.

He claimed the price of the tanks would be much lower than that of similar tanks produced elsewhere.

The construction of the plant at Lop Buri is expected to take two years.

Chawalit Reaffirms 'Support' for Chatchai
BK2704080689 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English
27 Apr 89 p 1

[Text] General Chawalit Yongchaiyut reaffirmed his support for the Chatchai Chunhawan administration before a gathering of top military leaders last night.

Addressing more than 400 commanders of Army units in Bangkok and the provinces, the Army chief also praised Gen Chatchai's foreign policy, especially his attempt to forge better ties with neighbouring countries.

The event held at the Central Plaza Hotel was also attended by Gen Chatchai and his Cabinet ministers.

Wan Chansu, the chairman of the Prime Minister's advisory board who is said to be Gen Chatchai's top choice for the vacant Senate Speaker post, was present at the meeting.

"What I am going to say, which I believe is the feeling shared by all the officers here, is that we are proud of him (Gen Chatchai) and his Cabinet," Gen Chawalit said.

Praising Gen Chatchai's foreign policy of befriending all Thailand's neighbours, the Army chief said that with the improving world situation "is it wrong for Thailand to try to do everything to create peace?"

He added that although Thailand was looking for new friends who shared the policy of non-violence, she would never forget her old friends.

Gen Chawalit also lauded the Premier for his attempt to help improve living conditions in rural areas.

According to Gen Chawalit, last night's gathering was a thank-you party for the Army officers who had cooperated with him in carrying out work of the armed forces as well as a celebration for many of them who had been appointed to the Senate.

Prasit Said 'Strong Candidate' for Senate Chief
BK2304063089 Bangkok THE NATION in English
23 Apr 89 p 1

[Text] Bangkok Bank board chairman Prasit Kanchanawat yesterday declared his readiness to contest for the top Senate post after the former House speaker was officially confirmed as one of the 94 incoming senators.

Remembered for his famous "What a damned mess!" phrase he frequently used in House debates during his political heydays, Prasit has been tipped to be a strong candidate for the post of Senate speaker, who is ex-officio Parliament president. The other prospective candidate is PM's [Prime Minister's] chief adviser Wan Chansu.

The election of the new Senate speaker, prompted by the omission of former Parliament president Ukrit Mongkhonawin from the list of the legislative appointees, has been scheduled for May 5, PM's Secretary General Gen Panya Singsakda said.

Prasit denied earlier reports that Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan had approached him and asked him to vie for the top Senate post.

Talking to reporters at his Chachoengsao residence, Prasit said he was delighted with the speculation that he would be made the next Senate speaker.

"But I don't know whether the speculation will turn true or not because it has been so far the Press which has appointed me to the post. But if that's true, I am ready to take the challenge," he said.

He added, half-jokingly, "If my friends in the Senate honour me, kha noi (a little man like me) dare not turn it down."

At age 74, Prasit dismissed criticism that he is too old for the challenge, saying: "No problem. A man in the seventies should not be considered too old. Take the premier for instance. You never know from his face that he is older than 70 years."

He said he did not expect the current Parliament to be as troublesome as the one when he was House speaker.

"But the future is uncertain. It could become a mess," he joked.

Prasit recalled that when he was House speaker in the seventies, there were more political parties than there are these days and that the live broadcast of all House debates also prompted MPs to show off to the audience.

He said he will consider proposing a bill seeking live broadcast of all parliamentary debates.

M.R. Khukrit Pramot, asked about the contest between Prasit and Wan, said yesterday he did not want to compare the two's qualifications because "both are my beloved friends."

The premier's mentor also sought to play down criticism against Gen Chatchai's decision to omit former Senate speaker Ukrit from the list of the new appointments. "The post cannot be monopolized. It can be changed depending on the (Chatchai) government," he said

M.R. Khukrit said it was hardly possible that the premier left Ukrit out of the list for fear that he would be re-elected speaker.

Nobody could deny the fact that a prime minister has the prerogatives to appoint senators and that if the premier wants anybody to be Senate speaker, the majority of senators should not oppose his choice, he said.

"The premier does not have to speak out his mind in public. He can let somebody spread his message and in this way, I believe the majority of senators will follow his wish," he said.

Gen Chatchai, however, said he would let senators elect the speaker by themselves. "I won't interfere in their affairs," he said.

Deputy Prime Minister Gen Thianchai Sirisamphan said he will call a meeting of Senate whips May 3 to sound out their views on the candidates to the post.

PM's Secretary General Gen Panya Singsakda said the election could be held on May 5.

Former PM's Office Minister Chan Manutham, one of outgoing senators, said he expected the Senate to elect Prasit because Wan is now helping the premier as chief adviser.

"I believe Prasit is the premier's choice. It will be perfect if Prasit helps the premier control the game in Parliament while Wan aids him in formulating policy advices," said Chan, ex-chief adviser of former premier Prem Tinsulanon.

Head of National Operations Center Viewed
BK2404100689 Bangkok LAK THAI in Thai
10-16 Apr 89 pp 20, 21

[Article: "Major General Thammarak Itsarangkun as Head of the National Operations Center—An Operation To Buy Big Chiu's Heart"]

[Text] General Prem Tinsulanon implemented the policy of putting political operations before military operations during his tenure as commander of the 2d Army Region. The policy evolved into Policy No 66/23 aimed at defeating the communists when Gen Prem became prime minister. While Gen Prem headed the 2d Army

Region, Major Thammarak Itsarangkun na Ayutthaya was one of his favorite aides, but outsiders hardly heard of the major, who also helped draft Policy No 66/23. The former Major Thammarak is now Major General Thammarak, commander of the Army Intelligence Unit.

Thammarak became well known when he headed the 4th Army Region's intelligence section. He played a strategic role in the attack on the Communist Party of Thailand Camp 508 in Surat Thani. Gen Han Linanon was commander of the 4th Army Region at the time and was implementing his Tai Romyen [Peaceful South] Policy.

Thammarak then moved to the Army Operations Center as head of the Army Intelligence Unit. He worked closely with Army Commander Gen Chawalit Yongchaiyut on intelligence and parliamentary political affairs and became a general in the reshuffle last October.

Thammarak's scope of duties as head of the intelligence unit is already broad, but being a rare intelligence "professional" he has been given another duty at Government House to coordinate affairs of the National Operations Center.

Maj Gen Thammarak said: "My duty at the National Operations Center is coordination and evaluation in order to submit data to the government for use in solving specific problems. But my normal intelligence collection duties also continue." He said the National Operations Center will consist of several teams and he will have to coordinate with civilian, police, and other military officials.

In short, his military intelligence duties are much smaller if compared with duties at the National Operations Center. The coordination with the National Security Council and the National Intelligence Center and input of intelligence data from these agencies will make Maj Gen Thammarak an official who holds every national secret.

Thammarak says collection of information and surveillance of military officials are among duties of the Center, which will report to the prime minister. Information about coup possibilities, although not a specific duty of the center, will have to be followed as well because "it is already part of my duties."

Thammarak says: "I am quite certain that there will not be a coup in the near future. A coup depends on the situation and conditions in a certain time period. I do not think a coup aimed at putting an individual in power will ever succeed. But a coup is possible if it is necessary to halt a certain situation to begin anew. Therefore, one cannot say that a coup is outdated."

Thammarak says the National Operations Center is a team formed to serve the government. If it works successfully, the government will be stable. He says the prime minister did not give him special assignments as when he assumed duties at the Center.

In any event, Thammarak notes that his post at the Center is considered political. Because intelligence is the core for stability of a government, a change of government or head of government could result in a change of the individual holding Thammarak's post.

A noteworthy point is Maj Gen Thammarak is loyal to Gen Chawalit. By putting Thammarak in such an important post at the National Operations Center, Prime Minister Gen Chatchai Chunhawan may want to show the soundness of his relationship with Gen Chawalit.

It could be regarded as an operation by both Gen Chatchai and Chawalit to buy each other's "heart" because Gen Thammarak will know every weak or strong points of the government. If intelligence reports are purposely distorted or bad recommendations are purposely proposed, it is certain that the Chatchai government will falter.

If this happens, it will mean that the succession issue in the Army has been worked out and Gen Chawalit is ready to take over the political leadership.

Weakness of Parliamentary System Viewed
*BK2704122389 Bangkok First Army Division Radio
in Thai 2300 GMT 23 Apr 89*

[From "Sayamanusati" feature]

[Excerpts] Dear listeners, when talking about political institutions, everyone will know that there are three major branches: the legislature branch—the parliament, the executive branch —the cabinet, and the judiciary branch —the courts of justice. Among the three branches, there have not been many problems in the executive and judiciary branches. But, there have always been problems in the legislature branch, or the parliament, which needs further development. As a result, this morning I would like to talk to the listeners again on the development of the Thai parliamentary system.

First, we have to accept that the Thai parliamentary system is still in the process of development. However, during the development period, it seems that our parliamentary system has many problems. When compared with the executive and judiciary branches, we see clearly that the legislature branch, the parliament, is still in a relatively weak position. So, we have to help strengthen it. In developing our parliamentary system, some people have suggested that the senators should come from

general elections and some even have suggested a unicameral parliamentary system—only a house of representatives. As a result, a problem of whether we should have a unicameral or a bicameral parliamentary system has emerged. So, let us discuss the history of the two systems. [passage omitted]

Another problem facing the Thai parliamentary system is the electoral method for members of the house of representatives, which is still not good. The members should not only represent their relatives or certain groups of people, but should be the real representatives of the Thai people. There are three important elements for a complete political party: First, it should have a democratic structure with legal registration and should abide by the laws. Second, it should have a political ideology. This will enable a political party to belong to the people because the party will try to use its ideology to establish guidelines for a democratic administrative system with the king as the head of state and clear guidelines for the economic and social system. Third, it should be a political party that people can depend on, able to solve the problems of the people. Looking at these three points, we see that our political parties still lack the major details of these three points. As a result, our political parties have become involved in a nepotistic system. This is the major cause of divisiveness in the political parties. When nepotism plays a role in the political parties, the superiors, or the chiefs of certain groups, will try to become a minister in order to find money to support his subordinates at the next general election. As a result, business and politics cannot be divided in our parliamentary system. Some people have called this political business, which describes the current situation.

In fact, finding money for election campaigns is considered necessary in the free world countries, such as in the United Kingdom and the United States. However, businessmen in these countries do not jump in or become involved in the political circle like our businessmen. They just openly give money to support their candidate. If the parties, which they have supported, win in the elections, their business will be promoted. In foreign countries, not only businessmen but also labor unions donate money to support political parties. For example, during the latest U.S. presidential election, two labor unions, with their 20 million members, donated money to support President Bush to win the election. If every person donates 10 baht, 20 million people will donate 200 million baht. This will not be much less than that of the businessmen or the capitalists. But, in our country businessmen are the politicians themselves and politicians also run businessmen. So, when politics become complicated, the political parties are in chaos. As long as the politicians and parties remain in this state, the Thai parliamentary system will face problems and remain weak.

The weakness of the Thai parliamentary system is caused by the politicians and political parties themselves. When they can not follow the above three points, their parties

follow favoritism and nepotism. It becomes necessary for them to let their superiors or their relatives be the ministers in order to find money to support them. This is a major cause for the weakness of the Thai parliamentary system.

The people are concerned with the parliamentary system and want to help strengthen it. Therefore, they have suggested dividing the legislative authority from the executive authority. The Members of the Parliament (MP's) would only perform legislative duties and would not hold ministerial posts. However, this suggestion would be difficult in practice for the above reasons. Under our parliamentary system and that of the United Kingdom, most ministers are MP's. But, the MP's in the United Kingdom have their ideologies and greater principles. For example, they hold that the government belongs to the Parliament, or the House of Commons. The term of his excellency is used for the British MP's as soon as they are elected. But, this term would not be used for the MP's in our country. This term would be used for them only after they became a minister. Moreover, when the MP's in the United Kingdom are appointed ministers, they continue to sit and work in the House of Commons as usual. But, ours move to work at the ministries. The ministers in that country leave the seats at the ministries for the permanent secretaries because they hold that MP's have to sit at the Parliament buildings. But, in our national assembly, there are no working places for the MP's, but only clubs for dining or billiards tables. So, our parliamentary system is not as stable as theirs.

To develop our parliamentary system, it is necessary to develop both the personnel and the facilities simultaneously. That is, to develop the politicians, or the MP's, with clean and fair elections, and to develop our political parties to become real parties of the people. We should also develop our national assembly building so that all MP's will have their own seats for working at the building. Even the ministers will have to work at the national assembly building and let the permanent secretaries work at the ministries. If we can follow this method, sooner or later our parliamentary system will become stronger.

House Speaker Responds

BK2704141189 Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai
25 Apr 89 pp 1,16

[Text] At the National Assembly on 24 April, House Speaker Pancha Kesonthong answered reporters' questions in response to an Army radio commentary program called "Sayamanusati," broadcast that morning, criticizing the legislative branch, as a political organization, as comparatively weak when compared with the executive and the judiciary branches. The speaker would like to assure everyone that the legislature is not as weak as accused and could see no reason for the program to make such criticisms. "I am really puzzled why the Sayamanusati program made such comments. I don't really know

what kind of intention it has, because we have never shown any weakness. The legislative branch has always done its best as a representative of the people."

He said the legislature does not have any weakness, and this can be proved by the parliamentary performances which have been carried out smoothly. During the period of parliamentary recession, the MP's have performed their duties in various house committees. Therefore, he said, there is nothing that indicates such a weakness. As for the opposition parties, they have done a good job during the past parliamentary sessions, added the house speaker.

Pancha went on to say that there has been some evolution in the legislative institution, comprised of political parties, such as a reduction in the number of parties, in compliance with the objectives of the Constitution. When the Supreme Court issued a verdict for the dissolution of three political parties—literally meaning bringing down houses of MP's—each MP was left the legitimate right to find a new house. He may join another political party. Pancha said he believed that those MP's did not make wrong decisions.

Asked for his comment on the radio program, which said that most of the Thai MP's are not working in the Parliament building, but like to gather in the club or around the billiards tables, unlike those in foreign countries, Pancha said such accusations cannot be acceptable. Take a look at the U.S. Congress, he said, sometimes few members attend an ordinary meeting but when it comes time for voting, they come to vote. They come to work when they see it necessary. After work is done, they relax at clubs. However, in some respects, the Thai Parliament is better than those in some other countries. In some countries, there are fist fights or throwing rotten eggs in the parliament, he elaborated. "I think we should not take some minor issues to undermine the legislative institution but should help promote it," said he.

Reacting to an accusation that the legislature is weak because nepotism and favoritism among politicians in political parties have caused divisions in Thai politics, Pancha said we must understand that in the past 50 years of democratic development in Thailand, not many leaders have become government heads through parliamentary elections. He said that throughout this period there have been only 15 general elections, thus resulting in a lack of continuity in the democratic process. From time to time, the country has been governed by certain groups of powerful people. Therefore we should also look at this aspect. Politics in Thailand would be far more advanced than it is now if it had been handled appropriately. Nepotism in political parties is not unusual in Thailand. It exists in every circle. It does not seem different in other countries either, he said.

"I regard such radio comments as trying to undermine the legislature in our own country," Pancha said. Asked if this shows that the military has always thought that the

Thai legislature is weak, he said he does not want to remark on this point. Asked by reporters if this could be regarded as political interference by the military, the house speaker concluded it is not obvious yet.

Vietnam

More MIA Remains Given to U.S. Representative

BK2704153089 Hanoi VNA in English 1502 GMT
27 Apr 89

[Text] Hanoi VNA April 27—A representative of the Vietnam Office for the Search of U.S. Servicemen Missing in Action delivered here today to a representative of the U.S. Joint Center for Casualties Resolution 21 remains of persons preliminarily identified as U.S. servicemen killed in the Vietnam war.

Up to now, Vietnam has made 26 deliveries totalling 348 remains of Americans missing in action and provided information on 61 other cases.

The representative of the U.S. Joint Center for Casualties Resolution highly appreciated the humanitarian policy, goodwill and cooperation of the people and Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

Normalization Talks With PRC Planned in May

BK2704151289 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese
1430 GMT 27 Apr 89

[Text] Vietnam and China have agreed that the deputy foreign ministers of the two countries will meet for a second time in Beijing from 6-10 May 1989.

Vietnam's First Deputy Foreign Minister Dinh Nho Liem will head the Vietnamese delegation at the second round of talks in order to discuss the question of the normalization of relations between the two countries and other questions of mutual concern, including the Cambodian issue.

Communiqué Issued on Council of State Session

BK2704161289 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese
1430 GMT 27 Apr 89

[“Communiqué of the Council of State”]

[Text] The Council of State met on 25-27 April 1989 under the chairmanship of Chairman Vo Chi Cong.

1. Based on a recommendation by the the Council of State and suggestions by the [National Assembly's] Judiciary Committee and the offices of the National Assembly and the Council of State, the Council of State discussed and gave opinions on how to rectify the draft law on the election of people's councillors in order to publicize it in May for soliciting the people's suggestions. The Council of State stressed the significance of the revision and amendment of this draft law, saying that this is aimed at upholding the role of popularly elected

organs in accordance with the spirit of the sixth party congress resolution, developing the people's right to mastery, broadening socialist democracy, and enhancing the working efficiency of state organs of power at various local echelons.

2. The Council of State heard representatives of the Ministry of Public Health and the National Assembly's Public Health and Social Welfare Committee report on the results of the solicitation of the people's suggestions about the draft law on people's health care and on the rectification of the draft law on the basis of welcoming opinions contributed by the people.

The Council of State warmly lauded the compatriots, combatants, various echelons, sectors, localities, mass organizations, and social organizations for having actively participated in discussions and contributed many realistic opinions in order to continue perfecting this important draft law.

The Council of State gave its opinions so the Ministry of Public Health and the National Assembly's Public Health and Social Welfare Committee and Judiciary Committee can perfect documents before submitting them to the National Assembly for approval at its fifth session.

3. After hearing representatives of the Council of Ministers and the National Assembly's Scientific and Technical, Judiciary, and Economic, Planning, and Budget Committees report on the results of the rectification of the draft law on the protection and development of the sources of marine products, the Council of States passed this law.

The Council of State urged the Council of Ministers and the Minstry of Marine Products to promptly issue documents guiding implementation in order to unify management over the sources of marine products and to improve the responsibility of various echelons, sectors, organizations, military units, and the entire people over the protection and development of sources of marine products—an extremely valuable natural resource of the country—thereby contributing to spurring the country's socioeconomic development.

4. The Council of State heard representatives of the Council of Ministers and the National Assembly's Judiciary Committee report on the rectification of the draft law on punishment of administrative violations and gave its opinions on how to perfect this draft law in order to publicize it for soliciting the people's opinions before official approval is given.

5. As recommended by the chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Council of State decided the following:

—Comrade Dau Ngoc Xuan, Minister [of State] and Deputy Head of the State Commission for Cooperation and Investment, will hold the position of head of the State Commission for Cooperation and Investment;

—Comrade Lu Minh Chau will be released from the position of Director General of the State Bank;

—Comrade Cao Sy Kiem, secretary of the Thai Binh Provincial Party Committee, will hold the position of director general of the State Bank;

—Comrade Huynh Chau So alias Nam Be will be released from the position of head of the State Control Commission;

—Comrade Nguyen Ky Cam will be released from the position of Minister of Labor, War Invalids, and Social Welfare to assume the position of head of the State Control Commission;

—Comrade Tran Dinh Hoan, deputy head of the Ministry of Labor, War Invalids, and Social Welfare will hold the position of Minister of Labor, War Invalids, and Social Welfare;

6. The Council of State decided to confer the Labor Hero title on Comrade Pavel Kymokivich Bogachenko, senior Soviet expert at the Hoa Binh hydroelectric power project site for having made outstanding contributions to the building of the project, thus contributing to enhancing the relations of friendship and cooperation between Vietnam and the Soviet Union.

CPV CC 6th Plenum Resolution Released

Part 1

BK2604135989 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese
1100 GMT 26 Apr 89

[“Part 1” of the Resolution of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee Sixth Plenum held 20-29 March 1989, entitled “Overall Assessment of the Situation”]

[Text] In compliance with the sixth party congress resolution, over the past 2 years at a time when the socio-economic situation has been rife with difficulties, our party, state, and people have renovated many aspects of social life, especially the economy. While working we have researched, drawn upon experience, and obtained important initial results. First, we have found the direction for building the economic structure, begun to shape a multi-element economic structure, and have adjusted a step further the structure of investment toward concentrating on the targets of the three major economic programs.

The renovation of the management mechanism has created a new impetus in production, especially in agriculture. Although the state-run economy still has many

troubles, many good business units have appeared. With the experiences we have acquired, including some concerning price reform, we have obtained additional conditions for shifting state enterprises to cost-accounting business. The above mentioned results have begun to liberate production forces, develop the economy of goods, and create new premises for continually accelerating economic renovation.

Second, the democratic spirit that was brought into play in the course of preparing for and conducting the sixth party congress and has been further developed, is becoming the driving force to accelerate renovation in many fields.

Third, the strategy of national defense has been adjusted to fulfill our tasks on various battlefields, reduce army personnel strength, initially revamp the regular force, and intensify the people's warfare. There have been changes in the defense of political security to suit the new situation.

Fourth, we have strengthened solidarity and renewed multifarious cooperation with the Soviet Union, Laos, Cambodia and other fraternal socialist countries. We are shifting the direction of leadership over the strategy of foreign affairs to step by step open new capabilities and favorable conditions for developing the relations of cooperation with regional countries as well as with other countries in the world.

Fifth, these results are closely linked to the initial achievements in developing the party politically and ideologically, and in cadre organization. Since mid 1988, the above-mentioned new progress and factors have gradually appeared more clearly. The socioeconomic situation has definitely improved. The rates of inflation and price increase have declined a little. The supply of grain and other food products has become less critical. Commodities in the market have increased. Trade operations and preparations for economic cooperation with foreign countries have opened, mobilizing the people to enthusiastically contribute their manpower, wealth, and ability to building the economy. Confidence among the people has increased.

Facts have shown that the renovation line set forth by the sixth party congress is correct. Following this path, our people are step by step overcoming difficulties, opening up new capabilities for concentrating on peaceful construction.

However, as yet our achievements have not been uniform nor fundamental. The socioeconomic situation is still beset with acute difficulties and the economy is developing slowly with meager results. Grain production is not yet steady whereas the population is growing too quickly. The distribution and circulation situation is still confused. The state budget is still suffering an enormous deficit, while the cash situation remains constantly tense and inflation remains at a high level. Prices are still

fluctuating. The material and technical bases of many economic sectors and public utilities continue to degrade. Foreign debt has further increase, and overdue debts cannot be paid. The state's reserves are too thin.

Taking the entire society into account, we can see that the economic mechanism of bureaucratic centralism and subsidization remains heavy. The social situation continues to worsen in many aspects. However, throughout two years of implementing the sixth party congress resolution, we have seen more clearly the directions and measures, and have gained new favorable conditions for gradually extricating our country from the difficult stage.

The socioeconomic difficulties are too great and cannot be overcome rapidly. Renovation has been carried out for only a short time and the situation is changing slowly due to subjective shortcomings.

Over the past 2 years the party Central Committee and the Political Bureau have issued many resolutions to concretize and develop the sixth party congress resolution, and have expounded more clearly with every passing day the contents of renovation in economy, national defense, security, foreign affairs, the ideological and cultural tasks, literature and arts, party development and so on.

State agencies have strived to institutionalize the party resolutions and have organized guidance and implementation. However, there have been major shortcomings in the tasks of party leadership and state management:

A. Leadership and guidance of the Political Bureau over socioeconomic tasks has not met the requirements in some respects. We have taken time in generally reviewing facts to clarify some viewpoints and steps adopted in the renewal of the economic management mechanism. As a result, in some cases we have laid down some policies that were not fundamentally firm, were not timely, and were not consistent effective, especially in the fields of distribution and circulation. Specifically, at times we have fumbled and made mistakes in providing guidance and guidelines for handling the mechanism of administering prices, exchange rates, wages, money, exports, imports, and so on.

We have taken time to provide guidance for establishing and publishing the three economic programs with the scope of determining major objectives and orientations, and key balances to serve as a firm mainstay for formulating annual plans.

We have been slow in guiding the formulation of general projects, measures and steps to counter inflation and renew policies, and the mechanism of finance, currency, and credit. We have not promptly studied and asserted the contents of renovation in some major domains such as education, public health, building new men, the nationalities policy, mass organization task, and so on.

B. The state organs, especially the Council of Ministers, have been slow in institutionalizing the party resolutions; in some cases, this work has not been carried out correctly and consistently. Their solving of major bottlenecks in the policies on tax, price parity, price, money, credit, the right to use foreign currency, and so forth, has been slow and unsatisfactory, causing numerous difficulties to economic activities and the people's lives. Many mandatory norms of the state plans concerning the volume of production, the kinds of goods, and product marketing have continued to be decided centrally and without basis at the upper level while plans for budget contribution and enterprises' financial management work have been neglected and revision of the credit system has been slow. The state organs and Council of Ministers have been slow in concretizing and promulgating policies and laws relating to the collective, individual, and private capitalist economies and in renovating economic management in agriculture, which are areas that can yield quick results.

The management renovation policies expounded in the resolution of the second plenum of the sixth party Central Committee were essential, but the renovation of the planning mechanism and enterprise management has not yet been continued in a well-coordinated and timely fashion, leading to poor results in the implementation of these policies. The state organs and Council of Ministers have been slow in revising and supplementing the legal system, especially economic legislation. The viewpoint and operations of some sectors of the internal affairs system have not yet been uniformly renovated to satisfactorily serve renovation in the economy. At the same time, right-wing deviationism and laxity have been reported in some fields of activities. The various ministries have not yet done a good job of performing their state management functions and solving macroeconomic management problems; they have continued to do many things that fall under the business and production management responsibility and power of grass-roots units.

C. The party and state have been slow in renovating their party-building and cadre organization work. The division of functions between party and state organizations has remained unclear and irrational; many party organizations have continued to take over a lot of managerial work that falls under the competence of the state organs. The structuring and organization of the administrative apparatus has not yet been carried out on the basis of a well-defined and rational master plan. The apparatus organization has remained cumbersome and inefficient.

The party and state have been slow in defining the essence of and devising measures for carrying out cadre planning work and have failed to build a mechanism capable of ensuring the discovery, fostering, and assignment of the right cadres with good qualities and capabilities to the necessary positions. They have failed to promptly replace those cadres who are no longer suitable for their jobs. They have been slow in rejuvenating the contingent of cadres. Generally speaking, though certain

results have been obtained in the restructuring of the apparatus organization and the replacement of cadres, especially in the rural areas and various precincts and districts, these results have fallen short of meeting the requirements of the political tasks.

The party and state have shown a lack of initiative in ideological leadership. They have failed to anticipate the possible emergence of wrong and deviant tendencies and thoughts in the process of renovation and to equip party members and the masses with necessary new perceptions so that they may stand firm and face the new socioeconomic phenomena with confidence. At times they have inclined more toward combatting negativism while doing little to introduce positive factors and achievements. They have failed to promptly check the wrong ideas among a number of cadres and party members and the deviations of some press, publishing, cultural, arts and letters agencies, allowing the bad cultural products to spread for a long time.

D. In their guidance and management, the party Central Committee Secretariat and the Council of Ministers have not yet clearly defined the functions of the organizational system of party and state apparatuses, thereby simultaneously causing overlapping, loopholes, and a lack of coordination in the research on and guidance of the implementation of the various mechanisms and policies. They have failed to exert regular supervision and control over the implementation of major resolutions and policies and to regularly guide good models to promptly review and draw experience from their achievements. They have failed to show firmness and giving guidance, allowing party discipline and state law to slacken for a long time. A prominent shortcoming has been their maintenance for too long a period of the state subsidy system in food distribution. They have not yet correctly solved the problems concerning the grain circulation and trading system and policy, thereby creating permanent tension in the grain supply situation and at times causing unnecessary food shortages and hunger in some places. When encouraging the various economic sectors to develop production and business activities, they have neglected to certain extent their duty to manage, guide, and control the activities of these sectors.

The Political Bureau, the Secretariat, and the Council of Ministers have not yet given due attention to the localities—especially the remote ones such as the mountainous regions, the Central Highlands, the border areas, and the offshore islands—and have failed to devise appropriate and effective methods to lead and guide them closely.

Part 2

*BK2704060189 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese
1430 GMT 26 Apr 89*

[Part 2 of resolution of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee Sixth Plenum held 20-29 March 1989, "dealing with the major viewpoints and orientations of the Central Committee Sixth Plenum for guiding renovation in the next 3 years"]

[Text] Based on the overriding task of the remaining years of the first stage—that of stabilizing the socioeconomic situation in all aspects—in the next 3 years,

1989-91, we will continue to go deeper into the renovation process with the aim of realizing the general goal of stabilizing the socioeconomic situation by an important step and creating further preconditions for advancement. We will be realizing the aforementioned goal at a time when the socioeconomic situation is still fraught with great difficulties. But we also have new capabilities and favorable factors. The material and intellectual potentials of the Vietnamese and the various economic components are plentiful, but they have not yet been tapped satisfactorily. They are the reserve forces for economic development. The viewpoints and policies on renovation in the economic field, which are becoming more and more suitable and standardized, will develop their effect more vigorously in life. The economy will, in the next 3 years, be reinforced with more material conditions, an important part of which will come from major projects that have been started in recent years and will begin turning out products for society. International economic exchange and cooperation between our country and other countries in the world will be increasingly expanded.

In the process of carrying out the renovation process, we must thoroughly understand the following basic principles:

Advancing to socialism is the inevitable path for our country, and this is a clear-sighted choice made by Uncle Ho and our party. Building a socialist Vietnam is the goal and ideal of our party and people. Renovation does not mean changing the goal of socialism, but instead, it means ensuring the effective realization of that goal through the adoption of correct concepts of socialism and suitable forms, steps, and measures. Marxism-Leninism always serves as the ideological foundation of our party and guides the entire revolutionary undertaking of our people.

Renovation in thinking is designed to overcome erroneous concepts and enrich correct concepts about our time and socialism for creative application and development, rather than to break away from the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Renovating the organization and operational mode of the political system is meant to strengthen the party's role of leadership and the state's managerial efficacy and to develop the people's right to mastery; that is, to enhance the strength and efficiency of the dictatorship of the proletariat and make the organizations of the political system operate in a more dynamic and effective manner.

Party leadership is the factor deciding the success of our people's undertaking to build and defend the socialist fatherland. We must criticize the tendencies to negate or belittle party leadership, and at the same time we must attentively listen to and accept sincere views critical of shortcomings in party leadership and party building.

Broadening democracy and developing the people's right to mastery in all fields of social life is both the goal and the driving force of the undertaking to build socialism. Democracy must go together with centralism, discipline, the law, the sense of responsibility, and so forth. Democracy requires leadership, and leadership must be aimed at developing democracy in the right direction. On the other hand, leadership must be exercised with democratic methods and on the basis of developing democracy. Democracy is applied to the people, but strict punishment must be meted to those who undermine the gains of the revolution, security, and social order.

It is necessary to combine patriotism with proletarian and socialist internationalism, and to link our nation's might with the strength of our time under the new conditions.

On the basis of these principles and basing ourselves on the resolution of the sixth party congress and on the conclusions drawn in the review of our practical work during the 2 years of implementing that resolution, in the period ahead we must continue to strongly push toward the renovation process in accordance with the following major viewpoints and orientations:

We must readjust the economic structure by concentrating on achieving the targets of the three economic programs; exploit all sources of investment capital and renovate the investment mechanism; and strongly push forward the implementation of the three national economic programs already elaborated and continue to supplement them. We must focus on the targets of producing grain and foodstuffs and a number of essential consumer goods and key export items. We must formulate a socioeconomic strategy step by step to set the direction for the arrangement of the economic and investment structure in the 1991-1995 5-Year Plan and for the broadening of economic relations with foreign countries.

It is necessary to resolve a number of major issues as follows:

We must adopt comprehensive and uniform measures to resolve the grain and foodstuff problem according to the viewpoint of developing the multisectorial commodity economy.

We must overcome the tendency to practice autarky and to maintain the management mechanism based on state subsidies and monopoly. At the same time, we must step up grain production and formulate a policy on grain circulation and supply based on production and goods exchanges, including import-export activities;

We must satisfactorily carry out the tasks of storing, transporting, and processing grain to create grain reserves at the central level and in each locality. We must strive to achieve self-sufficiency in essential kinds of food grain within the next few years.

Concerning consumer goods, we must step up production, raise product quality, lower production costs and renovate products to meet to large extent the demand for essential consumer goods in the country. We must encourage the use of locally made goods, considering this a practical deed to help promote domestic production.

We must adopt a correct import policy to help supplement the domestic commodity fund and to meet the diversified demands of consumers of different levels of income. We must participate in regulating the distribution of income through the consumption of high-class commodities. At the same time, we must apply a correct tax policy to protect and promote domestic production. In line with this spirit, we must revise and amend the customs regulations concerning consumer goods imported through commercial and noncommercial channels and must control and prevent smuggling.

We must make in-depth investments to better exploit the existing capabilities in heavy industry. We must attach importance to the building of a uniform infrastructure, pay attention to standardizing and fully exploiting the productive capabilities of various engineering establishments to meet the demand for production and repair of work tools, machinery, and equipment to serve agricultural production; the processing of agricultural, forest, and marine products; the production of consumer goods and export items; and transportation. We must formulate a policy to encourage the in-depth renovation of equipment and technology, especially in the establishments producing goods for export.

We must continue to build energy and water conservancy establishments, build uniform electric power sources and power grids, increase investments by tapping many sources of capital and using many forms of investment to gradually overcome the serious degradation of the communications-transportation and information-liaison systems and to develop these two sectors.

It is necessary to adopt policies for drawing capital from various sources, especially those for expanding and developing revenue sources and rationally mobilizing national income, and for strongly attracting capital investments from among the people as well as from foreign countries. Investment plans must cover all sources of capital and all forms of investments, with special attention given to the great sources of capital belonging to the various grass-roots units and the people.

At the same time, the mechanism for using capital investments must be renovated. The capital invested by the state must be concentrated chiefly on building the infrastructure, some key projects designed to serve the implementation of the three economic programs, and some social welfare projects. Other sources of capital at home and abroad must be also attracted under various forms in order to meet these investment targets. For the majority of production and business projects, capital

investments, instead of being covered by budget appropriations, must be made in accordance with the principle by which economic units borrow and repay capital by themselves. The state will satisfactorily carry out its function of guidance and control toward all investments in society and adopt policies designed to encourage establishments and the people to invest mainly in the development of production.

It is necessary to continue renovating the management and planning of capital construction, broaden the application of contract bidding, and completely shift capital construction units to profit-and-loss accounting.

Efforts will be made to reorganize production and circulation, develop a rational and effective economic structure, exploit all the potentials and strong points of the country, and actively participate in the international division of labor in order to vigorously and rationally develop the various production, circulation, and service branches. Attention will be paid to developing branches and trades in the countryside, setting up areas specializing in crop cultivation with a high rate of commercial production, and developing service activities in support of production, business, and life into an important part of the economic structure.

It is necessary to rearrange production and labor at grass-roots economic units and do away with unnecessary intermediary organizations. The state will set the orientations and use chiefly economic measures to create a business environment for accelerating the process of rearranging production and circulation through cooperation, integration, and competition among economic units instead of making arrangements in a purely administrative manner.

For the mountainous regions in the north and the Central Highlands, a review should be made at an early date and plans for socioeconomic development devised on the basis of the national defense and security situation to suit the characteristics and capabilities as well as the importance of these regions. In 1989, the Political Bureau will organize a symposium and adopt a comprehensive resolution on the mountainous regions.

Part 3

BK2704103589 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese
2300 GMT 26 Apr 89

[Part 3 of Resolution of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee Sixth Plenum held 20-29 March 1989. "Dealing With the Party's Viewpoints and Policies Regarding the Multicomponent Economic Structure"]

[Text] It is necessary to consistently carry out the multicomponent economic policy and unleash all production capabilities. The viewpoints and the correct policies of the party Central Committee's Sixth plenum regarding the multicomponent economic structure has been further supplemented and developed through practice:

First, the multicomponent economic policies are of long-term strategic significance, bear the character of the law governing the advance from small production to large-scale socialist production, and reflect the spirit of economic democracy—assuring that everyone can go about his business freely in accordance with the law.

Second, though having their own nature, all forms of ownership in production relations are not separate from one another but rather interrelated.

In a unified national economy guided, controlled, and regulated by the state with the state-run economic sector holding key positions, production and business units belonging to various economic components can either cooperate with and supplement one another while competing with one another on the basis of equality before the law. It is necessary to abolish prejudices and discriminatory treatment and to do away with any attempt to arbitrarily hinder this trend.

Economic units must take the initiative in involving themselves further in specialization and in the development of comprehensive business, trying to broaden their scope of activities and their cooperative business without being limited by the unflexible division of specialization in the fashion of being imposed by people from higher up and without being divided according to administrative boundaries.

Third, the state-run economic sector must be consolidated and developed in such a way that it can firmly maintain its key position in the economy, develop its advantage in technical know-how, constantly develop production output, quality, and efficiency, take the initiative in achieving economic integration and providing guidance for other economic sectors if it is to satisfactorily carry out its leadership role and ensure the stable and effective growth of the entire national economy along the socialist path.

The state shall guarantee the decisionmaking of state enterprises in production and business and create conditions for the state-run economic sector to satisfactorily carry out its leadership role in the economy as well as on the market by means of doing business.

The state-run economic sector must possess a force capable of manipulating the market but it does not necessarily occupy a large proportion in all branches and trades.

It is necessary to create conditions for those branches, trades, and activities in which the cooperative-, family-, and privately run economic sectors can work satisfactorily and can benefit the national economy.

Fourth, as the cooperative-run economic sector has many forms ranging from low to high, all production and business organizations with their capital voluntarily contributed by the laboring people which are managed in

accordance with democratic principles irrespective of the scale, technical standards, and the rate of collectivization of production relations are regarded as cooperatives. According to this spirit, it is necessary to consolidate and develop cooperatives in various branches and trades under appropriate forms and scales in such a way as to spur the development of the production forces and to increase economic results.

Agricultural cooperatives and production collectives are cooperativized economic units having various forms of ownership in production relations. Cooperatives and production collectives shall manage the enforcement of the policy on contracting out land to cooperative members while organizing the doing of business in those projects and economic activities in which work carried out by the collective would produce better results than by each individual family, particularly in production and circulation services, in promoting the application of technical innovations, and in expanding branches and trades. It is necessary for them to join with the administration and various mass organizations in caring for the social welfare of cooperative members' families.

The scope of organization and structure as well as the management mechanism of cooperatives and production collectives must suit the nature and the level of development of each unit as decided by the collective of cooperative members.

Cooperative members' families shall become self-governed economic units. Beside accepting contracts for land use and executing other contracts signed with the cooperatives concerned, they must take the initiative in developing production and business under various forms. The state and cooperatives shall encourage cooperative members' families to prosper themselves while working out concrete policies and measures to provide assistance to needy families so they can have better conditions and strive to surge forward to perform their jobs satisfactorily. The state and cooperatives shall also constantly enhance the relations of solidarity, mutual assistance, and cooperation in the rural area, and continue to settle the question of land dispute in a prompt, fair, reasonable manner.

Fifth, in the condition of our country, the private, individual, small owner, and private capitalist economic forms are still necessary in the long run for the economy and are included in the structure of the commodity-based economy for the advance toward socialism. Implementing this policy, we are carrying out socialist reformation in close association with developing the production force in accordance with the correct concept set forth by the Sixth CPV Congress.

We should pay special attention to two aspects:

On the one hand, we should urgently supplement and amend the current law for a unified application throughout the country in order to uniformly institutionalize

policies toward economic components and abolish irrational prohibitions and restrictions. The rights to own, use, and inherit property; the rights to do business and obtain legitimate income; and the obligation toward the state must be regulated into law in order to encourage everyone to invest in production and business. We must encourage individuals to invest in and do business with branches, occupations, and fields that will benefit the national welfare and the people's livelihood. We must also ensure the state control and regulation system to guide the private economy to gradually advance to a cooperative economy and state capitalist economy under various forms with an aim to develop production and business and to enhance economic results. In this spirit, private traders can carry out business without being limited in scale and area of activities of their production, construction, transportation, and service work which are not prohibited by the law. Private capitalists are not allowed to carry out import-export business, but privately owned production establishments complying with conditions prescribed by the law can make direct contact with clients abroad to export their products and to import equipment and material for production. Bourgeois traders who are carrying out activities in the domestic market are allowed to continue their trade of commodities not prohibited by the law, but the state must satisfactorily carry out the management work.

On the other hand, the state must establish a management mechanism for the multicomponent commodity-based economy, utilize planning and information instruments along with enforcing the law and applying the incentive policy in order to control, guide, and regulate activities of economic components. The state must combine economic measures and the law with tasks relating to motivating and educating bourgeoisie and those who have capital and skills to enthusiastically invest in and carry out activities in compliance with requirements for developing the national economy, overcome misguided spontaneity and the status of inclination on food catering business rather than investing in production, while struggling against such phenomena as illegal trading and failing to fulfill obligation toward the state.

Part 4

BK2804073389 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese
0500 GMT 27 Apr 89

[Part 4 of Resolution of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee Sixth Plenum held 20-29 March 1989, dealing with "the process of renovating the mechanism of developing a planned commodity economy"]

[Text] In the multi-element economy, the social market—including markets for consumer goods, materials, services, investments, and bonds—is a unified body of different forces that participate in the circulation of goods. In this body, the state economy, together with the

economy of cooperatives, surges forward to occupy the position of market control—the countrywide market in connection with the world market—through business procedures.

In the planned commodity economy, the market is both a base and a planning objective. A market mechanism that reflects the evolution of production and goods circulation laws in relations of mutual effect with other economic laws must be consistently applied to planning and economic policies. Economic plans and policies must combine the use of many laws, including market laws, to correctly settle the relations of interests in which the interests of producers and businessmen constitute the direct motive force of economic activities and create premises for meeting other interests.

The state, together with economic measures, constitutes the main tool to manage and regulate the market. The market has an effect on the process of recycling production mainly through prices. In relations of cooperation and competition, producers, distributors, and consumers actively engage in purchasing and selling activities, and agree with one another on market prices. To economic units, these are the business prices that reflect both the value and purchasing power of money while being subjected to the relations of supply and demand.

Domestic market prices are linked to world market prices. The exchange rates between Vietnamese dong and foreign currencies must correspond with both domestic and international market prices. The state only fixes the prices of materials and goods vital to production and life, which are controlled by state economic organizations, but does not give subsidies through prices. Other materials and goods are purchased and sold at agreed prices. Materials in short supply are planned in line with economic targets and tasks, and are sold to users through bidding. The state will not use administrative orders to impose prices, but will largely use economic policies and measures to influence the relations of supply and demand, and to regulate and guide market prices. It will combine economic with administrative measures to eliminate black market and illicit business.

The central task that is simultaneously the departure point for building the management mechanism of a planned commodity economy is to shift all economic units, especially state enterprises, to the system of market-connected business and to operate according to the principles of clearing one's own debts and developing oneself and of fulfilling one's obligations to the state budget. The present key problem is to expeditiously renovate the state economic management mechanism in the direction of eliminating subsidization along with adequately establishing a system of autonomy in production and business of economic units.

Administration agencies at all levels must stop their bureaucratic administrative control over the production and business activities of economic units. The state

economic management function must be aimed at meeting demands, creating environments and corridors for economic units to develop production and business in a dynamic and orderly manner, orienting economic activities toward large-scale plans, ensuring balanced economic development, and correctly settling the relations of interests.

To meet these requirements, the state should renovate and correctly use large-scale management tools. Renewing and enhancing the quality of large-scale planning consists of the formulation of economic strategies and general plans to meet the requirements of planned development, ensuring the major balances of the multi-element economy of commodities, implementing narrow regulating plans, shifting mainly to guiding plans, connecting them with various leverage policies for orientation purposes, and using economic contracts as important tools in formulating and implementing the plans of economic units.

With regard to some major products that are to be controlled, the state will place orders with economic units on the basis of agreed-upon contracts and will only assign regulation norms in case of dire necessity when leverage policies have not been effective enough.

The state should create conditions for primary installations to realize regulation norms; unify the establishment of plans with the formulation of economic policies; inventory and control economic activities; organize economic information well, especially information on market and technology at home and abroad; meet demands for information from leading management agencies and economic units; formulate national finance policy and other specific policies on taxes, credits, money, prices and wages in the direction of eliminating subsidies in order to tap all sources of capital and effectively use the capital; rationally distribute income; and increase contributions to the budget on the strength of encouraging the development of production and business.

These policies must simultaneously create a driving force and press economic units to seek all measures to meet market demands, contribute to implementing large-scale plans, and strive to reduce expenses and conduct profitable business. As an immediate measure, it is necessary to reform the taxation system along with eliminating all forms of subsidization that are hampering the mechanism of cost-accounting business.

On the basis of ensuring that state enterprises can rationally cover production costs and earn satisfactory profits, the state will not arbitrarily fix the prices of materials for state enterprises but will use the form of granting pensions directly to those recipients of social welfare policies in lieu of using subsidies.

State-run enterprises that receive no more subsidies in prices and capital must actively carry out their business with full right of autonomy, pay their own expenses and taxes, and earn profit.

A number of state-run establishments may use capital and share holding forms or shift into state capitalist enterprises to have more opportunities for broadening production and business and for enhancing economic results. The state may temporarily provide aid for a definite period to some enterprises that are producing very essential commodities for the economy but are still unable to cover their expenses. These enterprises should not use this to prolong their losses; if so, the state will bid their properties to other state-run economic organizations or lend or sell them to private collectives.

We must study policies and measures in compliance with real conditions to protect production when the prices of agricultural products or other essential goods in domestic or international markets are too low compared with the normal level. We must establish economic law in the direction of abolishing obsolete regulations, promulgate law and legal documents determining the authority and responsibility and obligation and interest of production and business, establish order and rule for economic activities in compliance with the new mechanism, and increase national reserves, first of all, in grain, fuel, gold, and foreign and Vietnamese currencies, while rationally supplementing the business projects of state-run economic organizations in order to actively cope with unusual market and price fluctuations.

Along with shifting economic units to business mechanism, we must continue to study and review realities in order to resolve a number of other important issues with an aim to uniformly establishing new management mechanisms for the entire national economy such as a management mechanism for grass-roots economic units. We must resolve issues of rearranging the system of organizing production and circulation of material and goods, credit, and money; the relations between state agencies at the central and provincial levels in the field of economic and budget management; and the issue of organizing management apparatus and cadres for the state economic management system and for training and fostering management cadres.

On the basis of consistency in the viewpoint and orientation of renovating the economic management mechanism, we must rationally organize steps in guidance, implementation, and execution of work in compliance with real conditions and steps to fight inflation.

Within 3 years, it is necessary to basically establish a new economic management mechanism and successfully shift the main part of state-run economic units to the full business accounting system to enable them to gain profit.

Part 5

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[Part 5 of resolution of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee Sixth Plenum held 20-29 March 1989; dealing with "anti-inflation" and "scientific and technical development" measures]

[Text] Restraining and gradually dispelling inflation now constitutes the most urgent task, a burning socioeconomic and political issue, and a prerequisite for bringing the socioeconomic situation to a stable and developing position. From actual experience learned over the years, we must clearly define basic viewpoints and orientations for an anti-inflation solution.

In fighting inflation, we must base ourselves on renovating the management mechanism, vigorously switching economic activities to business accounting, actively unleashing production capabilities, and promoting effective production and business.

The process of fighting inflation must be linked with the process of renovating economic management and implementing the three economic programs. All anti-inflation measures must conform to the business system without pursuing the mode of bureaucratic centralism or using administrative orders as a main tool to keep down the prices, secure the sources of goods and money, and maintain control over the market.

We must direct our comprehensive anti-inflation solution at solving a key point, that is, gradually reducing before ending the printing of more money to ensure budgetary spending and to allow the allocation of credit funds through banks. It is necessary to promptly work out uniform policies and measures in order to consolidate and ameliorate the national financial sector, practice thrift both in production and consumption, positively balance the budget, rectify the circulation of money, restore order and discipline in the relations of account settlement, develop credit and banking services in accordance with the business system, gradually stabilize the value of the money, urgently rectify financial and banking operations.

In the process of fighting inflation, along with executing the business system, we must switch from relations based on in-kind exchanges to relations based on commodity-monetary exchange. As the market and price situations continue to fluctuate, we must, on the one hand, take into account the price-increase factor in business accounting, first of all with regard to credit, taxes, and wages and the need to ensure a necessary volume of money in circulation while, on the other hand, make satisfactory use of various macro management tools in order to regulate between supply and demand, trying to prevent unexpected price increases, particularly the prices of rice, gold, and foreign currencies.

We must take appropriate steps to ensure that within 2-3 years' time we can restrain inflation at a level capable of guaranteeing the economic situation. Leadership must be highly concentrated and resolute and must uphold discipline and order.

Fighting inflation is the responsibility of all sectors and echelons and the undertaking of the masses. The entire party and people must concentrate every effort on overcoming the scourge of inflation. It is necessary to create a high singlemindedness and determination from top to the bottom. Anti-inflation measures must ensure the interests of the laboring people, take into account the social psychological factor, and win the support and response from a broad section of population.

Developing the prime-moving role of science and technology must be linked with requirements for developing a commodity-based economy. Science and technology can only become a motive force for socioeconomic development under the conditions where commodity-based economy is developed and where the findings of scientific and technical research are also considered as marketable products.

In the years to come we must carry out a number of essential measures: Along with switching grass-roots economic units to a business system, we must renovate the system of scientific and technical activities along the direction of achieving direct integration with production and business, switching a significant portion of scientific-technical activities to business accounting, and promoting self-financing of the entire or part of expenditures, including wages. On the basis of ensuring the implementation of those tasks assigned to them by higher echelons, scientific and technical research establishments have the right to take the initiative in conducting [scientific-technical] research so they can create for themselves their own operating funds. And when their [scientific-technical] inventions are successfully applied, they may sell these inventions or may be entitled to the profit distribution system on the principle of reaching an agreement with the users. There will be no limitations on the maximum level of income they may have.

Scientific and technical establishments must choose the most profitable investment plans, effectively combine their own research activities with the import of scientific and technical achievements, and raise the level of reception of modern techniques and technology from foreign countries.

We must increase investments for the development of science and technology by tapping several sources of capital. The state budget shall provide for expenditures according to projects with clearly defined objectives to support long-term basic research, key scientific and technical programs, and the building of material bases of a number of important scientific and technical research centers. The bulk of investments in science and technology must be derived from the signing of contracts with

production and business organizations, from credits, from capital contributed by the people, and from capital obtained through joint ventures with foreign countries.

We must urgently formulate a strategy for scientific and technical development closely linked with socioeconomic strategy and renovate the decisionmaking procedures of the organs of party and state leadership at all levels to introduce science into leadership and management activities.

We must develop democracy and uniformly apply numerous economic and organizational measures to create favorable conditions for scientific and technical activities; perfect and satisfactorily organize the implementation of regulations on protecting property right of inventions and innovations; and promulgate regulations on various forms of exams used to select project managers, regulations on assessing and testing the results of research projects, and regulations on buying, selling, and transferring the results of domestic and foreign scientific and technical research. We must set up a credit fund to support the application of new techniques and technology; develop all forms of diversified research and application organizations to promote cooperation and competition among different economic sectors; and broaden information and publicity services in support of science and technology.

We must reorganize the system of scientific and technical research establishments on the basis of the relations of cooperation and integration in the business environment by linking the research and application institutes to the production and business organizations to form scientific research-production complexes and training-research organizations or training-research-production organizations in a number of areas where proper conditions exist. We must dissolve inefficient science and technology institutes, assign more scientific and technical cadres to production and business establishments, and develop various forms of scientific and technical cooperation with foreign countries and overseas Vietnamese. We must implement the collective leadership

mechanism through science councils to determine the orientation and plans of scientific activities. We must speed up the setting up of two national councils for social sciences and technology.

We must renovate the various policies concerning scientific and technical cadres to encourage talented people and put them in important positions. We must ensure the necessary conditions and means for the activities and livelihood of scientific and technical cadres according to the contents of their work and the results of their research, not depending on their managerial functions. We must encourage scientific and technical cadres to increase their income through the use of their grey matter. Proper policies must be adopted to encourage scientific and technical cadres to work in rural and mountainous areas. A system of duly assessing and rewarding scientific talent and valuable results of scientific, technical, and management research must be implemented. A system must be established to consider and grant periodic national awards named after famous personalities of the country. A policy must be devised to effectively attract the talent of overseas Vietnamese.

We must gear all activities of social sciences to research work aimed at renovating perception and thinking methods and promoting social awareness and a socialist personality. We must encourage freedom of thought and creativity. Especially, we must attach importance to reviewing the practical experience of our country, quickly acquire and apply other countries' scientific information and experience in a fashion consistent to our actual conditions, and refrain from all rigid and mechanical imitation.

Social sciences must help promptly clarify all ideological issues, especially in the field of economic and social management, realize socialist democratization, renovate the organization and operational methods of the political system, and must contribute to elaborating the program of socialist revolution in our country and the socioeconomic strategy in conjunction with the strategy for scientific and technical development and the strategy for external economic relations.

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